

**RESEARCH PAPER****Outburst and Management of Crisis between Pakistan and India in the Context of Nuclear Threats****Dr. Salma Naz**

Assistant Professor, Faculty of social Science & Humanities, Minhaj University, Lahore(MUL), Punjab, Pakistan

**\*Corresponding Author:** [salmanoorshahid@gmail.com](mailto:salmanoorshahid@gmail.com)

**ABSTRACT**

Pakistan and India two nuclear states of south Asia have the hostile and conflicted history consisted on continuous mistrust, wars, conflicts, and skirmishes on border. The enduring antagonism between both countries that is augmented by signals of nuclear threats has produce recurrent crises. The threat of accidental collision between the both powers was high during these crises, nuclear deterrence stopped to expand the crisis into nuclear war and manage their crises diplomatically. This study covers the emerged crises between Pakistan and Indian during 2001-2019. The objective of the study is to explore the role of nuclear threats in Outburst and management of crisis between two nuclear powers. This research is qualitative in nature, so the qualitative technique is used for analysis of data. On the base of analysis conclusion is derived that nuclear threats played primary role in outburst and management of crises between Pakistan and India and on the base of conclusion recommendations are proposed that both powers should promote process of dialogue and to avoid crisis situation should avoid unnecessary nuclear signaling.

**KEYWORDS** Crisis Management, Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Threats, Outburst of Crisis

**Introduction**

During the cold war the policy of continuous conflict limited war and nuclearization seems applicable to the India and Pakistan crises. Regardless of the presence of nuclear risks between both opponents might cross the nuclear threshold the assessment present in the mind of leadership of both nations mainly opinion exists among Indian leaders that limited clash can be possible in presence of nuclear deterrence ( Naz, 2021).Regional crises are a kind of foreign policy crisis for the cause of the growth of threat perception among regional level states to their values and interests (Yusuf, 2018) . In post9/11 Indian foreign policy trend reveals that the India tried to achieve the major position of international power. In this context, India adopted the following policy towards Pakistan.

(a) Executed policy to declare internationally Pakistan as a protecting state of terrorism and promoter of terrorist activities.

(b) India tried to convince America and western countries to lower the significance of Pakistan in the war against terrorism (Jamshed, 2005) for the cause that Pakistan gave shelter to terrorists and was continuously involved in the spreading out of terrorism since many years.

**Literature Review**

Yousaf (2018) explains Pakistan and India relations in perspective of crisis management between both states, in which nuclear deterrence played significant role as well as America mediated effectively because of her global interests. Writer theoretically applied theory of brokered bargaining. The writer's presentation of "brokered bargaining" unlocks new theoretical dimensions. For instance, it is an attempt to relate the approach of

nuclear crisis behavior in the background arbitration of third-party. This research supports the readers to comprehend how small or local powers feel uncomfortable with the designs or interests of a global power.

In the Study of Lalwani and Hangeland(2018) identified south Asia most sensitive to the crisis. After gain of Nuclear status of Pakistan and India this sensitivity increased because arms race between both nuclear states comprising the advancement of their fissile material stock stockpile and nuclear resources enhancement of their traditional armies increases threats of risk, mainly in times of power conversions. It is a near realistic study of behavior of countries in crises for a well understanding of the causal processes, plans, and lessons learned from previous crises emerged between both states. Book comprises of ten chapters, authors from the America, Pakistan, China, and India assess the India and Pakistan crises and describes the outcomes for the management of future crisis in the region of South Asia.

Paul's (2005) study is an important reading to realize the multifaceted and ongoing antagonism between India and Pakistan. Their enmity become more severe with the addition of nuclear weapons and in spite of episodic peace, some attempts show no signs of reducing. In this book, the nonstop contention between both states attempts to examine from the in the background of international relations approach and comparative politics.

In the Study of Davis, (2011) various dimensions of military standoff Crisis explains. Nayak & Krepon in the perspective of stability-instability paradox assesses the military standoff Crisis. It describes that when enemy countries obtain nuclear ability, they will do attempt to abstain from overpass the nuclear verge, consequently having a safe distance from tragedy. At the same time both opponents might recognize this situation as an opportunity, to involve in aggressive actions below it. Moreover, the researchers explain the causes and do effort to response the questions why this crisis did not convert into armed collision? Swami connects the crisis with violence in Kashmir and the letdown policy of India in Kashmir. Jaspal , (2011)analyzed enmity between India and Pakistan not only has historical origins but after freedom, other progresses boosted this hostility like in Indian role in 1971 in East Pakistan crisis; India occupied Siachin Glacier in 1984; Nuclearization of India and Pakistan and the development of Hindu nationalism in Indian national politics. He further writes Kashmiris struggle is indigenous that started because of discontent of Kashmiris with the government of India but India alleges that Pakistan is involved in backing the violent activities in Kashmir particularly Indian government in the post 9/11 era yield the benefits of war on terrorism to legitimate its armed actions in Kashmir.

The study of cheema,(2009) discusses the various motives of nuclearization of South Asia. The writer expressively uses different aspects of nuclear policy to Evaluate the strategic progresses between India and Pakistan. Most of the study explains factors and actors forced Pakistan to acquire nuclear capabilities. This study explains the historical development of nuclear weapons of Pakistan and India, describes that since their independence both countries tried to upgrade their armed forces with modern weapons included nuclear arms that leads arms race between both sates. However, in this book comprehensively discusses the nuclear discourse of both countries, but this study do not discusses the impact of non-state actors' on nuclear relationship of Pakistan and India.

Sadiq (2019) analyzed the India and Pakistan nuclear power and generates nuclear fear and deter against each other. Both states created rational reason for nuclear deterrence and speedily upsurge of nuclear arsenals avoid proxy warfare. The proliferation of arsenals is harmful for the security & safety of the South Asian region. Contradictory thoughts and feelings aggravate collide behavior towards each other, which may reason severe dangerous to world peace.

An important study Chari et, al., (2007) explains four crises between Pakistan and India from 1986 to 2001. Authors conclude that strategically, both nations understand from the crises that they cannot attain their political objectives even resolution of dispute of Kashmir will not be resolved by use of military force. The existence of nuclear deterrence between both states also do not encourage the military option. Inadequate structure and deficiencies in current measures in both countries for decision-making regarding nuclear safety do not guarantee crisis stability if the present negotiation should stop. They have confidence that in spite of the existence of pressures after the Mumbai attack procedure of dialogue should be continued. This study reflects optimism concerning the future of peace in south Asian region and stress upon the continuity of negotiation and confidence building measures between Pakistan and India but did not describe the problems and obstacles in the start and continuity of dialogue.

### **Material and Methods**

The nature of research is qualitative. The study uses qualitative research method together with descriptive and explanatory research techniques to investigate the research questions. To enhance the arguments logically, the explanatory research technique is used comprehensively. Because of the sensitivity of research the primary sources are very rare. This forces the researcher to depend on secondary sources more for instance books, Research journals, newspapers and research reports. Analytical procedure for analysis of data for qualitative data that contains of Organizing, reading, defining, categorizing, explaining and illustrative is adopted for the current study (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).

### **Nuclear Threats**

Nuclear deterrence a military doctrine the chance that a state will use the Nuclear arms as a deter against its enemy. 3C model usually related with nuclear deterrence theories. It mentions “Capability,” “Communication” and “Credibility” of nuclear arms. Capability establishes the belongings of, and ability in using, nuclear power. Communication reflects the four co-existing phases as “Information”, “Interaction”, “Discourse” and “Signification. Credibility has two aspects Resolve and Capability ( Taylor, 2019). In 1974 India’s nuclear test created serious security threats for Pakistan, and forced it to entered upon secrete nuclear program. India changed this strategic equilibrium of power by nuclear test in 11 and 13<sup>th</sup> May 1998, which forcing Pakistan follow this example and conducted nuclear test in 28<sup>th</sup> May 1998. The nuclearization of south Asia started the race for progress and operationalization of their deliverable nuclear abilities that would permit the nuclear deterrence to prevail.

**Table 1**  
**Pakistan-India Crises (2001-2019)**

Total Number of Crises	4
Frequency per 3 years	2000-2003=1 2004-2007=0 2008-2011=1 2012-2015=0 2016-2019=2
Intensity	Medium
Strategies employed	Nuclear deterrence, third party mediation, surgical strike (claimed by India after Uri and Pulwama attack) Airstrike,

**Table 2**  
**Crisis Indicators between Pakistan and India**

Crisis	Nuclear signaling /intensity	Missile Test /intensity	Deployment of nuclear weapon/intensity	Statement from national
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				<b>leadership amplified nuclear readiness/intensity</b>
Military Standoff (2001-2002)	✓ High	✓ High	✓ Moderate	✓ High
Mumbai crisis	✓ Moderate	✓ Moderate		✓ High
Uri crisis	✓ Moderate			✓ Moderate
Pulwama Crisis	✓ High		✓ Moderate	✓ High

**Military standoff**

The 2001-2002 border crisis appeared as the consequence of two distinct peaks the first was on December 13, 2001 in Delhi the terrorists attacked the Indian parliament and the second was on May 14, 2002 attack on the bus and an Indian army camp. This Twin Peaks crisis turned into longest-lasting crisis in the contemporary history of South Asian. Forces of Pakistan and India faced off at the international border and alongside the Line of Control from December 2001 to October 2002. During the period of the crisis, both states involved in deliberate nuclear signaling.

Few days after the attack, the Pakistan’s army informed many states, as well as India, that it would be conducted a sequence of tests of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles to exhibit its first-strike ability. though refuting that the tests had relevance to the existing situation, but, it was to exhibit its first-strike ability( Khan, 2011)..These tests were endorsed by intelligence reports of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan report about aggressive deployment of Indian military showed that an attack may have been impending( Khan,2018).

**Table 3**  
**Threatening statement/actions from India to Pakistan**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening Designation/institution</b>	<b>Statement/Action</b>
December 13,2001	Prime Minister	“Our battle is now approaching the last Phase, and a conclusive fight would have to take place.”
December 13,2001	Home Minister	Indian Home Minister L.K. Advani Lal Krishan Advani threatened that India could be used the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strike.
	Defense Ministry	Indian conducted tests of Agni I, Agni II and the BrahMos missile.
December 15 <sup>th</sup> 2001	CSS	Indian cabinet passed resolution unanimously in which threatened that India "would destroy the terrorists as well as their supporters anywhere and whomever they are"
December 18,2001	Prime Minister	On 18 <sup>th</sup> December 2001 Indian Prime Minister ordered his military force chiefs to ready for war.
December 18,2001	junior minister for external affairs	Omar Abdullah junior minister for external affairs said no one should not be in suspicion that Indian geographical integrity should be maintained either it possible from such a (nuclear) attack
December 27, 2001.	Defense Minister	Initial stage of the crisis, Defense Minister of India Fernandes publicly stated that Indian missile systems are in place.

11 <sup>th</sup> January 2002	Army Chief	Army Chief of India declared that the military of India was totally prepared and looking for permission from the civilian leadership to attack. He threatened a nuclear strike if Islamabad launch a nuclear attack.
16 May 2002	Prime Minister	no arms would not be used only for defense. Whatsoever arms was existing, it would be used without any care of how damaged the enemy.
May 23, 2002	Spokesman of BJP political party	Spokesman of Vajpayee's political party stated that the possibility of war was present.
December 2001 and January 2002	Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister & Minister for External Affairs	conveyed the message to American officials that India will not hesitate to take serious any step against Pakistan and Indian leadership don't care if Pakistan has nuclear arms

**Source:** HindustanTimes, The Hindu, Tribune Dawn, The economist, Times of India, Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times.

When both parties stimulated to armed crisis brokering converted into a contest in risk-taking, with each party determine to demonstrate superior resolution. During the crisis, the leadership of both powers was busy in encouraging posturing to found their resolution in the background of the choice of nuclear war (Khan, 2005). In its place of India stressing its no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons nuclear signals were also exhibiting. Indian junior minister for foreign affairs Omar Abdullah said in the Indian parliament, that no one should not be in doubt that geographical integrity of India should be preserved or it possible from such a (nuclear) attack (Omar, 2001).

Apparatuses of missile preparation, comprising advance placements of missiles missing long range (the Prithvi, the Hatf I and II), were noticeable for satellites of America to watch (Chari, 2003). However Feroz Khan assertion that Islamabad refute the need to keep its atomic militaries prepared; in spite, the crisis "gave Pakistan guarantee in its nuclear deterrence and conveyed important message for atomic planners (Khan, 2011). Indian Defense Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs also visited America during December 2001 and January 2002 when the crisis was at its peak. Indian officials conveyed the message to American officials that India will not hesitate to take serious any step against Pakistan and Indian leadership doesn't care if Pakistan has nuclear arms (Stolar, 2008). K. Subrahmanyam an Indian international strategic affairs expert claimed a limited war was under consideration from Indian side and American would ensure to stop Pakistan from launching nuclear attack (Subrahmanyam 2002). Few days after the attack, the Pakistan's army informed many states, as well as India, that it would be conducted a sequence of tests of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles to exhibit its first-strike ability. though refuting that the tests had relevance to the existing situation, but, it was to exhibit its first-strike ability. (Khan 2004). These tests were endorsed by intelligence reports of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan report about aggressive deployment of Indian military showed that an attack may have been impending (Khan, 2018).

**Table 4**  
**Threatening statement/actions from Pakistan to India**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening Designation/institution</b>	<b>Statement/Action</b>
16 December 2001	Inter services Relations Pakistan	Public India must be understood that any reckless declaration or demands by the Indian government and

			implying any action along the International borders or LoC will not be acceptable to Pakistan. Delhi must keep in mind that it will bring massive damages if remains involve such type of action.
December 19, 2001	Inter services Relations Pakistan	Public	order was delivered to react to any aggression by India and recruit minimum one aggressive attack.
March 23, 2002	President		if enemy started a war it would be received an "memorable punishment"
March 23, 2002	President		in case if single soldier of India cross over the international border into territory of Pakistan, Islamabad would have replied with nontraitional war."
April 7, 2002	President		Nuclear arms (is perhaps ) will be applied as a last option in case of the pressure on Pakistan upsurge to be too high.
May 25, 2002	Inter services Relations Pakistan	Public	Pakistan conducted the tests of Shaheen, Ghauri , Ghaznavi and Abdali missiles.

Source: Dawn, The News, HindustanTimes, The Hindu, The economist, Washington Post.

The most communicative signal of the growing risk of nuclear war during the crisis was the instruction conveyed by ambassador of America to India Robert Blackwill for needless embassy staff to leave India (Nayak & Krepon, 2011 ; Chari et al., 2009). As the consequence of this directive, a lot of citizens of America left India due to the threat of possible nuclear war between India and Pakistan. American government assumed that the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of the crisis would possibly convert into war. Many experts describes that both powers never moved toward the threshold during the crisis. Devin & Sumit relate the Waltz theory of deterrence to the case of India and Pakistan. They explained that the threat of nuclear choice of Pakistan was prevailing in the assessments of leadership of India, therefore, this prohibited India from selecting of option of war (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2012). nuclear threats were high during the Military stand off crisis even during a crisis, the most talented officers were not certain to control the results. The crisis managed without harmed the prevailing status quo.

### **Mumbai Crisis**

On 26 November 2008 a numerous militants in a boat landed on the coastlines of Mumbai (Rath, S. K. 2010, p.360). They spread to soft aims crossways the city, eight attacks happened in Mumbai (Nayak & Krepon, 2012). On 29<sup>th</sup> November at the Taj Mahal hotel Operation Black Tornado was initiated by the Indian armed forces followed in fired the last

left behind terrorists. This incident became the longest terrorist incident in the history of India(Acharya, Mendal & Mehta, 2008) the only alive attacker Ajmal Kisab was arrested.

**Nuclear Signaling during Mumbai Crisis(2008)**

A terrorist attack at the center of India’s main city threatened to push India and Pakistan toward nuclear escalation once again.Both countries canceled military leaves and employed amplified air force and air defense attentive positions as the Indian Army conducted routine exercises. The Mumbai crisis was very embarrassing and infuriating for India, as the deficiency of preparation of security forces of India and it also shocked and infuriated the Indian people.

**Table 5**  
**Threatening assertion/activities from India to Pakistan**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Designation/institution</b>	<b>Assertion/activities</b>
November 29,2008	Foreign minister	“ if Pakistan do not take action, then it will not be situation as normal.”
22 December 2008	Foreign minister	“obtaining a more and more dangerous measurement and carry onto damage peace and security in South Asia gave emphasis to Indian diplomats that India was not eliminate probable reaction to the attack.
December24,2008	Air Marshal of India WesternAirCommand	Delhi had “identified approximately 5,000 targets for air attacks in Pakistan.

Source: HindustanTimes, The Hindu, Tribune Dawn, The economist, Times of India,Washington Post.

**Table 6**  
**Threatening statement/actions from Pakistan to India**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening Designation/institution</b>	<b>Statements/Action</b>
December 3, 2008	Chief of Army staff	“We need peace with India ,but in case of any aggression Pakistan will be respond by appropriate reaction.
December 14, 2008	Information Minister	Fighter jets of Indian Air Force had violated the air space of Pakistan on December 12 and 13, 2008..

**Source:** BBC World Service, *GeoTV*, BBC News, Reuters ,The Guardian, Dawn, The News, HindustanTimes, The Hindu, The Economist, Washington Post.

During this tense situation sensitive actions were seemingly taken after misunderstood phone call when Pakistani officials claimed that Pakistani officials received threatening phone call from Indian foreign minister(Abbas 2008; Coll 2009).Some bureaucrats, military personnel and media pundits in India suggested executing “limited military attacks” across the Line of Control, possibly using special forces or smart bombs. Nuclear threats worked and asymmetric escalation attitude of Pakistan, leadership of India refrain from executing militarily action(Narang, 2010).

**Uri**

On 18 September, 2016 terrorists attacked inside the military headquarter in Uri .This attack was stated as a ‘disastrous attack’ in the military history of India(Naz, 2022) in which death of 70-80 soldiers were reported (Nitin, 2017).India claimed Pakistan for this terrorists attack and a crisis had developed between contending nations.Indian government faced extreme domestic pressure for a histrionic military attack against Pakistan even ready to face nuclear annihilation to penalize Pakistan for the Uri incident(Anon 2016).Indian Prime Minister,ministers and civil and military leadership condemned Pakistan threatened with military reaction.

**Table 6**  
**Threatening statement/actions from India to Pakistan**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening Designation/institution</b>	<b>Statements/Action</b>
18 September 2016	I. Prime Minister  II. Minister of Defence  III.Minister of Home	I. .“I promise the nation that those responsible for this shameful attack will not go without punishment,”  II. .Parrikar directed the milirty to take solid action against those accountable for the attack and also said that the demises of the soldiers "will not go in." vainly
19 September 2016	I. State Minister for Defence II. Home Minister Rajnath Singh  III.Army chief Vijay Kumar Singh	I. the government had come to a decision that some kind of a "reply" essentials to be given to Pakistan. II. India will give an "appropriate answer" to the attack III He said to the Indian Army to strengthen their security and called a planned reply as the demand of the time.
29 September 2016	Indian DGMO	stated that it had completed a preemptive attack against "miltants groups" who were made to " continue the intrusion and perform militants attacks inside Indian controlled Kashmir

Source: Reuters, The Guardian, Dawn, The News, HindustanTimes, The Hindu, The economist,Washington Post.

On September 28, 2016 in a press conference Indian Director General of Military Operations claimed that in a miltry operatin against militant camps conducted in Pakistan administered Kashmir in a reaction of Uri's attack( Biswas, 2017). Director General of the Inter Service public relations of Pakistan briefed the media that no attack as India claimed had launched(Ghumman, , 2021).



**Table 6**  
**Threatening statement/actions from Pakistan to India**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening Designation/institution</b>	<b>Statements/Action</b>
19 September 2016	Chief of Army Staff	Delhi was spreading an "aggressive story" in reaction to the attack and also said that the <u>Pakistani army</u> was "ready to reply to the whole scale of the direct and indirect threat."

Source: Reuters, The Guardian, Dawn, The News, HindustanTimes, The Hindu, The Economist, Washington Post.

Nuclear Pakistan reserved limitations on the capability of India to answered Pakistan with force. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, Chairman of Strategic Plans Division of Pakistan said that the goal of strategic nuclear arms of Pakistan is to "pour cold water on Cold Start" (Smith, 2013). To more lessen the military options of India, Pakistan condensed its nuclear threshold by introducing strategic nuclear weapons, representing its assurance to using these short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons in the event that Indian decision-makers think conducting a low-scale traditional war. As India confirmed having accomplished the surgical strikes, Pakistan's army rejected and alleged India of fabricating the truth. According to the report air defense of Pakistan air defense of Pakistan is very strong, while the army of India have no weapons necessary for the surgical strikes. Further stated surgical attacks in a sensitive part of Kashmir are tough in the presence of the advanced missile system of Pakistan (Malik, 2020)

**Pulwama**

The convey of Indian *Central Reserve Police Force* hit by a car overloaded with explosives when was passing through the Pulwama district in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. In this attack more than 44 security personnel killed and many were injured (Kronstadt, 2019). This attack was the deadly incident of terrorism in Kashmir in thirty years. India alleged that Pakistan's base militant groups and organizations particularly Jaish-e-Muhammad that is protected by Pakistan's inter services intelligence are responsible for the attack. A massive internal pressure on government of India for retaliation was witnessed in India (Yusuf, 2019).

**Table 7**  
**Threatening statement/actions from India to Pakistan**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Threatening personality/institution</b>	<b>Statements/Action</b>
February 15, 2019	Prime Minister	"The people's blood is boiling" and involved groups and forces in terrorist attack will certainly be punished.
February 26, 2019	Indian Air Force	Aircraft of India violated the Line of Control

Sources: Dawn, The Nation, The News, Indian Newspapers, Hindustan Times, The Indian Express, India Today, New York Times, The Washington Post.

Pakistan denied any connections of terrorists with Pakistan involved in this attack. Because of upcoming general elections in India after two months India activated the tone to increase loudly even more than as compare to preceding crises.

**Table7**  
**Threatening statement/actions from Pakistan to India**

<b>Date</b>	<b>personality/institution</b>	<b>Statements/Action</b>
February 19, 2019	Prime Minister	If you plan that you will do any type of aggression against Pakistan, we will not just consider about reprisal, Pakistan will retaliate,"
February 26, 2019	I. Chief of Army Staff  II. Director General of inter Services Public Relations	<b>I.</b> Forces of Pakistan completely ready to answer powerfully any attack. <b>II.</b> II. Time for India to wait for our response
February 27, 2019	Air force of Pakistan	Indian jet knocked down and pilot arrested.

Sources: Dawn, The Nation, The News , Indian Newspapers, Hindustan Times, The Indian Express, India Today, New York Times, Washington Post.

On February 26, fighter jets of India advanced Balakot, territory of Pakistan, India declared that fighter jets of India targeted the terrorists camps and assassinated some , trainers and many fighters of militants groups. But Pakistani officials refuted the explanation of India regarding attack, instead stated that the of Pakistan’s Air Force forced the plane of India to a “hasty withdrawal”( Ghumman, 2021). On February 27, Air Force of Pakistan launched attacks crossways the Line of Control and alleged that Pakistan shot down Two MiG-21 Indian jet inside Pakistani airspace and captured of an Indian pilot (“Captured Indian pilot”, 2019).

To estimate ‘strategic aspects’ of the outspreading Indian- Pakistan crisis and in mutual clash the National Command Authority of Pakistan held meeting and stressed the significance of nuclear deterrence This meeting held on a day when Pakistan’s forces performed reprisal attacks in Indian held Kashmir “open space” to display its “capability and willpower” to respond against Indian attack. Pakistan’s attack back and powerful reprisal Indian controlled, and because of supremacy of India over traditional arms , it trust on nuclear weapons for deterrence. In this background some experts and officials declared South Asia flashpoint of nuclear war. (Krepon, 2017).

Open and needless nuclear signaling undermines the atmosphere of confidence building, boosts Hindu nationalism and carries costs for future restrained dealings between the adversaries. Indian leadership selected the option to launch various traditional missile attacks on Pakistan and Pakistani decision-makers also announce a fast and powerful reply. Delhi and Islamabad exhibited aggressive threat-making signals and involved in massive quantity of bombardment on the Line of control. The crisis was on its peak, but the release of arrested Indian pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman handed over to India kept both states refrain from kinetic acceleration.

**Conclusion**

Crises between Pakistan and India had amplified since both powers had status of nuclear states. The amount and power of crises have changed the dynamics of nuclearization of South Asia. Indian had shaped a perilous strategic psychosis, because of prevailing thought among Indian decision-makers that a restricted war was conceivable, and supposed that Pakistan's assumed threat to unveiling atomic arms was only a deception. Pakistan converted into a much more secure country obsessed nuclear capability. Having developed nuclear weapons capability, plans of Pakistan regarding Kashmir go through substantial changes. Because Pakistan in conventional war is weak as

compare to India, it began taking advantage of the nuclear gestures. On other side nuclear threats worked as a substantial element to avoid armed collision between nuclear powers because there is thought prevailed among Indian decision-makers that any aggressive armed action by India possibly will be faced a nuclear attack by Pakistan. So, emerged crises managed without going into full scale war.

### **Recommendations**

In the light of analysis to evade the crisis the following recommendations are suggested.

- I. Both powers must give assurance that the possibility of a nuclear war is rejected and nuclear deterrence remains an essential element of their security and should avoid unnecessary nuclear signaling.
- II. Confidence building measures should be encouraged.
- III. Both states should encourage to start process of negotiation.
- IV. Both nuclear countries should take initiative to move from crisis management to conflict resolution.

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