

**RESEARCH PAPER****The Politics of Collective Security in pursuit of Peace and Security****¹Dr Uzma Naz* ²Syed Husnain Haider and ³Gul i Ayesha Bhatti**

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***Corresponding Author:** druzma.ir@mul.edu.pk**ABSTRACT**

This paper highlights the importance of collective security and alliances. The research is analyzing the collective security frameworks and its role in maintaining peace and security in international relations. States, in times of danger, have sought safety in collectivity using devices like alliances, alignments, treaties pacts and organizations. With the creation of nation states, the European states grouped themselves into alliances to protect and promote their respective military, colonial, economic, political, and territorial interests. The pattern has repeated itself right up to WWII. The creation of the NATO and WARSAW pact exhibited that the states of Europe considered a collective approach For this paper conduct a comprehensive literature review to gain an in-depth understanding of the topic, data collected from various sources, like official documents, international treaties, academic articles, and reports etc. A qualitative methodology will be used for this research to assess the effectiveness, challenges, and limitations of collective security. Findings of the study will discuss its implications and reflect on the potential future directions for collective security.

KEYWORDS: Alliances, Coalitions, Collective Approach, National Security, Peace**Introduction**

It was a common practice among the Italian princes of the Renaissance era to form alliances, sign treaties, to join the rivals and betray the allies whenever statecraft dictated it and national interests was at stake. Nicole Machiavelli, while writing 'The prince' was not advocating a divorce between morality and statecraft. He was merely using his exceptional deductive powers to describe how the statecraft was being conducted at his time and was making suggestion as to how a true understanding and practice of the 'realpolitik' may benefit a ruler. (Machiavelli, 1532).

The Doctrine of Collective Security

The doctrine of collective security has been under a constant flux as far as its meaning is concerned. The term 'Collective security' has carried different meanings for different states at different times. During the 18th and the 19th centuries collective security generally meant security through temporary alliances against adversaries who appeared too menacing to be dealt with individually by a state. The war of Spanish succession (1702-1714) (Buzan, 1984), the seven year war (1756-1763) and the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) are classic case examples of what collective security meant to the 18th century statesmen. They understood it as formation of alliances and counter – alliances with the general aim of dealing with enemies and ensuring national security along with creating a favourable balance of power. An alliance, and the allegiance it had created, disappeared as soon as a crisis was over. (buzan, 1984) The alliance system which took shape in Europe after the respective unifications of Italy and Germany in the 19th century was almost a replica of the way statesmen had translated the term collective security during the previous centuries.

It was this alliance system, originally intended to prevent wars by deterring the rivals, which became the very cause behind the WWI by exaggerating the atmosphere of insecurity and creating a general feeling of something ominous inevitably bound to happen. With the dawn of the 20th century, the doctrine of collective security underwent a radical transformation. Behind it stood a university professor turned politician, and an idealist statement, the American president Woodrow Wilson's (fourteen points carried the seeds of this transformation. The fourteen points were concerned mainly with the post-war objectives of the allies and one of them was the establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain world peace, resolve disputes and ensure equality and cooperation among the nations of the world. Only the collective security approach Wilson believed, had the potential of turning the continuation of the existence of humanity into surety (Buzan, 2004)

The beginning of the 21st century has found humanity facing completely new and unforeseen dangers. Global warming, Global food security, population explosion, expanding economic disparity among the peoples of the world, pollution, illiteracy, and poverty are only some of the new villains who have made entry on the Global stage and are hell bent on causing the annihilation of humanity. These are not the problems which states, regions, or even continents can solve individually and only a collective and well-orchestrated effort on the part of the entire humanity has any hope of saving the day.

Literature Review

Mearsheimer (2001) The history of collective security trace back to the aftereffects of World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations, which sought to prevent the recurrence of armed conflicts through collective action. The League's inability to avert the outbreak of World War II underscored the complexities of implementing collective security.

Ruggie (1993) Ruggie highlights the significance of multilateral institutions in shaping collective security and emphasizes the role of institutional design in achieving peace and security.

Snyder (1997) and Walt (2018) offer critical evaluations of collective security, asserting that states primarily act in pursuit of their self-interest. Realist arguments suggest that states may frequently undermine collective security mechanisms if doing so aligns with their national interests. Walt's analysis of U.S. foreign policy elites reveals the potential for great powers to prioritize their strategic objectives over collective security endeavors.

Matthews (1993) and Pape (2005) present contrasting viewpoints. They argue that collective security institutions play a vital role in managing and mitigating conflicts. Matthews asserts that these institutions provide a structured framework for states to peacefully address disputes. Pape introduces the concept of "soft balancing," where states collaborate to counterbalance a dominant power, exemplified by their pursuit of collective security.

Reus-Smit (2007) examines the ethical facets of international law and collective security, underlining how moral principles can influence state behavior and foster adherence to international norms, even when those norms seemingly conflict with national interests. This ethical dimension represents an essential element in the politics of collective security.

Material and Methods

This paper is based on qualitative research methods. Data was collected from various sources, including official documents, international treaties, academic articles, and reports, to analyze historical and contemporary case studies related to collective security. Qualitative analysis techniques were used to assess the effectiveness, challenges, and limitations of collective security in each case study. A comparison was drawn between different findings from case studies to identify common assumptions and variations in the quest for collective security.

Historical Background

Origin of International Organization

The ideas of an international organization, collective security, international law and a permanent mechanism for conflict resolution and maintenance of peace have taken centuries to evolve. Successive generations of men through centuries have contributed to this process of evolution. It has taken centuries for these doctrines to assume their current promising shape. (Terry, 2000). After the final defeat of Carthage and the conquest of all the Mediterranean world and of most of western and central Europe, Rome, established a kind of a universal empire. Its remoteness from other centers of power like India and China meant that the Romans had the chance to concentrate on evolving mechanisms for governing a plethora of peoples under a single rule. They, consequently, introduced legal, administrative, and military techniques which established the basis for the 'jus gentium 'i.e.' (Law of peoples") which in later centuries became a fertile source of international law.

The Rise of Roman Empire

The rise of the Roman Catholic Church preserved the order The Roman Empire had created. The Church was the first truly strong, centralized, well-functioning, fully bureaucratized and compact international though 'non-governmental', organization of the world and it held sway over the entire Christendom for centuries. (Gellner, 1983) Through the church Europe experienced unity for the first time in its history. The treaty of Westphalia (1648) confined papacy only to spiritual matters and the princes of Europe consented to the principle of absolute sovereignty within the domain of a monarch. This turned Europe into a mosaic of adolescent nation states. Christendom had become fractured with the demise of the church.

Post-Renaissance colonial wars and the collective approach towards security

The 18th and the 19th centuries can safely be called the golden age of the balance of power politics, shifting and dynamic alliances in quest for military, maritime and economic gains is the hallmark of this period. Two successive wars seldom had the same team members when it came to the alliances facing each other, so fluid and fragile was the condition of the European politics at that time. (Gellner, 1983)

The War of Spanish Succession

The war of Spanish succession (1702-1714) set the politico-strategic tune for the 18th century. Preservation of a favorable balance of power was the motive behind the war. An alliance led by England and including Prussia and Austria faced the combined forces of France and Spain. The war continued for a dozen years and ended in a Franco-Spanish defeat. The post war settlement was made through the treaty of Utrecht(1713) with Britain emerging as the biggest beneficiary (Huysmans, 2004).

The Diplomatic Revolution

The English definition of the balance of power in Europe was England in a hegemonic position holding maritime military and economic hegemony. The English policy was to play the role of the 'balancer' whenever a state or coalition of states threatened European 'order'. When Napoleon challenged the English hegemony after the French revolution in (1789) the English response was to form four successive coalitions against France, three of which were smashed by Napoleon one after the other. In the battle of Waterloo in 1815 Napoleon was pre-destined to lose simply because he had run out of men, money, and guns. (Muller, 2002)

The 1815 post war arrangements made in the treaty of Paris (1815) were an intricate network of alliances and pacts. The victory nations were represented by men like Castlereagh, Czar Alexander 1, Frederick II, and Metternich and all of them had rival conceptions of a European order. This understanding afterwards became the 'concert of Europe' because all the states agreed to meet periodically through their representatives for consultations on measures necessary for peace in Europe. (Muller, 2002)

The Concert of Europe

The formation of the Concert of Europe is a landmark development in the political history of Europe. Never before had the states of Europe agreed to co-exist in the form of a quasi-permanent concert in order to make collective efforts to preserve peace. This collective approach towards peace with a common aim was a novel feature in the politics of Europe. In a world dominated by the state which firmly believed in the principles of 'real-politik', the formation of a concert for collective security meant that idealism had made entry into international politics.

Numerous political thinkers had suggested the creation of a permanent collective European security organization. The idea dated back to 1693 when William Penn proposed a 'Parliament of Europe' in his 'Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe'. The Abbe-de-saint Pierre's 'Project to bring perpetual peace in Europe' (1712) and Bentham's, who coined the word international, 'Principles of International Law' (1793) had made similar proposals. However such notions had always been dismissed as utopian foolery by the men who formed the foreign policies of the European states in early 19th century. (Patomaki, 2001).

Theoretical Framework

Unfortunately, the European statesmen of that era were no idealists. They were staunch realists pursuing purely national aims at their disposal. Canning's proclamation "Every nation for herself and God for us all" accurately depicts the mood of the European states in the early 19th century. It meant only one thing, that the 'Concert of Europe' was a stillborn project.

The failure of the concert and the British hegemony:

The British foreign policy in the decades following the end of the Napoleonic wars had as its objective a peaceful Europe where trade could be reestablished. She needed her maritime superiority to consolidate her empire and to protect her global trade. She neither wanted conflict in Europe nor wanted to be in one if it ensued. The conservative powers of Europe like Prussia, France and Austria wanted to restore the pre-Napoleonic order. Europe was in the grips of liberal agitation with most of the capitals of Europe flocked by people demanding constitutional and civil liberties and fundamental rights. (Muller, 2002) The French revolution had given birth to an idea which had caught popular imagination. These powers deserved to use the 'concert' as a European anti-

revolutionary body with an armed organ to crush liberal agitation demanding constitutional governments. England firmly preached non-intervention and showed herself willing to use force to make others listen because she knew that meddling and intervention's always lead to conflict.

The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe doctrine certainly had British contribution behind its articulation. The almost Biblical proclamation by Peele, "I called the new world into existence in order to redress the balance of the old" meant that England had succeeded in gaining the United States' support to prevent the other European powers from meddling into south American affairs. These are some of the reasons why the concert was a complete failure and the congresses of Aix-la-Chappell (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822) achieved practically nothing. The first European attempt to preserve peace through permanent collective organization had proved to be a complete failure. During the 3rd and the 4th quarters of the 19th century, Britain maintained her hegemonic position on the Global. Her Empire expanded, she became the first industrial nation of the world, and her navy ruled the waves. Her trade increased manifold and she became the richest country in the world. She played her traditional role of the 'balancer' in European politics and largely maintained peace in Europe (Buzan, 1984). The only major event in the British Isles was the Anglo-Franco-Italian alliance which defeated the Russian in Crimean War of 1854-1856. It was basically fought to preserve the status-Quo.

Emergence of Germany and the crises in Europe

The last quarter of the 19th century transformed the European political scene beyond recognition. With a resurgent France, an ambitious Russian and a rising Germany, dark clouds had begun to gather around the sun which never set on the British Empire. The old European political order based on the policy of English hegemonic isolationism was preparing for mutation (Gellner, 1983).

The formation of the concert of Europe (1815) was the only occasion on which the European statesmen had tried to adopt a collective approach towards peace and security. This approach had kept Europe relatively peaceful for almost a half century. The rigidity of the British isolationism and her unflinching adherence to policy right up till the Anglo-French Entente of 1903 is an example of the extent to which the Europeans did not know to cope with the changing political situations. Between 1871 and 1900 Britain added four million square miles and sixty million people to her already vast empire. Germany, Belgium, and Italy each acquired new colonial empires. France nursed a nostalgic feeling of having been a great empire once. Russia wanted to expand, Austria-Hungry wanted a major chunk of the Balkans (Ole Waever, 2004).

Colonial Conflicts

Colonial conflicts, competition for spheres of influence, economic and political rivalries were sure to create hostility among the Europeans states. It meant the birth of feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and need for protection. The Berlin congress of 1882 was the only occasion when almost the whole of Europe sat together to deal with the issues.(Ole Waever, 2004). In the absence of a permanent mechanism for conflict resolution dispute settlement and to deal with the security issues, the states men of Europe reverted to the only methods they knew. In a frantic search for security and colonial gains they began to weave a web of Ententes, treaties facts and leagues which complicated the situation even further. Abortive and halfhearted attempts to adopt a collective approach gained nothing except increasing the distrust among the European states regarding one another's intentions.

The European Alliance System prior to WW1

The Austro-Hungarian and German Alliance of 1879, the Reinsurance Treat between Russia and Germany in 1879 and the Anglo-French Entente of 1902 were what was resorted to by diplomats and the strategic planners to gain colonies and remain safe. The Triple Alliance among Austria, Italy and Germany of 1882, the Franco-Russian entente of 1893, the Anglo-Japans Alliance of 1902 and the British-French alliance of 1902 are just some of the examples of similar alliances and alliances that took place during the 19th century. Every treaty, Every Entente and every pact only added to an already prevalent atmosphere of instability and insecurity.

Europe had been divided into two rival camps with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Turkey on the one side, and France Britain and Russia on the other. What was needed was only a spark and it was provided by the gunshot fired to assassinate the Archduke of Austria in 1914. The treaty of Versailles which concluded the First World War had all the characteristics of a typical European post war settlement. For first time in history of the world, global politics was no longer Euro-centric in character. The WW1 (1914-1918) along with causing epic destruction in Europe on an unprecedented scale, had completely annihilated the old European political order (Walker, 1993).

The Treaty of Versailles

Halter's rise, in part, was a reaction to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles which made it impossible for the victors to break up their colonial empires and forced the vanquished to give up theirs. Germany was declared the aggressor' blamed for the war and told to pay war reparations 'an Allied Reparation Commission was set up which in April 1921, eventually fixed German's liability at 132,000 million gold marks. With Europe lying totally in ruins, the pacifists, the liberals and the idealists preaching co-operation had at last gained the world's attention. However, there were men co-existing with them inspired by lofty ideals who were ready to embark upon brave new ventures. Woodrow Wilson created the first international organization of a universal character i.e league of nations.

Formation and failure of The League of Nations

The formation of a character or constitution for an international organization had been begun in 1916. The 'covenant' which finally emerged after the war provided for a "league of nations " with three main organs. These were the Assembly, the council and the secretariat. The assembly was entrusted with the primary responsibility of safeguarding the peace of the world. The structure of the 'League' had clear and disturbing defects for those who expected it to be a state above the states. Germany's exclusion from the council till 1926 and the soviet absence till 1934 meant that the council was crippled from the very start. The permanent court of international justice did not have compulsory jurisdiction and delivered non-binding verdicts. There was no international legislature and no international codified laws.

Measure for collective security after WWI

During the fifteen years following the setting up of the 'League'. The draft treaty of mutual Assistance was finalized in 1923. According to its terms, within 4 days of outbreak of hostilities, the measures of financial or military aid for the 'victim'. However, the treaty collapsed due to the British opposition to a clause which required the military aid for the victim to come from the same hemisphere as the aggressor. The Geneva protocol of 1924 requiring the signatory states to submit non-legal disputes to the council and accept necessary jurisdiction of the international court of justice along with

the unanimous report of the council on a dispute was also a 'League' effort. However, it also failed mainly due to the British opposition. (Kennedy, 1987)

The Locarno Treaties of 1925 were the zenith of the 'League' efforts to preserve peace in the world, and for a change, the 'League' had succeeded in seeing through an initiative. The Locarno treaty included numerous agreements. A five-power treaty among France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Belgium guaranteed the French, German and Belgian borders and a permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland. States agreed upon not resorting to war except in self-defense or under 'League' obligations, Germany was admitted to the council. The seed for the crop of peace seemed to have been sown in Europe. This atmosphere of optimism was further enhanced by the Pact of Paris 1928, through which the states of Europe announced the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. Europe seemed hungry for peace and ready to think collectively for its sake. The league tried to advance its efforts for building a system of collective security through the General Act of 1928 relating to non-aggression, international arbitration and mutual assistance. By 1935, 23 states had acceded to the act of 1928. (Muller, 2002)

With the hindsight, the causes behind the failure of the league are not difficult to explain the absence of powerful international players like the US, USSR and Germany meant that the league was a mere side-show and the real diplomacy went on behind closed doors in the old style away from the eyes of the world. The Washington Naval conference of 1925 which set limits on the respective sizes of the navies of the US, Germany, Japan and Britain was one of the few concrete collective steps taken for peace and the league had no involvement in it. The league could not stop Mussolini from attacking Abyssinia, nor it could it do anything about the French occupation of the German Ruhr district when Germany defaulted on war payments. The statesmen of the world did not seem to believe that preservation of peace through collective action was possible. The unjust terms of the treaty of Versailles, the global financial crisis of 1930s, and the way states responded to it with a total lack of collectivity show that the world still had not become a place where men thought collectively for common interest. (Kennedy, 1987)

The inter war years and failure of collective security

Since 1914, Peace in Europe, and the world had been resting on fragile footings. Under Hitler Germany had risen from the ashes like sphinx and was visiting Europe, demanding "rights" for the "wrongs" of Versailles. The failure of the League was not the failure of collective approach towards peace and security, it rather was a failure of men to adhere to with sincerity and practice with integrity the principles of collectivism.

Collective Security after WWII

The preparations to create a successor to the League of Nations had begun before the end of the WW2. The Bretton-woods conference of 1943 created the "International bank for reconstruction and development" and the "international monetary fund". At the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, China, Britain, the US, the USSR drafted the initial proposal for a general international organization. At the Yalta conference of 1945, the partition of Germany was agreed upon and the principle of 'Veto' which was later embodied in the UN charter under Article 27 was finalized. The UN charter is perhaps the most important document in the history of the world politics. It has 111 articles divided into 19 chapters and was first published in 1945. At san-Francisco the principles of sovereignty and of great power unanimity (veto) were written into the charter. The UN has proven to be more effective and durable than its predecessor, i.e. the league.

The UN charter also gave birth to a host of specialized agencies charged with tasks critical to human welfare. For three quarters of a century, the WHO and the UNICEF

are behind campaigns launched to eliminate diseases like polio, T.B, diphtheria, Goiter etc, and are saving millions of lives on daily basis. This has served well to preserve the piece of the world by being a factor which prevents hostilities among states from turning into armed conflicts.

The Korean War (1950-53) was the first test of the UN as an international organization. The soviet failure to use veto enabled UN action against north Korea while resulted in first military action directed by the UN and carried out by its member states. The Korean war was immediately followed by the Suez crisis of 1956 when Egypt decided to nationalize the canal and Israel, backed by France and England, retaliated. The UN's role was virtually non-existent during the Vietnam War. It played a mirror role in the finalization of the Geneva accord which ended the Afghan war. In 1991, the Us used a UN resolution to carry out military action against Iraq which is known as the First Gulf war. The UN arranged for a peaceful plebiscite in East Timor and played a critical role in 1995 in the conclusion of Bosnia's independence.

The UN has not been a complete failure despite the fact it has been deliberately kept weak by the big powers. The period between the end of the second war and the collapse of the Soviet Union was a period of proxy wars, which were fought in Latin America, south east Asia, eastern Europe, Africa and even Asia. The UN was used merely as a platform for diplomatic point scoring on the global political scene.

Changing dimensions of insecurity

Even during that period, the UN continued its efforts to build a peaceful world. The creation of international regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) forbidding nuclear tests in the out-space or under water, The Geneva character of human rights, the united nation convention on law of seas, (UNCLOS) the introduction of the Human Development Index (HDI) and the United Nations millennium development goals (UNMDG) program are only some of the accomplishment of the UN. These achievements have made the UN indispensable to the lives of nations.

Conclusion

Every major war in the last millennium has been fought by enemies who faced each other in the form of allies. After the First World War, regional organizations sprouted across the globe. The European Union began its journey as the European coal and (ECSC) steel community immediately after the WW2. The Association of South, East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has caused the economic interlinking of the region. The Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) created in 2006 betokens the shift towards regional collectivism among states. The (EU) and the (ASEAN) have become role models for the other regions of the world when it comes to regional co-operation. The old enemies of humanity like war, slavery, imperialism, genocide epidemics have moved to the background, giving way to more massive and potentially deadly enemies. Global warming, Hunger, over population, illiteracy, poverty, and financial disparity between nations and regions are the new lethal enemies which require new tactics in order to be beaten.

The time has come for humanity to cast away the divisions of nationality, faith, color, race and to work as a unit. If humanity must survive and thrive, a collective approach toward peace and security is indispensable. The current Saudi attempt to construct a regional military alliance is yet another attempt to recourse to a collective approach towards security. It means only one thing, that collective security has always been seen by states as tantamount to security.

Recommendations

Nations should strengthen their commitment to multilateral cooperation through established international organizations, such as the United Nations. It is needed for more diplomatic efforts and crisis management mechanisms within these organizations to facilitate collective security initiatives.

It is recommended to work for a shift in focus from reactive measures to proactive conflict prevention. Promote the development of early warning systems and mediation capabilities to address potential conflicts before they escalate. Regional collaborative as complements to global collective security efforts. Encourage regional organizations to play a more significant role in addressing conflicts within their specific geographical areas.

Countries should stress the central role of diplomacy in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Diplomatic initiatives can be more inclusive and adaptable to the unique dynamics of each situation. States invest in training their diplomats, military personnel, and peacekeepers in conflict resolution and negotiation techniques to enhance their effectiveness in supporting collective security efforts and adherence to international laws and agreements that underpin collective security.

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