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RESEARCH PAPER

Honeycomb Framework: Examining the Social and Personal Drivers of Fake News Sharing on Social Media Platforms

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ABSTRACT

Presently, the dissemination of false news is one of the greatest problems surrounding social media platforms. Fake news is a weapon used to distort and mislead people's views, contributing to the escalation of social disputes and increase of insecurity. Honeycomb framework of social media was employed to examine various elements that impact the behavior of sharing information, including fake news. Findings show that media consumers claim to engage in fact-checking and corrective measures to prevent the propagation of misleading information. The results are inconsistent with the reality where the spread of misinformation remains a serious issue. More research is needed to further understand how the personal and sociological aspects identified by the honeycomb framework influence the spread of false news and how they relate to the worldviews of the communities in which people are embedded. It is important to comprehend fake news as a part of a wider media ecosystem.

KEYWORDS Active Corrective Action, Honeycomb Framework, Instantaneous Sharing of Fake News, Passive Corrective Action, Social Media Users

Introduction

Social media has a massive impact on people's behavior online; the way they interact, share content, form communities, develop and maintain relationships, and consume news (Kietzmann, Silvestre, & McCarthy, 2012). For many people, social media has replaced traditional mass media as a major source of news content (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019). The negative link between social media and the dissemination of disinformation or 'fake news' has also been emphasized by research (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). The changed news consumption habits may have several positive effects regarding social networking, political involvement, or civic engagement (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). The term "disinformation" is used here to describe the dissemination of false information with the intent of misleading the reader or influencing their actions. When people talk about "misinformation," they usually mean false information spread without any harmful intent. Disinformation/fake news is more hazardous since it is often well-organized, has access to ample resources, and is bolstered by automated technologies. In this study all the three terms misinformation, disinformation and fake news are used interchangeably.

Significantly, the high-velocity environment of conversation, referring to the amount, speed, and frequency of exposure to shared facts and viewpoints on an array of topics and issues, has tremendous implications on social media users' opinions (O'Reilly, 2007; Malone, Laubacher, & Dellarocas, 2010). Numerous studies indicate that exposure to sources of false news hinders logical thinking, which in turn can impact readers' views, attitudes, and behaviors (Obadă, 2019) and affects perception of critical concerns may have direct effects on public health and government. (Gunther, Beck, & Nisbet, 2019; Bode &

Vraga, 2018). It can make ideas and impressions viral and sets the direction in which consumers' conversations might go (Aral & Walker, 2011; Bampo M, Ewing MT, Mather DR, Stewart D, & Wallace, 2008), and influences the collective intelligence (O'Reilly, 2007).

Concerns about the spread of false information have prompted the emergence of a new field of study in psychology (Pennycook, et al., 2021; Brady, Crockett, & Bavel, 2020; Brady, Gantman, & Bavel, 2020) (along with other disciplines like computer science (Zhou, Zafarani, Shu, & Liu, 2019), political science (Tucker, et al., 2018), and communication (Li, 2020), among others (Paletz, Auxier, & Golonka, 2019) devoted to understanding the psychological underpinnings of the dynamics of social media sharing. Understanding the reasons why individuals share incessantly online might aid in finding a solution to the rising problem. Presently, there is a paucity of literature on the elements that intensify the propagation of fake news.

Due to the fast developing Internet and social media infrastructure in Pakistan, citizens are increasingly open to state- and foreign-induced misinformation. In 2013, research indicated that 49.8% of the Pakistani population was online (January 2022). According to data, 23.9% Pakistanis used Facebook. March 2022 data shows that among the most popular social media sites, Facebook was used by 65.85% of all internet users, followed by Twitter (20.56%) and YouTube (9.71%) (Internet World Stats, 2022). Despite the importance of fact checking, 83% of journalists have never received any training in the field. Reporters (88.7%) think that social media is the least reliable news source that happens to be the major source of information for majority of population in Pakistan. Due to inadequate media literacy and a lack of fact-checking training and practice to combat disinformation, the increasing use of social media in Pakistan raises significant problems.

To investigate the behavior of spreading fake news, the current study employed the honeycomb framework of social media to examine various elements that impact the behavior of sharing information, including fake news. This study investigates the factors that may lead to the spread of false news by examining major media and psychological themes. According to the honeycomb framework, the inherent psychological incentives offered by social media platforms push media consumers to share frequently. Major research questions of this study are: RQ1: Is it a perceived lack of time that drives social media users to share news instantaneously? RQ2: Do fact-checks and corrective actions help stop media users from spreading political misinformation on social media?

Literature Review

Honeycomb Framework

Kietzmann et al. (2011) presented the honeycomb framework to comprehend the characteristics of social media activities and aspects of users' experiences with the seven building blocks of social media. Each block represents a single social media capability or feature that permits configuration of that feature with the social media user's experience and the amount of those features impact the experience. These include (i) conversation, (ii) sharing content, (iii) making ones' presence felt to others, (iv) form relationships, (v) building reputation, (vi) making groups, and (vii) curating self-identity (Kietzmann et al., 2011). All building blocks are not mutually exclusive, and all may not be included in any given social media action. These are not only the existing blocks, other blocks such as "trust" and "image" may be added in addition to reputation (Kietzmann, Silvestre, McCarthy, & Pitt, 2012, p. 117). Social media platforms typically highlight three or four main blocks to adapt to the shifting motives and demands of social media users while focusing on functionality, such as "identification" or "sharing," etc. As a result, the user's satisfaction cannot be cleanly and solely restricted to any block.

Figure 1: Honeycomb Framework

This model provides compelling viewpoints to study the engagement requirements of media consumers and how they may evolve over time, offers adequate explanations for each component. This approach is useful for connecting a variety of research threads, hypotheses, and problems relevant to social media and public affairs scholars researching users' evolving identities.

Conversation

Conversation illustrates how much communication occurs in social media environments. It highlights the users' desire to maintain group connections by exchanging news, jokes, wishes, knowledge, and rumors. The need to amuse, raise awareness about, and express opinions with other social groups may therefore be the driving force behind dialogues on social media platforms (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Okazaki, Rubio, & Campo, 2013).

Sharing

The extent of interaction of social media users, distribute, and receive content is described here (Ozanne & Ballantine, 2010). In the honeycomb model, users are encouraged to exchange material by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1997; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). Interest, curiosity, enjoyment, and involvement in the action itself are examples of intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation is driven by the desire to get a social reward such as recognition and a leadership role in the group.

Presence

Presence deals with being aware of other people's availability both online and/or in the real world as well as alerting others to one's own availability to communicate synchronously and to experience greater levels of closeness and immediacy (Elaluf-Calderwood, Kietzmann, & Saccol, 2005; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). This enables more influential interactions.

Relationships

It focuses on connections that users make with others on social media networks. These associations control the level and type of user involvement, as well as the kind and format of the content they exchange. In contrast to LinkedIn- built around business connections relating to job and career. Facebook is centered on all types of friendships.

Reputation

How much people know about and may change self and other's standing on social media: how people demonstrate social norms (social reputation), functional competence (functional repute), appear interesting, appealing, and inspiring (Eisenegger, 2009). The number of people who follow a social media user on Twitter, YouTube video, or the status provide users about their reputation.

Groups

How social media users may create or join friend networks or communities based on a common hobby or interest? Facebook groups (public, private, or secret) are used for networking, amusement, self-promotion, and informational purposes (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009). Users benefit from the ability to manage their expanding social network and choose what content certain groups may see.

Identity

The ability to publicly present one is crucial to the success of any social media user. In addition to disclosing more concrete information about oneself (age/gender), users may make more nuanced statements about who they are by, for example, joining discussion groups on a specific topic, disliking, or commenting on material. Create a profile for most social networking apps so that you may be recognized by other users. It is usually up to the individual user to select what sort of personal information they desire to expose, social media platforms provide a tremendous incentive for users to share as much information as possible.

All building piece serves as a representation of a key social media phenomenon that may be studied in the context of pertinent ideas.

Social identity Theory

The social identity theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner (1986) partially describes why people instantly share news to alert others. According to theory, people define themselves in relation to both their personal and social lives (Tajfel, 1982). A person's unique qualities: personality traits and skills, represented by their personal identity. The sense of belonging to a human group is referred to as the social aspect (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).

Thus, people may categorize themselves i.e., cognitively associate themselves with a particular group even when they are not acting in ways that would indicate membership in that group. They might not feel any emotional ties to the group either (Wang, 2017). A person may belong to several groups and have different social identities because of the self-categorization method they use to identify groupings. People might categorize themselves according to their place of employment, country, and/or gender (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

People share on social media not only to inform others, but also to form social connections and attain collective attention (Kietzmann, Silvestre, & McCarthy, 2012). People tend to share impatiently and find it beneficial to share instead of keeping the information to themselves (Nielsen & Razmerita, 2014) because keeping the information flowing helps them to stay in touch with and to engage others (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, & Nielsen, 2019), allowing them to become opinion leaders by leading followers and their respective followers further (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018) that in turn boosts their self-esteem. Some of the major motivations to share news include the need for social acceptance (Bright, 2016; Lee & Ma., 2012), emotional stimulation (Harber & Cohen., 2005; Duffy, Tandoc, & Ling., 2020), propagation of political and ideological beliefs (Weismuellera, Harrigan, Coussement, & TinaTessitore, 2022; Marwick, 2018; Uscinski, Klofstad, &

Atkinson., 2016), or to inform "friends" (Steijn & Schouten, 2013; Ghaisani, Handayani, & Munajat, 2017).

In other words, membership to a group increases people's feeling of self-worth because members of a group feel included and acquire a social identity. Being a part of an informed and current social network is one of the key reasons people share knowledge. But there is a chance that immediate news sharing may unintentionally result in the dissemination of misinformation.

Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects

Three key aspects of the sociotechnical model of media effects are used to explain why people use social media for sharing: first, people's interpretations of information vary depending on their social positioning, identity, discursive resources, and technical abilities; second, media messaging is frequently structured in specific ways to achieve a variety of goals; and third, media effects are rarely unintended. Finally, the technical affordances of different media consumption settings (such newspapers, cable television, or social media) affect how meaning is made and communicated. The presence of networked peers, as well as the algorithms and advertising mechanisms that drive social media, make this more challenging in networked situations (Marwick, 2018).

According to the active audience theory, users do not merely take in media messages but rather analyze or interpret them according to their social standing and the discursive tools at their disposal. According to Celeste Condit, viewers typically do not understand texts in dramatically diverse ways; rather they concur on the core premise of a media message (Condit, 1989; Marwick, 2018).

The second aspect assumes that media texts are polysemous (understood in a variety of ways). Polysemy indicates a restricted plurality, a circumscribed openness of the text having finite meanings (Ceccarelli, 1998; Condit, 1989). These restrictions or limitations are frequently set by the characteristics of the medium used to convey the messages (Boxman-Shabtai, 2021).

Affordance in technology studies describes what a user thinks a specific object is capable of (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, & Treem, 2017). An affordance is a potential course of action that depends on the user, the qualities of the technology, and the goal for which it is being used. For instance, Snapchat may allow users to send hilarious photographs to friends to promote intimacy and a feeling of "backstage" closeness, as opposed to Instagram, which may only let users to share a restricted number of well-chosen and edited images (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, & Treem, 2017). Although nothing inherently prevents them from posting the same candid shot to Instagram, they have quite different perceptions of what technology is capable of.

Fact-Checking

Fake news is inaccurate material intended to mislead readers into undertaking actions that may have unintended detrimental effects. Fact-checking is deemed crucial to reducing the spread of misinformation or fake news which may have harmful consequences. The argument in favor of fact checking is based in part on the idea that misleading social media users can avoid the harm if they can counter check the facts. Fake posts and news items would be harmless once they have been disproved.

But contrarily, research indicates that the impacts of disinformation are more complicated, and tend to last, and can even have the opposite effect of what was intended. Furthermore, little is yet known about how users of social media assess information that has been fact-checked and marked as fake. More concerningly, prior research indicates that

some individuals may purposefully spread false information on social media, even though their motivations are yet not fully understood.

Fact-checking is based on the idea that when presented with accurate information, individuals will change their minds, which assumes a highly passive model of the audience (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). Moreover, this approach overlooks social and cultural components and isn't backed by science. Fact-checking may make stories "stickier." According to Pennycook et al. (2017), repetition reinforces message; the more false news headlines people see, the more likely they are to trust them, even if disproving evidence is repeated.

Furthermore, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) discover that there may be a "backlash effect" if individuals reject corrections that disagree with their worldview and tend to become even more convinced of their errors (p. 303). Most people view fact-checkers' reports as just another piece of information to consider rather than a primary factor in their judgments of the accuracy and reliability of the content (Ardèvol-Abreu, Delponti, & Rodríguez-Wangüemert, 2020). Indeed, the fact-checking allows people to do better on questions pertaining to the issue's facts. However, the "hostile media effect," which refers to the notion that people who care profoundly about a subject may regard fair coverage of that subject hostile to their own point of view, has long been studied by researchers. This also holds true for fact-checking. While referring to an idea as a fact-check encourages people to examine their facts, they may even say the fact-check was biased (Li & Wagner, 2020).

Material and Methods

Participants and Sample Characteristics

A total of 108 (45.4% male; 54.6% female) social media users participated in the study. Out of them 64.8% had 14 years of education and 35.2% had 18 years of education from age brackets of 15-25 years (85.2%) and 26-45 years (14.8%). Data was collected from Lahore using Google Forms by sharing links in diverse students' social media groups.

Measures

Instantaneous Sharing of News for Creating Awareness (INS)

Recent studies have shown that people frequently spread false information without verifying it because they may think it is true (Hunt, 2016). Researchers contend that social media bots distribute false information quickly significantly restricting the ability of recipients to fact-check it (Jun et al., 2017). In short, social media users tend to share news immediately share after receiving it.

When it comes to political news, sharing tendencies may be more visible in settings with well-known people because people reserve their opinions on social media for situations; they are unfamiliar with (Moe et al., 2014). People can freely share their thoughts in well-known online social media groups like those on WhatsApp. The socio-technical model of media effects (Marwick, 2018) postulates that consumers distribute fake news since it fits well with their established worldviews, social standings, and beliefs in addition to the fact that they may have themselves been deceived by biased media.

H1. There is a positive correlation between INS and LT.

H2. There is a positive correlation between INS and PN.

Active and Passive Corrective actions on fake news

Active Corrective action (AC) comprises warning the sharer of false information to cease spreading it, confirming its veracity before spreading it, and educating the public

about the false information. Passive Corrective action (PC) comprises bringing inaccurate information on social media to light or preventing users from sharing it. Taking corrective action (AC and PC) is also consistent with the goals of identity and reputation building. Corrective action, include direct actions such as advising or indirect actions such as reporting, blocking the source. Social media users who use AC or PC actions are less likely to post such news due to a lack of time. Therefore, the following hypotheses are put forth:

H3. There is a negative correlation between AC and LT.

H4. There is a negative correlation between AC and PN.

H5. There is a negative correlation between PC and LT.

H6. There is a negative correlation between PC and PN.



Figure 2: Hypotheses of the study

Authenticating news before sharing (AN)

Social media users may tend to verify news before sharing it to put forth a more impressive image. Prioritizing news authenticity can help people gain social acceptance and improve their credibility. Therefore, it is expected that authenticating the news before sharing make social media user less likely to share false information. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed.

H7. There is a negative correlation between AN and LT

H8. There is a negative correlation between ANand PN.

Data Analysis

Data was normally distributed reflected by the skewness and kurtosis values that stood within the bounds of +1. Jarque Bera test demonstrated 31% variance that ensured the multivariate normal distribution of variables. No issues related to multicollinearity were found as the tolerance level (> .6) and variance inflation factors (VIF) below 2 for all the variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Additionally, Harman's single factor CBM test was run to confirm the absence of common method bias (Harman, 1976).

A confirmatory factor analysis was performed to judge the unidimensionality of the instrument items. The results of the CFA each item loaded showed significant loadings revealing distinct basic concept.

Reliability and Validity of the Confirmatory Factor model

For construct reliabilities, the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures was checked by following Fornell and Lackers's (1981) recommendations (Table 1).

The composite reliability (CR) value of each measure was computed (< 0.70) reflecting good internal reliability (Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014). Maximum Reliability also confirms it (> 0.70) (Tables 2). Validity stats were good. The convergent was verified by the value of average variance (AVE) extracted (> 0.50). Discriminant validity was established as the square root of AVE was greater than all the inter-construct values. Moreover, the value of AVE remains greater than MSV confirms uniqueness of each construct. Principle factor analysis was conducted to confirm the uniqueness of each measure. Additionally, the factor loadings for all the items of each variable were (> 0.50), therefore accepted as adequate (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010) see Table 1. The measurement model fit indices were excellent.

Table 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Constructs	Factor Loadings	t-value
Instantaneous Sharing of News for Creating Awareness (INS)		
I attempt to raise awareness by disseminating news online.	0.77	**
I wish to inform my internet contacts by sharing online news articles.	0.87	7.23
Active Corrective Actions on Fake News (AC)		
I wish to educate my internet friends about authentication methods.	0.72	6.44
	0.66	6.01
I encourage the sender of false news to always check its veracity before forwarding it.	0.78	**
I tell the sender of "fake news" to always verify its authenticity before forwarding it.		
Passive Corrective Actions on Fake News (PC)		
I report the account that consistently gives me false news.	0.85	**
I block accounts that provide me false information.	0.72	6.07
Authenticating News Before Sharing (AN)		
I rely on television news channels to verify the truthfulness of any message prior to disseminating it.	0.59	5.93
	0.88	8.74
Before forwarding a message, I request that my friends verify its truthfulness.		
I urge that my family/relatives verify the truthfulness of any message before forwarding it.	0.78	**
Sharing Fake News Due to Lack of Time (LT)		
I often share fake news because I don't have time to make sure it's true.	0.84	**
I share fake news because I don't have time to check facts through reliable sources.	0.90	4.43
Sharing Fake Political News (PN)		
People share political news with which they agree, even if they think it might be false.	0.76	7.06
	0.84	7.45
People share political news that they think is true because they agree with it.	0.73	**

People tend to believe news that is good for their party, even if it hasn't been confirmed yet.

Note. Measures were adopted from S. Talwar et al.

CFA Model Fit Statistics: (CMIN/DF = 1.406, CFI=0.955, TLI= 0.963, RMSEA= 0.06)

** = Items constrained for identification purposes

Table 2
Reliability and Validity of the Constructs

	CR	AVE	MSV	MaxR(H)	ISN	AC	PC	AN	LT	PN
ISN	0.866	0.764	0.057	0.874	**0.874**					
AC	0.808	0.678	0.404	0.823	0.238	**0.824**				
PC	0.763	0.519	0.433	0.771	-0.049	0.481	**0.721**			
AN	0.765	0.621	0.404	0.784	-0.048	0.636	0.549	**0.788**		
LT	0.797	0.573	0.433	0.844	0.076	0.598	0.658	0.536	**0.757**	
PN	0.821	0.605	0.428	0.831	0.218	0.393	0.381	0.262	0.654	**0.778**

Note: Bold values are the square root of AVE, and the vertical values are correlations. AC: active corrective action on fake news; PC: passive corrective action on fake news; ISN: instantaneous sharing of news; AN: authenticating news before sharing; LT: sharing fake news due to lack of time; PN: Sharing Fake political News.

The Structural Model

The structural model showed reasonable model fit indices that reflected a good fit to the data (χ^2 =1.341, df =1, p = .020, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .99, Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) = .97, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .06). It explained a 55% variance, in PN. About sharing fake news due to lack of time (LT), explained 21% variance. The variance is inferred from R^2 values which are regarded as satisfactory predictor of the variance explained (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).

The model supported majority of the hypotheses. H1 is supported as the result showed a significant positive association between INS and LT (β= 0.66, $p < 0.001$). While the effect of INS on PN (β= 0.07, $p > 0.05$) was positive but not significant supporting the H2. The results supported H3 and H4 confirming a negative correlation between AC with LT (β= -0.18, $p > 0.05$) and PN (β= -0.13, $p > 0.05$). Likewise, results of H5 and H6 showed that PC also did not share any significant correlation with LT and PN and showed same negative association with LT (β= -0.45, $p > 0.05$) and PN (β= -0.22, $p > 0.05$). The results of H7 and H8 showed that AN did not share any statistically significant correlation with LT (β = 0.06, $p > 0.05$); However, it had significant positive association with PN (β = 0.92, $p < 0.01$). The outcomes of testing the hypotheses are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
The outcomes of testing the hypotheses

Hypothesis	Path	β	Support
H1. There is a positive correlation between INS and LT.	INS → LT	.66***	Yes
H2. There is a positive correlation between INS and PN.	INS → PN	.07	Yes
H3. There is a negative correlation between AC and LT.	AC → LT	-.18	Yes
H4 There is a negative correlation between AC and PN.	AC → PN	-.13	Yes
H5. There is a negative correlation between PC and LT.	PC → LT	-.45	Yes
H6. There is a negative correlation between PC and PN.	PC → PN	-.22	Yes
H7. There is a negative correlation between AN and LT	AN → LT	.06	No
H8. There is a negative correlation between AN and PN.	AN → PN	.92***	No

The model was controlled for age, gender, and education. None of the variable significantly influenced sharing of fake news due LT or PN. Nonetheless all the three control variables showed negative relationship with PN. However, the gender variable was

negatively correlated with both the dependent factors (LT: *ß* = - 0.05, *p* > 0.05; PN: *ß* = - 0.03, *p* > 0.05). Age showed positive relationship with LT (ß = 0.09, *p* > 0.050) and with PN (*ß* = - 0.13, *p* > 0.050). Likewise, education showed positive relationship with LT (ß = - 0.07, *p* > 0.050) and with PN (*ß* = - 0.02, *p* > 0.050).

Conclusions

The findings of the study question 1: "Is it a Perceived Lack of Time that Drives Social Media Users to Share News Instantly?" the answer was found to be "Yes." The data support the related hypotheses that there is a positive association between instantaneous sharing of news with lack of time and sharing of political information. INS is found to be significantly and positively associated with lack of time – as anticipated in H1. It fits with the honeycomb framework building blocks of relationship and sharing, which indicates that the only reason to share news is not merely to spread information, but to keep personal and social networks strong (Kietzmann et al., 2011). The primary motivations for users to disseminate news stories are for purposes of stimulating conversation and attracting widespread interest (Sasahara, Hirata, Toyoda, Kitsuregawa, & Aihara, 2013).

Similarly, results supported Hypothesis 2: INS has a positive correlation with PN, suggesting that individuals disseminate political messages generously to raise group members' knowledge. According to the sociotechnical model of media effects, individuals will actively distribute political messages when they are comfortable using the technology to do so and when they feel safe expressing their thoughts (Marwick, 2018).

In response to the second research question, "Do fact-checks and corrective measures help deter media users from propagating political disinformation on social media"? Results indicate the answer is in the affirmative. The related hypotheses H3 and H5 present a negative association of active (AC) and passive corrective (PC) action with lack of time LT, respectively. The two hypotheses suggested that engaging in either active or passive corrective action reduces the immediate sharing of messages on social media. The hypotheses H4 and H6 anticipated a negative association between active and passive corrective measures (AC and PC), respectively, and the dissemination of political news (PN). The acceptance of H7 and H8 suggest that authenticating fake news (AN) has a negative association with LT and PN. The results matched theoretical assumptions and were consistent with those of similar prior studies (Talwar, Dhir, Singh, Virk, & Salo, 2020).

However, the negative correlation between fact-checking practices and instant sharing understood in terms of AI algorithms, which is the opposite of what would have been implied by the results regarding restraint from the propagation of fake news. Some people who spread misleading information to their contacts might not be doing it knowingly. Prior research in judgement and decision-making reveals that while evaluating news headlines, individuals frequently employ heuristics or mental shortcuts. The fact that viral fake news has high social media metrics (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018) cannot be overlooked. If media consumers observe that a certain fake news item has been liked and shared several times, they may perceive that the narrative is generally accepted; accordingly, they join the trend and disseminate the news on social media without understanding that the story is untrue (Pennycook, et al 2021; Simon, 1954- bandwagon effect).

Furthermore, it's possible that this negative association may not accurately represent how well media users' corrective actions have worked. However, when it comes to political news, not all reasons for disseminating incorrect information are malicious or intentional. Some individuals spread false information to express dissatisfaction or to notify others that the information was false. Such efforts to remedy the problem may be futile (Ardèvol-Abreu, Delponti, & Rodríguez-Wangüemert, 2020; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011). However, as social media algorithms may misinterpret this interaction as a signal of interest and promote the material in the news feed (DeVito, 2017; Mosseri, 2018). Eli Pariser (2012, pp. 1-2) argued that these algorithms significantly change "how we

experience ideas and information" by creating "a unique world of knowledge for each of us". A "Filter bubble" develops when algorithms alter users' viewing patterns. A person's "filter bubble" might lead to an "echo chamber" (Sunstein, 2001) where they only interact with people who share their views, reinforcing their own biased beliefs. Most of the time, people spread misinformation because they believe they are correct. This applies to all news, not just politics.

Nevertheless, little is known about how social media users evaluate information that has been fact-checked and shown to be inaccurate. It is plausible to assert that individuals support political information that they regard to be authentic. The content's perceived authenticity may be understood considering their values and ideas that form the basis of one's worldview, that are frequently contested and politicized (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2020; Bode & Vraga, 2018). When political information originates from well-known and trustworthy party leaders or groups, it is not recognized as problematic and is widely disseminated on the assumption that it is factual. Note that the term "misinformation" originally refers to how the people understood a situation (Jerit & Zhao, 2020) .

The pace at which social media groups distribute messages does not appear to be affected by the methods adopted to regulate the propagation of fake news. This finding reaffirms that social media users value instantaneity above everything else when it comes to exchanging information and communicating with one another. The social identity hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for this behavior by postulating that people's goals in engaging in social activities both online and in person are to create and strengthen their sense of self.

It is intriguing, however, since a number of recent studies challenge whether people truly believe the facts, they claim to, particularly in areas where partisans hold divergent views on what is true (Prior, Sood, & Khanna, 2015; Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2015). This is referred to as "expressive response," and it occurs when individuals "deliberately propagate misleading information" to bolster their political identification (Schaffner & Roche, 2018, p. 136).

Conclusions

The current research contributes to the understanding of the propagation of misinformation by shedding light on the role of fact-checking and the corrective efforts adopted by social media users regarding fake news. Additionally, the study investigates how the motivations of news-sharing social media users are related to the efforts they take to thwart the spread of misinformation.

The study's findings show that media consumers claim to engage in fact-checking and corrective measures to prevent the propagation of misleading information. This is inconsistent with reality where the spread of misinformation remains a serious issue.

More research is needed to further understand how the personal and sociological aspects identified by the honeycomb framework influence the spread of false news and how they relate to the worldviews of the communities in which people are embedded, such as membership and reference groups. It is important to comprehend fake news as a part of a wider media ecosystem. We need to think carefully about how algorithms and ad systems reward or promote the dissemination of harmful material, as well as how often political content appears. Finally, the well-intentioned efforts of media users to fact-check and undertake other remedial activities may still be insufficient to stem the tide of false news in the highly polarized and skeptical political environment.

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