



RESEARCH PAPER

**The Struggling Democracy in Pakistan: A Case Study of PPP Regime
(2008-13)**

¹Dr. Sharaf Ali* ²Dr. Ghulam Shabbir and ³Dr. Muhammad Kashif Ali

1. Associate Lecturer, Department of Political Science & I.R., University of Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan
2. Assistant Professor, Department of History & Pakistan Studies, University of Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan
3. Lecturer, Department of History & Pakistan Studies, University of Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan

***Corresponding Author:** shaarif.ali@uog.edu.pk

ABSTRACT

This qualitative study aimed to evaluate the performance of PPP regime during the period (2008-13) by locating those factors due to which the PPP regime lost its government in the next elections. The PPP regime successfully completed its constitutional tenure of five years in 2013 but could not be re-elected for the next term. This study highlighted the various gray areas in performance pattern of the PPP regime and systematically listed the factors due to which the PPP regime became unpopular in the eyes of the general public. The study has mainly used the descriptive and case study method for achieving the objectives of this research. This study concluded that the poor performance in various areas of public service delivery resulted to weaken the credibility of PPP regime in the public eye, and accordingly the PPP regime had lost her political mandate in the next elections which were held in 2013.

KEYWORDS Political Performance, Political History, Political Deliverance, Pakistan People's Party

Introduction

In most part of the political history of Pakistan, the political parties have been found to be more interested in ensuring their victory in the 'electoral process' than of caring for the political deliverance i.e. according to the aspirations of their respective electorates. Most of the elections were held either under the command stick of military or after the ruins of military dictatorships. Pakistan has faced three periods of military dictatorships and it is noteworthy that after the end of every dictatorial period the PPP has managed to win the majority. The election 2008 was shaped by the multiple factors and in the context of the dying regime of General Musharraf. The factors included the returning of the exiled popular leadership of the PPP and PML (N) and the popular lawyers' movement for the rule of law and restoration of judiciary. Earlier, in November 2007, Musharraf proclaimed emergency to settle his scores with the uncompromising supreme judiciary alleging the country was facing a serious crisis in the wake of increased militancy and political chaos due to uncompromising behavior of the supreme judiciary (BBC, 2007). Further, Musharraf proclaimed a controversial 'National Reconciliation Ordinance' (NRO) to provide general amnesty to the overall political leadership in general and especially to the leadership of PPP. The NRO ordered to roll back the corruption and other criminal cases against the long persecuted political leadership of major political parties (Siddiqi, 2011). Further, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in a public rally at Rawalpindi in December 2007 gave the upcoming elections its final shape.

The Elections 2008 were held in the turbulent security environment and under the pseudo-democratic regime of General Musharraf which mainly aimed to backlash the democratization process in Pakistan. Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarian (PPPP), the electoral wing of the PPP won the majority seats (95 out of 248 in the National Assembly) and formed the government in collaboration with the Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Jama'iat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) and PML (N). Later, the PML (N) left the coalition and sat on the opposition benches. The PPP regime completed its

constitutional tenure of five years in 2013 but could not be re-elected. This study aims to review the performance of PPP regime during the period (2008-13). Further, this study aims to highlight the factors contributing to the loss of political mandate in the Elections 2013.

Literature Review

The performance of a democratic regime plays the fundamental role in the longevity of its rule, even, same is true for a non-democratic regime. It is believed that the better performance enhances the legitimacy and longevity of a democratic regime, whereas, the poor performance may decrease the public trust over a democratic regime. It is not meaningless to say that it may be difficult for a democratic regime to be re-elected if it fails to deliver according to the demands of the public effectively. As Lipset (1981) have noted that 'effectiveness' means the actual performance in the eyes of the public. Further, Lindse & Ekman (2003) have noted that 'the perceived performance' has to deal with the both e.g. what a regime have actually delivered successfully and what it has refrained from delivering deliberately. In other words, credibility and longevity of democratic regime is not only dependent on its ability to deliverance but also on the reluctance to deliver e.g. as per the public perception.

The primary elements of the modern liberal democracy are the citizen who equally share in the rights guaranteed under a constitution and work as the final decision makers regarding the issues of public interest by choosing their representatives upon whom the legislative and executive powers are vested e.g. through regularly conducted election after a specified time period. In any democratic system of government citizen wield the final veto power over the policies of government as they can oust any government if their policies do not regard to their common will or if the elected government ignores its primary mandate (Shuffa & Jinglie, 2008). The democratic system of Pakistan has been shambling due to the growing trust deficit between the public and ruling elites. When it comes to the internal structure of the political parties, none of them are truly following the democratic principles (Tahir, 2008).

The scholars have explained the drawbacks of the democratic structure of Pakistan in many ways. Some of them held the complex and non-transparent electoral setup responsible for the election of less responsible democratic governments. Others have pointed out the poor quality of the political leadership which had weaker roots in the public and were less loyal to serve the public interest in general. Many scholars have also advanced the economic arguments to explain the deficient performances of different democratic governments in Pakistan, their focus has been to establish a correlation between the poor economic background and behavior of the political forces. Many of them have questioned the poor popular base of the mainstream political parties. There are many who raised questions regarding the degree of compatibility between the Islamic principles of democracy and the doctrines of modern liberal democracy (Weinbaum, 1996).

In most of the democratic states, the public office holders e.g. the legislative and executive are chosen by the voters of their respective constituencies. Since, ideally the elected officials feel themselves bound to support the legislation or other public policy which represents the demand of their respective electoral constituencies. The main reason why people conform to majority opinion in the electoral politics is because of their vested interest in the support they need from the public for getting re-elected in the upcoming elections (Malhotra & Rothscild, 2013).

Political parties in a liberal democratic system reflect the actual leadership supported by the masses. In Pakistan, however, political parties have weak political base and have been used by the powerful elite (military, corporate, religious and feudals) as an instrument to gain or legitimize the power to rule in country (Akhtar, 2000). Consequently, the public feels disenchanted with the political parties and have less trust on the political leadership. Another contradiction existed in the political parties of Pakistan is lack of democratic practice in their internal structures; one feels astonished by knowing that such kind of parties claim to be struggling for 'Democracy' in Pakistan (Zain, 2010).

After the independence from the British imperial in 1947, Pakistan inherited a multi-party system which was shaped by the cultural diversity, pluralism and ideology of Pakistan. On the onset of election 2013, there were total 216 political parties registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan (Pakistan Today, 2013). Pakistan has experienced tumultuous democracy with the persisted military takeovers due to the poor structures of political parties. Political parties suffered a severe blow due to the party-less elections in 1985. Although, the party system was restored in 1988 but no single party was in a position to form its government, the result was the emergence of fragile coalition governments. After the elections of 1988, most of the times the two major parties, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN) won majority and managed to form governments at federal level by forming coalition with the regional and small parties (Waseem: 2007).

The following data would reflect that the election 2008 resulted into a hung parliament as the political mandate was split among multiple parties and no single party was in the position to form government i.e. independently. In the aforesaid election, the Pakistan People’s Party secured highest number of seats (n = 89) in national assembly. Further, two factions of Pakistan Muslim League i.e. PML (N) and PML (Q) were emerged as the second and third biggest parties by securing sixty-eight and forty-two seats i.e. in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

Table 1
Table 01: Party wise distribution of National Assembly Seats after the Elections- 2008

Name of Party	Votes (%)	Seats (n)
PPP	31%	89
PMLQ	23%	42
PML (N)	20%	68
MQM	7%	19
ANP	2%	10
Independent	11%	30
All Others	6%	13
TOTAL	100%	271

Table 2
Party wise distribution of National Assembly Seats for the Punjab Province

	Punjab-1		Punjab-2		Punjab-3			
	All Punjab		(North and Central)		(Western)		(South)	
	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)
PPP	29%	44	27%	13	25%	8	34%	23
PML-Q	29%	28	26%	4	29%	11	32%	13
PML-N	30%	64	40%	46	26%	6	20%	12
Independent	11%	13	7%	6	20%	6	10%	1
All Other	1%	1	0%	-	0%	-	4%	1
	100%	150	100%	60	100%	31	100%	50

Legend:

Punjab-1	North and Central (Rawalpindi, Gujranwala and Lahore Division)	Punjab-3	South (Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur Division)
Punjab-2	Western (Sargodha and Faisalabad Division)		

Source:http://pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf

Table 3
Party wise distribution of National Assembly Seats for the Sindh Province

	All Sindh		Sindh-1 (Karachi)		Sindh-2 Rest of Sindh)	
	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)
PPP	44%	32	24%	3	55%	29
MQM	30%	19	69%	17	7%	2
Independent	3%	1	2%	-	3%	1
All Others	23%	9	5%	-	35%	9
	100%	61	100%	20	100%	41

Legend:

Sindh-1	Karachi (Karachi Division)	Sindh-2	Rest of Sindh (Mirpur Khas Hyderabad, Sukkur and Larkana Division)
---------	----------------------------------	---------	--

Source: http://pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf

Table 4
Party wise distribution of National Assembly Seats for the KPK Province

	All KP		KP-1 (Malakand)		KP-2 (South)		KP-3 (Peshwar)		KP-4 (Hazara)	
	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)
ANP	16%	10	17%	2	6%	2	38%	6	1%	-
JUI-F/MMA	12%	4	7%	-	24%	3	10%	1	1%	-
PML-N/IJI	12%	4	3%	-	2%	-	4%	-	40%	4%
PML-Q/O	14%	5	16%	2	10%	1	15%	-	29%	2%
Independent	24%	13	14%	-	46%	11	8%	1	5%	1%
All Others	22%	10	43%	4	12%	1	35%	5	24%	-%
	100%	46	100%	8	100%	18	100%	13	100%	7

Legend:

KP-1	North (Malakand Division)	KP-3	Peshawar Valley (Peshawar, Mardan Divisions)
KP-2	South (Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat Divisions)	KP-4	Hazara (Hazara Division)

Source: http://pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf

Table 5
Party wise distribution of National Assembly Seats for the Balochistan Province

	All Balochistan		Balochistan-1 (Quetta Zhob Zone)		Balochistan-2 (Kallat-Makran Zone)	
	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)	Votes (%)	Seats (n)
PPP	22%	4	23%	2	22%	2
PML-N/IJI	4%	-	8%	-	1%	-
PML-Q/O	5%	4	23%	1	23%	3
JUI-F/MMA	13%	2	23%	2	6%	-
Independent	24%	3	13%	1	33%	2
Regional/Others	34%	1	10%	1	15%	1
	100%	14	100%	6	100%	8

Legend:

Baluchistan-1: Quetta Zone included the Zhobe and Quetta Divisions
Baluchistan-2: Kallat-Makran Zone included the Naseer Abad, Sibbi, Makran, and Kallat Divisions

Source: http://pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf

Material and Methods

This study mainly deals with the description and explanation regarding the performance of the political institutions in the historical context. Keeping view of the nature and objectives of the study, this study has employed descriptive research methods. Further,

for achieving the purpose of this research the researcher has primarily used the secondary data sources, and accordingly, the researchers have conducted a systematic literature review of the relevant published material i.e. Books, published reports of the various think tanks, periodicals, research journals, news reports etc. After conducting an extensive and systematic literature review, the researchers have presented the relevant facts in the form of results/discussion, conclusion and recommendations i.e. by adjusting the relevant facts according to the scope of this research.

Results and Discussion

In the context of the pre-election political scenario, the most pressing concern for the contesting political leadership was to revive the democratic process and to strengthen the spoiled democratic institutions—a concern which was reflected in the election manifestos of all major political parties (Afzal & Sameen, 2013).

After the elections, the arch rivals in the history and opponents at NRO e.g. the PPP and PML (N) joined to form the coalition government which then was interpreted as a positive sign for the sustenance of democracy in Pakistan. Further, the PML (Q), a major partner of NRO with PPP was not invited to join the coalition and PML (Q) was marginalized to sit in the opposition benches. The situation was changed in the later years and the PML (Q) joined the coalition government replacing the PML (N). In the pretext of a decade long military rule of General Musharraf, the election-2008 resulted to create a hung parliament and a resultantly a weak coalition government was formed under the Zardari-led PPP regime. Despite of its failure to practice the good governance, the PPP regime steered a number of structural changes in the overall politico-constitutional structure of state. The major notable successes of the aforesaid Zardari regime included the restructuring the NFC award, securing provincial autonomy and re-activation of the Council of Common Interests i.e. through successfully passing the 18th Constitutional Amendment.

It important to overview the context under which PPP took reins of power into her hands, a meeting between Mr. Nawaz Sharif (the leader of PML-N) and Mr. Asif Ali Zardari (Co-chairman of PPP) was held in Murree to discuss the political formula and political agenda for the newly elected regime (The News, 2008). Accordingly, both the leaders signed an agreement to form the coalition government by declaring that their government will reinstate the deposed judges of the Supreme Court within thirty days after the formation of federal government. Later, Mr. Yousaf Raza Gilani from the PPP was nominated as prime minister who was unanimously elected by the parliament on 28 march, 2008. Following is the critical review of the potential causes of failure in performance for the PPP regime.

Confrontation with Judiciary

Confrontation with the supreme judiciary made Musharraf unpopular in the last days of his reign. In March 2007 he sacked CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary in typical dictatorial way which resulted a strong public resentment and popular movement was started under the leadership of the prominent lawyers. Musharraf took this malicious step in the backdrop of CJ's bold stances taken against the controversial policies regarding the privatization of the state enterprises and extrajudicial detentions by the security agencies.

In the wake of the emergency imposed by Musharraf on November 3, 2007, the deposed CJ Iftikhar Chaudry and the other judges of the supreme court were kept under allegedly preventive house arrest. This whole situation was turned against Musharraf regime due to the amplified coverage by the privately owned electronic media. The deposed CJ Iftikhar M. Chaudhary became a symbol of justice and rule of law. Aiming to win the popular support, the major political parties e.g. PML (N) and PPP also vowed to restore the deposed judges in case they won the upcoming election 2008. The PPP chairperson, Benazir Bhutto in her public statement outside the house of CJ demanded the restoration of all the deposed judges which was assuredly a reflection of the public sentiments (Wasim, 2007). She was assassinated later before the conduct of election on December 28, 2007. Her brutal

assassination in addition to her vision affected the election 2008 and result turned in favor of PPP.

The newly elected prime minister of PPP, Yousaf Raza Gilani in his first address to the parliament ordered to release the CJ and other deposed judges from the house arrest in March 2008. Despite of the pressure from the mass media, the legal community and a coalition partner PML (N), the PPP government remained reluctant to restore the deposed judges of the superior judiciary which prompted the public resentment in the early months of its rule. In response to this unwanted behavior of PPP regime, PML (N) left the coalition and the famous lawyers' movement for the restoration of judiciary regained its momentum (Abbass, 2015).

The first challenge for the PPP regime was to face widespread and regular public protests for the restoration of judiciary. These public protests were spread all around the state and such protests were getting an amplified coverage by the electronic and mass media (Rafiq, 2012). The PPP regime was forced to restore the deposed judges in the wake of a million march launched by the collaborative efforts of the lawyers' movement and PML (N). At the first instance the PPP regime, attempted to halt the million march by ordering the preventive house arrest of Nawaz Sharif and the prominent leadership of the lawyers' movement, but, was failed to do so. On March 16, 2009, Nawaz Sharif rejected to obey the house arrest orders and decided to lead the million march ("Pakistan Long March", 2009). In the back drop of the million march, the overall security conditions and writ of the PPP regime was weakened throughout the country, especially in Punjab. The million was heading to Islamabad from Lahore and the PPP regime had no choice but to restore the deposed judges of the judiciary (Gall, 2009). The Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary and the other judges were restored on March 16, 2009, before the million march was arrived into Islamabad.

The restoration of judiciary proved a bad omen for the PPP regime because it resulted the restoration of the paused judicial activism CJ Iftikhar Chaudhary. Accordingly, CJ Iftikhar Chaudhary gave several landmark decisions checking the mal-governance of the PPP regime (Waseem, 2012). A key verdict of SC reversed the NRO, a law providing amnesty to the wide range of political leadership. The court ordered to reopen the corruption cases against the alleged leaders including the then President Asif Ali Zardari (the co-chairperson of PPP). The court ordered the government to correspond with the Swiss authorities for reopening the cases against Mr. Zardari (Supreme Court: 2009). A legal battle lasted for more than two year with government lawyers contesting for the constitutional immunity available to the office of the president. The legal battle ended in June 2012, when the SC removed the then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani from his office on the charges of contempt. The deadlock was finally ended in October 2012 when the government complied with the orders of SC to contact with the Swiss authorities and sought concession regarding the early demanded immunity for the office of president (Wasim, 2013).

After the removal of Yousaf Raza Gilani, the PPP appointed Raja Pervaiz Ashraf as the next Prime Minister. The PPP faced another setback from judiciary in December, 2012, when the court issued an arrest warrant against its second prime minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf on the charges of corruptions during his early held portfolio of the ministry of water and power. The investigation agencies remained hesitant to arrest him until the end of his term as prime minister. Later, the case was halted after one of the investigating officials found dead in an apparent suicide. This whole situation of the persisting tussle between PPP regime with the judiciary, was under the gaze of masses through the electronic and mass media, it negatively affected the public image of the PPP regime (Walsh, 2013).

Economic Issues Faced

In 2008, the PPP regime inherited a war torn economy which was mostly dependent on foreign aid and the financial assistance of the IMF. Further, the PPP regime had been plagued by the corruption charges throughout its tenure and thus had less focus upon the economic issues of the state (Cookman, 2013). The PPP regime successfully developed

political consensus upon many issues of national interest especially the issues relating to the power sharing between the centre and provinces and National Finance Commission (NFC) award. When the PPP regime undertook the reins of power, the public was expecting to deliver against the shortage of energy supply, the soaring inflation, the overall economic stability, worsening conditions of public health and education facilities and above all the deteriorated law and order situation hampering the smooth economic activities in the country (PILDAT, 2007).

The PPP regime, during the course of its tenure, has faced several major economic shocks in addition to the above given economic crises. In May 2009, the PPP regime launched a military operation in swat to restore the weakened writ of state against the Taliban militancy which added into economic strains for PPP regime (Zaidi, 2009). Further, Pakistan's agrarian economy faced three successive years of massive flood during the years between 2010 to 2012. Those floods exposed the fragile infrastructure for the national irrigation management systems. The PPP regime failed to address the situation in the first instance and resultantly the repeated floods remained a nightmare for the peasantry which comprised 70 % of the total population. The country found itself trapped into a vicious circle of ever declining growth economic growth.

The energy crises was deepened due to the alleged corruption in the rental power projects, increasing ratio of line losses, soaring circular debt and poor rate of billing recovery. The PPP regime did nothing more than a spectator in this regard which resulted the frustration of both the development sector and public at large (Cookman, 2012). Further, the PPP regime paid less heed about investing in the public health, education and other areas of social development which added in the overall frustration of the public at large (Planning Commission, 2011). The leadership of PPP was plagued by the charges of corruption and has faced sheer public distrust during the most of its constitutional tenure. The cases of corruption were pending against the then sitting president and prime minister of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf respectively, which affected the public opinion badly. Further, the mass mobilization by the PTI and PAT against the alleged corruption of the PPP regime changed the political landscape of Pakistan by weakening the morale of PP government in public eyes (Flamenbaum, 2012).

Corruption Charges and the Aggressive Media campaign

The electronic media in Pakistan have flourished rapidly in recent years and in less than a decade; about a hundred new television channels have been established. It has been turned into a center stage for the politics in Pakistan (Khan, 2008). The leadership of PPP regime, especially ex-president Asif Zardari has been one of the key targets for media. For the media houses it was attractive to attack the government because it contributes to their popularity among public and is good for their marketed rating. The media gave amplified coverage to the corruption scandals of PPP regime and highlighted its non-cooperation with the superior judiciary. Even, the then President and co-chairman of PPP threatened some big media houses by alleging them with the charges of maligning the democratic government and attempting to spoil the character of party leadership. The media industry used to unleash a barrage of attacks on the unpopular –President- Zardari almost every day (Aziz, 2010).

To his credit Zardari spent several years in jail and faced charges from corruption to murder. He also succeeded in ensuring his government's full term in office, but could not improve his image and in the end led to the PPP's worst defeat in 2013. His image of "*Mr. Ten Per Cent*" or "*Mr. Cent Percent*" caused colossal damage to the party reputation (Abbas, 2015). Further, some other scams i.e. corruption charges against PPP's second premier Raja Pervaiz Ashraf (Dawn, 2012), Hajj Corruption Scandal of Hamid Kazmi PP's Minister for Religious Affair (Transparency International, 2012) and Fake degree Scam of many parliamentarians, Memo gate scandal kept the flame of media burning against the PPP regime.

To a large extent, the media played a negative role in assessing the performance of the PPP regime. This doesn't mean that the government was performing quite well and that the media was unnecessarily criticizing it. Rather, it means perhaps the media never gave a fair chance to the PPP regime. To some level, not by all the channels and newspapers, the general theme that was coming out was that this government is corrupt; this government cannot perform, and that it has done nothing for the people. Definitely, this was a kind of aggressive campaign launched by the mainstream media against the PPP regime which negatively affected the public perception about the PPP regime (Peshiman, 2013).

Conclusion

It has been a historically proven fact about the democratic history of Pakistan that none of the democratic regimes got re-elected after completing its constitutional tenure. Pakistan has faced multiple episodes of military dictatorship and it's another noteworthy fact that after every episode of military dictatorship the PPP managed to win the public trust and came into power but in no case it got re-elected. In the wake of the weakened regime of General Musharraf the PPP got elected again in the Elections 2008. The PPP regime completed its constitutional tenure of five years in 2013 but this time again she was not able to win the next elections held in 2013. This study aimed to review the performance of the PPP regime during the period (2008-13) and attempted to locate the factors which contributed to the weakening of public trust and hence resulted the loss of political mandate in the Elections 2013.

PPP claimed to improve the economic growth. It vowed to overcome the energy crises and committed to establish a world class irrigation system. PPP promised to address the rampant issues of health, education, poverty, unemployment and terrorism in their election manifesto but all of these problems remained present, rather, most of them were aggravated at the end of its tenure in 2013.

The leadership of PPP regime, especially ex-president Asif Zardari has been one of the key targets for media. President Zardari, prime ministers Yousaf Raza Gilani and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf and other leadership of the PPP regime faced corruption charges and were in a constant tussle with judiciary. The electronic media gave an amplified coverage to all these scams which affected the public perception negatively.

Crippling power and gas shortages, unbridled price hike, burden of foreign loans, economic collapse, the weakened state institutions like PIA, Pakistan Railways, Pakistan Steel, WAPDA and false claims that the country is making progress were some of the 'gifts' of the PPP regime which the public could not neglect in the next elections to be held in 2013. This study concluded by arguing that the PPP regime had the chance to focus on the popular issues of literacy, public health, economic stability, and terrorism, but she failed to use her opportunity during its constitutional tenure e.g. (2008-13) effectively. So, there were hardly any "achievements" which the PPP regime could have en-cashed to win the next elections to be held in 2013.

Recommendations

It is a widely accepted notion of the modern history of political science that the better political performance/deliverance enhances the legitimacy and longevity of a democratic regime, whereas, the poor performance may decrease the public trust over a democratic regime. It can safely be claimed that the chances of re-election get to be very low for a democratic regime if she fails to deliver according to the popular aspirations/demands of their respective electorate(s). This study highlighted the various gray areas in performance pattern of the PPP regime and systematically listed the factors due to which the PPP regime became unpopular in the eyes of the general public. This research re-emphasizes the aforesaid notions of the modern political history and recommends that leadership of the major political parties in Pakistan should realize this fact that in case they win some election to form government (at any level of government) and further wish to win the next election i.e. to stay in government/power, they must have to deliver/perform with respect to the popular demands of their respective electorates.

References

- Abbass, Mazhar. (2015, October 21). Three factors cause PPP's downfall. *The News International*.
- Afzal, Shemrez N. & Sameen, Zoya. (2013). *Delivering on Promises: Assessing Implementation of Political Party Manifestos*. Jinnah Institute. Lahore.
- Akhtar, Rai Shakil. (2000). *Media, Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press
- Aziz, Faisal (2010, Oct 23). Pakistani Media finds anti-government partner in Judiciary, *Reuters*,
- BBC. (2007, November 4). Musharraf Targets Key Opponents. *BBC*.
- Cookman, Colin. (2012, May 10). Uh-Oh. Pakistan Can't Pay Its Electric Bills. *Foreign Policy*.
- Cookman, Collin. (2013). *Reviewing Pakistan's 2013 Elections*. Centre for American Progress
- Dawn. (2012, November 11). Rental power plants scam. *Dawn*.
- Flamenbaum, Stephani. (2012). *The PTI and Pakistan's Changing Political Landscape*. United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.
- Gall, Carlotta. (2009, March 17). Reinstatement of Pakistan's Chief Justice Ends a Crisis, but It Might Lead to Another. *The New York Times*,
- Khan, Zafarullah & Joseph, Brian. (2008). The Media Take Centre Stage. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(4). pp 32-37.
- Lindse, Jonas & Ekman, Joakim. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics., *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 391-408.
- Lipset, S.M. (1981). *Political man: The social bases of politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Looney, Robert. (2012). Economic impacts of the floods in Pakistan. *Contemporary South Asia*, 20 (2), 225-241,
- Malhotra, Neil & Rothschild, David. (2013). *Are Polls and Probabilities Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?*, Stanford University Press, Working Paper No. 3105.
- ECP Register 216 Parties. (2013, January 14), *Pakistan Today*.
- Peshimam, Gibran. (2013), *Media-powered Democracy: How media support has been pivotal to Pakistan's latest Democratization Project*., *Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper*. University of Oxford.
- PILDAT. (2007). *Election 2008 – A Comparative Analysis of Election 2008 Manifestoes of Major Political Parties*. PILDAT publication
- Planning Commission of Pakistan. (2011). *Task Force Report on Urban Development*. Planning Commission of Pakistan
- Rafiq, Arif. (2012, November 9). The Judge, the General, and Pakistan's Evolving Balance of Power. *The Diplomat*.
- Pakistan Long March. (2009, March 16). *Pakistan Times*.
- Shuifa, H., & Jinglei, H. (2008). The Concept of Democracy. *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, 3(4). 622-632.
- Siddiqi, Faisal. (2011, December 31). The NRO Mystery. *Dawn*
- Supreme Court of Pakistan. (2009, December 16). *Short Order for Constitution Petition Nos. 76 to 80 of 2007 and 59 of 2009 and Civil Appeal No. 1094 of 2009*.

- Tahir, Kamran. (2008). *Democracy and Governance in Pakistan*. South Asia Partnership Publishers, Lahore.
- Transparency International Pakistan. (2012). *Stating to probe the matter of the hajj corruption case*. Transparency International Pakistan
- Zardari, Nawaz swear by Murree Declaration. (2008, April 23). *The News International*.
- Walsh, Declan. (2013, January 23). Inquiry Ordered in Death of Prosecutor Who Investigated Pakistani Premier. *The New York Times*.
- Waseem, Mohammad. (2007). *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. National Institute of Cultural and Historical Research: Islamabad.
- Waseem, Mohammad. (2012). Judging Democracy in Pakistan: Conflict Between the Executive and Judiciary. *Contemporary South Asia*, 20(1). 19–31.
- Wasim, Amir. (2013, February 10). Swiss Govt Shuts the Door on Zardari Case. *Dawn*,
- Wasim, Amir. (2007, November 11). Benazir keeps Administration on the Run. *Dawn*.
- Weinbaum, Marvin G. (1996). Civic Culture and Democracy in Pakistan. *Asian Survey*, vol. 36(7), 639–654.
- Zaidi, Asif. (2009, May 21). Drawing the right lessons from Swat. *The News International*.
- Zain, U. Farooq. (2010). Paradox of our Political Parties. *Journal of South Asian Studies*. 25(1). 89-97.