Journal of Development and Social Sciences
www.jdss.org.pk

The Rise of Islamic Liberalism: A Qualitative Study

Muhammad Rasheed Arshad

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan

| *Corresponding Author | rarshadpk@gmail.com |

ABSTRACT

The contemporary world order from public to private, academic to politics and society is largely based on liberal values and ideals. This global hegemony of the liberal order has also become a catalyst for the liberalization of Islam. This article details the emerging trends of Liberal Islam in Muslim societies and focuses on the post 9/11 period. The wave of fundamentalism has not only caused a strange response among the modernized classes of the Muslim population, but also among traditionalists and the fundamentalists. This response is the emergence of a cosmopolitan liberalism in Muslim societies. In this article, various aspects and factors of Islamic liberalism will be discussed. The process of liberalization in the traditional circles of Pakistan and the liberalization of the Islamist political organizations are discussed as representative cases. The article would be concluded by suggesting the future of liberal Islam, the challenges it faces and how it will dominate the major interpreted versions of Islam.

Introduction

Are human rights compatible with Islam? Are they compatible with predominantly Muslim societies? Are Sharia laws necessary today? Is an individual free in Islam? Questions like these have become a common echo in the contemporary cosmopolitan culture of Islamic liberalism.

A prominent liberal Muslim scholar and activist, Tariq Ramadan, came openly on the media and social media following the attacks on Charlie Hebdo after the blasphemous attempts. He expressed explicit support for the French victims of the attacks and denounced the assassins who violated the liberal norms. He clearly expressed that the liberal norms are the very translations of the Islamic values (Khader, 2015). Many other academicians and scholars followed the trend and claimed that almost all the liberal values and ideals can be traced back to the Islamic text and its history.

The pioneers of liberal Islam have a similar outlook with that of the liberal movements in various other religions and strive to adapt to the reforms in the western societies and pursuing a freer society. They pay unusual stress for the separation of 'Church and State', endorse democratic values, propagate pluralism and diversity, advocate women and gender rights, free-thinking, and expression, and try to internalize the narrative of rights. Liberal Islam may now seem a minority in the Islamic countries, but with the ongoing political and social developments, it is expected that it might convert into the mainstream trend. This article will try to look at the history, development and factors associated with the rise of Liberal Islam.

The Contemporary Ethos

The contemporary world order, encompassing the public spheres from academic to political and economic to social, is predominantly based on the values and ideological foundation of liberalism. The values of liberalism can be seen in the clothing fashion, dietary habits, leisure activities and social connections too. Hence, in other words, liberalism enjoys

global victory. The overwhelming domination of liberalism can be observed by the attitude of opponents who themselves, willingly or not, base their case of argument on the liberal values of individual freedom. Liberalism was a slow process of civilization that was worn like a badge in the European scenario, contrary to this, it was forced vigorously in the colonized lands, Muslim lands in particular. From then on, the debates of synthesizing the liberal and Islamic values have persisted in the Muslims, until the rise of recent Arab spring and the Turkish AK Party. This phenomenon was named 'Liberal Islam' by the Indian scholar Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee. He writes, "We need not bother about nomenclature, but if some name has to be given to it, let us call it Liberal Islam" (Langlois, 2007).

This article deals mainly with the rise of Islamic cosmopolitan liberalism, however, to trace the linkages and consanguinity between liberalism and religion we must go back to the origin of liberalism. As a matter of fact, liberalism's birth took place at the same time in Europe when the previously dominant religion – Christianity – was losing its long-established form very significantly (Plant, 2001) (Nicholls, 1994). The sociologists mostly agree on the fact that liberal ideals and democratic values sprung out of the Protestant foundations of the Anglo-American society (Zaret, 1989). Liberal values such as tolerance and plurality of interpretations of truth are believed to be emanating from the Protestant beliefs of the priesthood of all believers and the rejection of papal authority. To many analysts of history, liberalism is in a lot of ways a progressive and evolved but secularized version of Christianity (Langlois, 2007).

Cosmopolitan Liberalism

Cosmopolitan liberalism is a relatively latter phenomenon. It followed the spread of modern means of communication and the world becoming a global village. It can clearly be linked to the emergence of globalization, the establishment of free markets, the end of nationalism, the rise in immigration, and the advent of feminism (Hannerz, 2007). Globalization compelled the intellectuals of the world to think of the whole world, though on a bigger canvas, with a single theory-for-everyone.

Impressed and fascinated by the success of liberalism in the modern world, the liberal cosmopolitans argued that this model should be spread and be adapted throughout the globe (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001). Cosmopolitan liberalism sprang out from the older individualistic moral egalitarianism (Beitz, 1999). Previously, liberalism had impartiality and consideration for each member of the society as equals. In fact, most of the versions of contemporary cosmopolitanism are liberal in essence.

Since liberalism was born with an inherent relationship with the modern state, it had the ideas of citizenship, human rights, and the relationship of the individual and the state ingrained in it. Cosmopolitan liberalism, subsequently, assumes a universalistic view of the rights and obligations of the citizens of the world. This view considers the world as a single coherent policy and even dreams of global liberal democracy.

Cosmopolitan liberalism subsumes the autonomy of states and even societies. It considers a global public order that must follow liberal ideals. It comes along a complete package containing, along with the liberal values, the human rights framework, liberal-democracy, liberal economics of the free market, international liberal law and institutions and the free media.

A closer look at the contemporary social and political dynamics reveals that liberalism is rising as a response to the rise of fundamentalism. Leonard Binder, the American political scientist had previously risen a question, "Will Islam become liberal?" However, the real question is not that as it is had become an evident reality now. We have been witnessing this process being unfolded in the previous two decades (Binder, 1988). The question is what caused it to happen. The basic thesis of this article is that liberal Islam is a response to the rise of fundamentalism in Islam. Liberal interpretations of Islam

emerged as a neutralizing effort to minimize the horrific effect the fundamentalism had created with the image of Islam. At the end of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first century, the world, including Muslims witnessed a blood bath played in the name of Jihad by the fundamentalist movements.

The Case of Pakistan

Since the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the military regimes in Pakistan as well as the civilian governments, to expand their constituencies to reinforce their legitimacy locally as well as to seek regional support from other Muslim governments, supported the process of Islamization in the country. However, there took place a Frankenstein effect – the unintended consequences – after the fostering of these organizations. Domestically the revivalist and fundamentalist religious organizations were fostered which were predominantly the Sunni movements. The unintended consequence of this act was the development of violent groups that were anti-Shia (subsequently after the revolution in Iran) and their counter anti-Sunni violent groups of Shia groups. Along with it the military dictatorship of that time struggled to portray itself as the vanguard to safeguard the region against Soviet expansion, thus, it supported the military resistance groups in Afghanistan. The next government of Benazir Bhutto supported the Taliban upsurge and helped in establishing an extreme fundamentalist government in the neighborhood. Also, domestically, during her tenure, she courted both sides of the sectarian divide and appeased the violent leaders of both factions to maintain her vote bank in both constituencies. Domestically sectarian violence reached a height in the following years since Nawaz Sharif also did not work against this policy. During this period, we witnessed a new uprising against the Indian occupation in the Kashmir Valley. All the governments supported this uprising morally and harnessed the military organization. The two decades of the extremist atmosphere in Pakistan created a plethora of militant organizations within the country and on the borders with the neighboring countries.

By the end of the twentieth century, Pakistan was again administered by a military dictator Pervez Musharraf who dragged Pakistan towards enlightened modernism, however, he too turned a blind eye towards these militant organizations until the 9/11 attacks. A crackdown followed the NATO intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, two decade-support of militancy was not easy to remove. Adding more to the misfortune, the sanctions on militant movements, harsh policies against the religious seminaries, delegitimizations of the traditional religious court systems in the tribal areas and the mass imprisonments of militants caused a more violent reaction from the extremist elements from Pakistan. Similarly, the disbanded militant organizations from Afghanistan and the outlawed Taliban officials also found a relatively safe haven in Pakistan. In the following years, the horrifying blood bath terrified even the terrified Islamists and revivalist fundamentalists.

Post 9/11 Fundamentalism

A big difference in pre and post 9/11 fundamentalism in Pakistan was that before the September events, the military activities were focused outside the borders of Pakistan and mostly against non-Muslims. However, the clampdown against the militant organizations turned the direction of the violent activities inside Pakistan. Though Sectarian violence was present before this too, it accelerated after 2001. Another type of militant fundamentalist movement was of those who focused to enforce shariah laws in Pakistan or revival of local sharia courts in tribal areas. The Lal Masjid uprising in 2007 was a terrifying event where Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rasheed kept thousands of men, women and children hostage in a mosque and a seminary demanding the enforcement of strict Sharia laws. The emergency concluded with the armed force commandos storming the seminary on 10th July, leaving dead hundreds of men, women, and children. Another figure was Mullah Fazlullah—who was also called 'Mullah Radio' due to the broadcasts he used to present regarding the Taliban treaties on banned radio stations in the tribal areas of

Pakistan. He was the leader of banned Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, literally, the Movement for the Implementation of the Law of Mohammad (or Islamic Law). He strengthened the TTP (Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan) which was responsible for the major massacres in Pakistan The TP claimed that the Pakistani State performed at the directive of the US and NATO killing and imprisoning its own population and that the subsequent phase of "war on terror" by the Pakistan army in the tribal areas is also a US-sponsored war against the Pakistanis and Afghan Muslims.

The biggest victims of this jihadist upsurge were Muslims themselves. According to an estimate, approximately 60,000 Pakistanis have fallen victim to this militant violence (Ali, 2016). Without discussing the causes of this violent movement (which is not relevant to our article), its impact needs to be analyzed on the creation of liberal Islam.

The Muslim Response

Even the sincere protagonists of Islam faced a shock in this post 9/11 era and rejected the violent Jihad. During the 2007 uprising in Islamabad by the Lal Masjid proponents, a large number of traditional and even nonviolent fundamentalist Islamic scholars proposed and urged them against violent methods.

Consequently, either in an apologetic manner or in reaction, the softer, more tolerant, and more liberal view of Islam emerged as an alternative narrative. Once again, verses such as "there is no compulsion in religion" and "If one wishes he may believe, and if one wishes he may reject" started to emerge. This resurgence of liberal Islam was not very surprising for traditional scholars this time. Even they were dazzled by the fundamentalist movement that caused heavy damage to the image of Islam. An example is the 'Amman Message', the resolution passed by the traditionalist scholars of the whole Muslim world in 2004, calling for tolerance and harmony.

On October 9, 2012, Malala Yousafzai, now the youngest Nobel Laureate, was shot in the Swat valley by the militants of TTP. Being a young student activist and already been portrayed in a New York Times documentary, the attack got global coverage. The attack aroused a public outcry against fundamentalist militarism within the country and a significant lot of the population turned against fundamentalist views of Islam, especially on the matter of gender roles. A group of fifty scholars issued a fatwa against the brutal attack. Zohra Yusuf, the head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan commended the "great big moderate majority" of Pakistani Muslims that "never speaks up".

The year 2014 turned all the tables down. Six militants of TTP attacked an army school in Peshawar and assassinated around 150 people including 132 children. A public consensus was developed against not only the TTP but against all fundamentalist organizations. The moratorium was lifted on the death penalty and a large number of convicted terrorists were hanged in a purge against terrorists. 477 were hanged in this purge till October 2017. Soon after this event, a military operation was launched against the militant organization which left at least 3400 militants killed in the tribal areas. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), along with this reaction, managed to broadcast successful propaganda against fundamentalism through popular culture including songs and movies. All the religious leaders and organizations too condemned the attack, and a total consensus shift was experienced in the population against fundamentalism and its ideals.

In the aftermath of the emergence of this consensus against fundamentalism, the intelligentsia and journalists started writing against the ideals of fundamentalist Islam such as shariah laws, Islamic state, etc. Liberals and Secularists such as Pervez Hoodbhoy, Raza Rumi, Nadeem Farooq Paracha had long been lobbying against these fundamentalist notions for a long time, but this time moderate Islamists came up with such opinions which strongly condemned the fundamentalist ideals. "Islam and the State: A Counter Narrative" was an article written by prominent scholar Javed Ahmad Ghamidi which initiated a strong

discourse on political Islam and created a ripple effect due to which hundreds of articles were written subsequently (Ghamidi, 2015).

His article clearly indicated a picture of cosmopolitan liberalism replacing Islamism and fundamentalism in the national conscience. This article was criticized by a few scholars for being too liberal. However, just three years after it, in January 2018, a unanimous fatwa was issued by more than 1800 scholars belonging to all the schools of thought and religious organizations. The fatwa was titled "Paigham e Pakistan" is available as a hundred-page document prepared by the Islamic research institute of International Islamic University, Islamabad sponsored by the government of Pakistan. Most of those who criticized the article written by Ghamidi had unanimously agreed to nearly all the points mention by him previously, in the updated fatwa. This shows a clear transformation paced towards a liberal version of Islam, even by the traditionalists.

Transformation of the Fundamentalist Organizations

Amidst this trend, many of the Islamist groups and scholars started to depict a shift too. The Islamist parties which used to condemn the modern political systems, especially the liberal democracy, turned out to be the greatest supporter of democracy in their countries and claimed that democracy is the most feasible political system in the current time and the nearest possible of any political version to that of the earlier caliphate of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The examples can include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamat e Islami in Pakistan, AK Party in Turkey, Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, The Islamic Salvation Front (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah) in Algeria are some of the examples. Even before the Arab spring, there had been a transformation in the Islamist parties. They had been coming closer to the minorities and the leftist associations, in a way giving up their exclusivist outlook (Abdelrahman, 2009) (Clark, 2010) (Stilt, 2010) (Schwedler, 2007). It is claimed that these transformations, 'tamed' the Islamist fundamentalist movements into liberal ones (Webb, 2015). Another shift was also prominent; the shift of scholars debating about tolerance and coexistence, about human rights, and women empowerment and also about science and technology. Many researches show that the newer generation of fundamentalist parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, is more pluralistic and open to liberal values (Glain, 2011) (Sawhney, 2008). This went to such an extent that a leader of the AK Party in Turkey, Yalçın Akdoğan claimed that "Human rights have to be defined as independent from religion … Pluralism has to be accepted… Religion has recognized the freedom to reject religion" (Akdoğan, 2004). Abdelfatah Mourou, the vice president of the Islamist Ennahdha Party in Tunisia, condemned the growing non-liberal attitudes in his followers, "When we enter the political arena, I won't say that those on my side go to heaven and those who oppose me will go to hell. Everything I suggest will be open to debate" (Kurzman, 1998). Abbasi Madani, the leader of the Islamist party in Algeria al-Jabhah al-Islāmiyah, openly declared that Pluralism is directly and necessarily related to economic growth, development and cultural diversity. Hence, "we do not monopolize religion. Democracy as we understand it means pluralism, choice, and freedom" (Brumberg, 1991).

Albeit the fact that liberal democracy, according to the experts of political science, needs necessarily the secular condition as a prerequisite, yet these Muslims and even Islamists become the supporters of liberal democracies. Nader Hashmi identifies this problem in his book 'Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy'. He argues that a form of secularism is a necessary prerequisite for the sustenance of the liberal democracy, "yet simultaneously the main political, cultural, and intellectual resources at the disposal of Muslim democrats today are theological" (Hashemi, 2009). Bernard Lewis, too, explains in detail the contradiction of Islamic tradition and its history with the ideals of liberal democracy and suggests that there is a very narrow ground considering the Muslim past to synthesize Islam with liberal democracy, "and yet" he says, "despite all these difficulties and obstacles, the democratic ideal is steadily gaining force in the region", and the manifestation of this phenomenon is that growing numbers of Arabs are now readily looking for the liberal

democratic system as their last hope that could evacuate them from their political, economic and social miseries (Lewis, 1996).

The Rise of Islamic Liberalism

By the start of the twenty-first century, the growing means of communication, developing urban and metropolitan centers in nearly every city and increasing population of people acquiring modern education create a pluralistic society. Hence the growth of Islamic liberalism took place in a multicultural context. Islam in such a context is sought as an entity ripped from its Arabic nativity and literal specificity and decontextualized so that it may conform to the ideals of progress, democracy, and liberty. After doing so, liberal Islamic movements target issues like child marriage, women empowerment, polygamy, and inheritance. They are against state interference just like other liberals around the world, and resultantly, they are against religion's interference in public affairs. They do not consider secularization as resistance against religious identity and institutions. Another characteristic of liberal Islam is its greater emphasis on public ethics and civic values than the religious virtues and morals. There are some other factors as well that supplemented the rise of Islamic liberalism. Charles Kurzman argues that the growth of education and literacy in the Muslims, the rise of free media and the formation of alternative religious institutions are the cause why Islamic liberalism boosted at the beginning of and at the end of the twentieth century (Kurzman, 1998). Though this analysis of Kurzman might be true at the second instance, during the whole century the educated, intellectual youth related with media and journalism became radicals and fundamentalists. For example, the literate youth of Egypt started following Syed Qutb, the intellectual young Iranians followed Ali Shariati and Khomeini while in Pakistan, Syed Abul Ala Maududi continued to inspire the educated youngsters. During the end of the century, this trend began to change. The inclination of the youth began to shift from Ali Shariati to Abdul Karim Soroush in Iran, from Syed Abul Ala Maududi to Javed Ahmed Ghamidi in Pakistan and from Syed Qutb to scholars like Muhammad al-Jabiri in the Arabian world. All of these scholars of liberal Islam rejected the practicability and even the possibility of an Islamic state in the modern time. Some even challenged the basic idea that there should be an Islamic state.

Liberal Muslims do not have a majority presence in any country except a few such as Turkey, Indonesia and Lebanon, however liberal Muslim intellectuals have a global presence and get large media screen time as compared to other representatives of Islam. These intellectuals also enjoy the support of large numbers of Muslims who connect them and to their videos and written material through the internet. These intellectuals do not blame any external influence for the downfall and current miserable situation of Muslims, rather they consider the internal dynamics and wrong interpretations of traditional Islam as the real cause. They are even usually critical of anti-US and anti-Israel sentiments in the Muslims. They consider such sentiments antagonistic with liberal values and condemn them. This is especially prevalent in the Muslims living in the US or in European countries who on one hand do not want to give up their Islamic identities while longing for integration in the larger society and fearing marginalization.

Liberal Islamic scholars are becoming more self-confident day by day as the liberal order gains more hegemony and dominance worldwide. These Muslim liberals are no more apologetic for their liberal stances about Islam, rather they are confidently striving to make such notions the mainstream face of Islam. These contemporary liberal Muslims are not such ignorant of modern academic thought as their academic ancestors, rather they are mostly the graduates of western academic institutions and later appointed on high meritorious academic posts. On the other hand, they are also much less apologetic for their stances on Islam and its need in solving modern problems. This self-assurance is because of their familiarity with the internal critique of modernity itself. Islamic liberalism emphasizes both the liberty of the community (ummah) from occupation and oppression, and at the same time the liberty of the individual within the community.

Another reason for the rise of the liberal version of Islam and its self-assuring nature is the growth of literacy in the Muslim world. Literate Muslims are able to read the Quranic text and the texts of traditions from the Prophet (PBUH). Along with the liberal attitude developed during their study in the modern education system, the literacy of religious texts results in a study of religion without the authority of experts. They apply their diverse and novel approaches learned from secular education in learning and later interpreting Islam. In contrast with former liberals in the colonial era and before, later, and contemporary scholars of liberal Islam are never trained as traditional scholars of Islam. For example, Bazargan in Iran and Shahrour in Syria were trained as engineers, Arkoun in Algeria and Rachid Ghannouchi in Tunisia as philosophers, Chandra Muzaffar in Malaysia, etc. These writers are resultantly more popular in the literate and especially secularly literate people.

One more indicator of the rise of liberal Islam is the institutionalization taking place at an unbelievably fast pace. More and more organizations are emerging aiming to foster liberal values of tolerance, harmony, and peaceful coexistence either with other religions or with other sects in Islam itself. Aliran in Malaysia, Hizmet in Turkey, Christian - Muslim Democracy in the Philippines, Yewwu Yewwi in Senegal, Al Mawrid in Pakistan, Freedom movement of Iran are a few of such examples. Apart from such organizations, a plethora of research institutes can be seen growing in recent years. The first of such institutes was the Islamic Research Institute in Pakistan that was headed by Dr. Fazlur Rahman. Today, more liberal Islamic institutes are situated in Western countries. International Institute of Islamic Thought in Herndon, Virginia; the Institute for Research and Islamic Studies in Houston, Texas; the World and Islam Studies Enterprise in Tampa, Florida; the Liberty for Muslim World human-rights organization in London, England; and the Ibn Khaldun Society in London and Washington, D.C are few of such institutes.

Future of Islamic Liberalism

Laith Kubba, an Iraqi journalist and a writer on liberal Islam, highlights the future of liberal Islam in the modern Muslim states in his book, 'Islam and Liberal Democracy', that with the advancements of Muslims in the economic race and the development competition they will rearrange their priorities eventually (Kubba, 1996). For them, then, the abstract and absolute notions of Islam will not be attractive, rather they would be compelled to see Islam pragmatically considering the material realities of the Islamic world. Finally, "they will continue to turn to Islam as a source of personal and communal identity and moral guidance, but they will also critically assess the legacy handed down by previous generations who may have narrowed Islam in ways that had less to do with the essence of the faith than with historical accidents and parochial circumstances" (Kubba, 1996). The liberals adhere to a linear evolutionary conception of history in which each coming era unleashes novel potentials with which the past was pregnant, instead of considering it a repeating cycle. Hence, Islam must not be confined to the interpretation of some point in the past, rather it contains the potentialities of all the eras that will have to come, in the future. A liberal Muslim writer in India, Syed Vahiduddin writes, "This static concept of religion neglects the truth that at no point of history can all possibilities be exhausted, though a given point in history might be pregnant with implications for the future. History is a process of creative expression; not a perpetual repetition, and hence it is presumptuous to limit Islam to its classical expression" Vahiduddin, 1986).

Conclusion

As for predicting whether this project of liberalizing Islam will succeed, it is perceived that by the ongoing process of historicizing the Islamic texts, as Toby Lester suggests in his article 'What is Koran', it is very much likely that Muslims will be able to synthesize Islam with liberal ideology (Lester, 1999). The rise of liberal Islam is associated with the zeitgeist and is likely to intensify in the coming years (Aras, 2004).

However, there are few challenges to the future of liberal Islam in the post 9/11 world positing a distinct religious identity. Some western critics are still skeptical of the liberalization process going on in Islam. They think that this project of liberal Islam might fail. The reason they associate with it is the lack of significant reformation in Islam, similar to protestant reform (Haines, 2015). The Reformation is said to have weakened the authoritarian chains of medieval Christianity and resulted in the rise of capitalism and the development of individualistic human beings as a fundamental unit of society.

In the Muslim world, however, almost the majority of the attempts of liberalization in Islam emanated from the authoritarian modern regimes, advocating repressive state measures. Liberal Islam has not yet become the version for the common man, and it is still very confined to the elite circles. The mainstream of the Muslim population is alienated, disenchanted, and outraged by all the ideals and values of liberalism that these states once stood for: liberalism, secularism, and a corrupted form of Western modernity.

Although the liberalization of Islam had been a western agenda and hundreds of policy papers suggesting better policies to liberalize the Muslim world have been published in the recent decades by the research institutions funded by the western regimes, a change is now being proposed by various analysts. These analysts argue that liberal Islam's relationship with Western governments is no longer dependent on continued doctrinal reconciliation through institutional backing. Rather, it is about creating an environment in which liberal ideals and democracy can naturally flourish (Mondal, 2003).

Policy experts claim that the future of liberal Islam will mainly be contingent on the level of pluralism and increasing heterogeneity in Muslims' own context and they suggest a careful policy line to be taken into consideration in the political arena as well (Aras, 2004). They hypothesize that the episode of global terrorism nurtured the hatred against any kind of fundamentalist orthodoxy in Islam, and that it is expected to reinforce the liberalization process in the Islamic world.

For this to happen, the analysts suggest that Islam must rediscover a new narrative and give up the revivalist passions of a nostalgic 'golden age', duplicating the ideal of the progress of the West. This would be only possible by a deterritorialization of Islam accommodating "difference, dissent, heterodoxy and heresy" (Kazmi, 2017).

With the emergence of cosmopolitan liberalism, the discourse of Islamic Modernism, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, is losing its credibility, and its scope and appeal in the intelligentsia and the larger population is shrinking. With the advancements of Muslims in the economic race and the development competition, they will rearrange their priorities eventually. For them, then, the abstract and absolute notions of Islam will not be attractive, rather they would be compelled to see Islam pragmatically considering the material realities of the Islamic world. Finally, Muslims will look onto Islam merely as a source of individual and collective identity or a guide for a few moral acts, and they will also critically analyze the tradition passed down by their forefathers who, according to them, might have tapered Islam in ways that have less link with the essence of the faith than with historicity of their temporal and spatial specificity.

References

Abdelrahman, M. (2009). 'With the Islamists? —Sometimes. With the State? —Never!' Cooperation between the Left and Islamists in Egypt. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 36(1), 37–54.

Ali, T. (2016, August 16). Terrorism and Pakistan. *Dawn.*

Aras, B. (2004). The future of liberal Islam. *Futures*, 36(9), 1034-1037.

Binder, L. (1988). *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*. University of Chicago Press.

Brumberg, D. (1991). Islam, Elections, and Reform in Algeria. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(1), 58–71.

Charles R. & Beitz, C. R. (1999). International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought. *World Politics*, 51(2), 269–296.

Clark, J. A. (2010). Threats, Structures, and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan. *Comparative Politics*, 43(1), 101–120.

Donohue J. J. & Esposito J. L. (2007). *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Ghamidi, J. A. (2015). Islam and the State: A Counter Narrative. *Renaissance*, 25(4), 25-40.

Glain, S. (2011). Fault Lines in the Muslim Brotherhood Seemingly within reach of unprecedented power, it faces the prospect of implosion. *Nation*, 293(11), 22-25.

Haines, C. (2015). Being Muslim, Being Cosmopolitan: Transgressing the Liberal Global. *Journal of International and Global Studies*, 7(1), 32–49.

Hashemi, N. (2009). *Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies*. Oxford University Press.

Kazmi, Z. (2021, May 1). Is It Time to Look beyond the Idea of Liberal Islam? *Aeon*. https://aeon.co/essays/is-it-time-to-look-beyond-the-idea-of-liberal-islam.

Khader, J. (2015). Repeating Fundamentalism and the Politics of the Commons: The Charlie Hebdo Tragedy and the Contradictions of Global Capitalism. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 3(1), 12–28.

Kubba, L. (1996). Islam and Liberal Democracy: Recognizing Pluralism. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), 86–89.

Kurzman, C. (1998). *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook*. Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W & Opalski, M. (2002) *Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*. Oxford University Press.

Langlois, A. J. (2007, March 1). Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Liberalism. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 10(1), 29–45.

Lester, T. (1999, January 1). What Is the Koran? *The Atlantic.*

Mondal, A. A. (2021, May 01). Liberal Islam?. *Prospect Magazine.*

Neil K Sawhney, N. K. (2008). *A Democratic Brotherhood? An Analysis of the Democratic Reorientation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood*. Harvard University.

Nicholls, D. (1993). *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Psychology Press.

Nugent, D. & Vincent, J. (2007). *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Plant, R. (2001). *Politics, Theology and History*. Cambridge University Press.

Schwedler, J. (2007). Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties. *Development*, 50(1), 56–61.

Stilt, K. (2010). 'Islam Is the Solution': Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *Texas International Law Journal*, 46, 73.

Vahiduddin, S. (1986). *Islam in India: Islamic Experience in Contemporary Thought* (Vol. 1). Chanakya Publications.

Webb, A. K. (2015). The Rise of the Cosmopolitan Traditionalists: From the Arab Spring to a Global Countermovement? *International Political Science Review*, 36(4), 425–440.

Zaret, D. (1989). Religion and the Rise of Liberal-Democratic Ideology in 17th-Century England. *American Sociological Review*, 54(2), 163–179.