

**RESEARCH PAPER****Evaluating Confidence in Government and its Determining and Contributing Factors: A Case Study of Pakistan using World Value Survey****<sup>1</sup>Yasir Zada Khan and <sup>2</sup>Tehmina Asad**

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**Corresponding Author:** yasirzkhan09@gmail.com**ABSTRACT**

This paper assesses public confidence in the Government of Pakistan and examines the key factors influencing this confidence, as identified in existing literature. Using data from the 7th wave of the World Values Survey (2017–2020), the analysis is conducted in two stages. First, Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping is employed to visualize the spatial distribution of average confidence levels across multiple dimensions, including trust in government, armed forces, judiciary, democratic and religious political systems, business ownership preferences, and overall happiness. The subsequent part of the study employs ordered-logistic regression analysis to quantify coefficient values corresponding to the determinants and contributing factors of confidence levels. These coefficients are extrapolated as mean values representative of the entire nation. Furthermore, the study generates average marginal effects of the variables, which aid in interpreting the coefficients in terms of probabilities. The study's findings underscore the pivotal role of public institutions in fostering substantial government confidence. Key determinants such as public institute confidence, income levels, education, health, life and job security, political engagement, happiness, life satisfaction, and perceptions about corruption all significantly influence and contribute to the public's confidence in the government.

**KEYWORDS** Public Confidence, Governance, Public Institutions, World Value Survey, Ordered-Logistic Regression, Average Marginal Effects, GIS Mapping, Pakistan, Political Economy, Corruption Perception, Socioeconomic Factors

**Introduction**

Confidence in government and public institutions is a cornerstone for the effective and sustained implementation of public policies at federal, provincial, and local levels. Contemporary macroeconomic theory highlights trust in government as a key determinant of how fiscal and monetary policies operate and how economic actors respond to them. The government's ability to manage complex socioeconomic challenges and foster positive expectations is central to macro-level policymaking, while at the micro level, trust is reflected in how citizens experience public services in their daily lives (Monkelbaan, 2019).

In democratic systems, a sufficient level of trust in government is critical for policies to achieve their intended outcomes; without it, policy effectiveness diminishes or diverges from its goals (Clark & Lee, 2001; Raab, 1998). This principle is embedded in the idea of good governance, where stakeholders fulfill their roles responsibly and administrative procedures serve as vital instruments for achieving policy objectives. Numerous studies confirm the strong interrelationship between good governance practices and public confidence (Nam, 2011; Moynihan & Soss, 2014; Gozgor, 2022; Muzaffar & Choudhary, 2017). Trustworthy leadership fosters confidence, while representative democracies

themselves rely on trust as one of the most crucial elements for credibility and survival (Bouckaert, 2012).

Pakistan faces persistent socioeconomic challenges that are often inadequately addressed due to deficits in public trust. Evidence shows that citizens' attitudes toward government are shaped by the quality of governance, and when confidence erodes, a cascade of social, political, and economic problems undermines institutions and administrative capacity (Jameel, Asif & Hussain, 2019; Mansoor, 2021; Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003; Newton & Norris, 2000; Muzaffar, Fern & Yaseen, 2023). Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, Pakistan has endured successive economic and political crises that have sharply reduced public confidence in the state. These crises have widened the gap between "responsiveness and responsibility," weakened democratic quality, and heightened frustration with governments compelled to adopt measures contrary to public preferences (Foster & Frieden, 2017).

However, the decline in confidence is not uniform across all districts of Pakistan. This study addresses this variation by employing GIS mapping to capture spatial patterns of trust across districts. It also undertakes descriptive and correlation analysis to assess average confidence levels in different public administrative bodies across selected regions. Building on this, ordered logistic regression is applied to evaluate the determinants and contributing factors shaping confidence in government. The analysis draws on data from the World Value Survey (WVS), wave 7 (2017–2020) (Haerpfer, Inglehart, Moreno, Welzel, Kizilova, Diez-Medrano, Lagos, Norris, Ponarin & Puranen et al., 2020).

## **Literature Review**

Public confidence in government reflects more than administrative performance: it indicates the extent to which citizens perceive government actions as aligned with their preferences and expectations (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003; Parry, 1976). Political scientists examine the structure, causes, and geopolitical significance of confidence across institutions, government, legislature, judiciary, media, industry, and armed forces, because institutional strength and legitimacy both shape and are shaped by public trust (Keele, 2007; Newton & Norris, 2000).

Trust reduces transaction costs in social and economic exchanges and helps maintain long-run stability when institutions are well designed and safeguarded (Llewellyn, Brookes & Mahon, 2013; Yosuf & Nauman, 2015). Empirical work from Pakistan supports this: effective governance practices enhance public confidence by fostering social solidarity and enabling government agencies to function more effectively; importantly, reforms must be locally embedded rather than externally imposed to succeed (Jameel, Asif & Hussain, 2019). Complementing this, organizational ethics have been identified as a central driver of citizen trust, corrupt or immoral practices weaken the positive effect of governance on public confidence (Muzaffar, Fern & Yaseen, 2024; Yousaf, Ihsan & Ellahi, 2016).

Cross-national and sectoral evidence illustrates how perceptions of authority, performance, and institutional design interact. Using World Values Survey waves, research on Turkey finds that citizens sometimes treat "government" primarily as an authority actor rather than as a functioning democracy, with the relative importance of performance versus party considerations shifting over time (Aydın & Cenker, 2012). In financial markets, investor confidence and corporate governance materially influence firm investment decisions: stronger governance correlates with higher investment levels (Shahid & Abbas, 2019), and managers' investment behavior responds to creditor and investor confidence (Polk & Sapienza, 2008; Gilchrist, Himmelberg & Huberman, 2005).

The mandate theory underscores the political logic linking electoral responsiveness to institutional legitimacy: when citizens believe their preferences are respected in decision-

making, confidence in public institutions rises (McDonald, Mendes & Budge, 2004). However, studies across new democracies show weaker ties between voters and political parties, and greater scepticism toward parties than toward parliamentary procedures or government authorities, party engagement in policy formation tends to bolster institutional credibility (Malik, Yaseen & Muzaffar, 2023; Kim, 2007).

Socioeconomic and technological factors also shape trust. Globalization, institutional quality, independent media, and macroeconomic performance influence public confidence, and demographic patterns are consistent across studies: older citizens tend to report greater trust, while youth show lower levels; health and education exhibit complex associations with confidence (Gozgor, 2022). The expanding reach of digital media transforms information flows and political engagement, evidence from Pakistan indicates that social platforms (notably Facebook among youth) and other digital tools increase political information dissemination and engagement, especially for the educated (Eijaz, 2013).

Corruption and institutional integrity remain central constraints. In Pakistan, corruption allegations have historically been used to justify extra-constitutional interventions and claims of “good governance” by military regimes (Robinson & Sattar, 2012). Broader studies likewise document pervasive misuse of official authority for private gain (Taghavi, Nikoomaram & Tootian, 2011), which undermines public trust. Trust is also affected by administrative behavior: frontline employees’ actions, responsiveness to citizens, communication, follow-through on commitments, and leadership, directly influence how the public assesses government credibility (Salminen & Ikkola-Norrbacka, 2009).

Collectively, this literature frames the study’s focus: confidence in government is multidimensional, institutionally embedded, and contingent on governance quality, ethical standards, demographic attributes, media environments, and observable administrative behavior. The following analysis builds on these strands to map spatial variation in trust across Pakistan’s districts and to identify the institutional and individual factors that explain that variation.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Institutional confidence has emerged as a pivotal element in shaping and augmenting trust and confidence levels in government. It has gained prominence in the realm of administration and governance strategies, embodying the public's anticipation of governmental success. Assessing outcomes and measuring effectiveness directly influences the surge in trust and confidence directed towards public authorities. Essentially, institutional confidence mirrors the democratic trust vested in the government's capacity to be responsive and committed to ethical standards, irrespective of ongoing public scrutiny (Easton, 1975; Batool, Asmat, & Muzaffar, 2023). Personal social psychological elements, the influence of cultural settings, and judgments of government effectiveness are also highlighted as three separate actors of public institutional confidence (Newton & Norris, 2000).

Trust and confidence in the relevant public entity and satisfaction levels with the public institutions show strong relationships. Building up confidence is more difficult to achieve than eliminating it. In other terms, the influence of a bad encounter with a governmental agency is far more significant than the consequences of a pleasant one (Kampen, De Walle & Bouckaert, 2006).

Citizens' impressions of the severity of present corruption and overall level of satisfaction with the government's anti-corruption programs have an impact on their trust and confidence in the capability of their government to manage wrongdoing. Additionally,

public trust and confidence in government efforts to combat corrupt practices are moderated by the public's endorsement of anti-corruption effectiveness (Xiao, Gong, Yu, Juang & Yuan, 2020). Confidence in government promotes good governance and further facilitates the prevention of corruption (Rothstein, 2011; Seligson, 2002; Javid, 2010). Citizens demand aspects of good governance, including high-quality services, equitable sharing of the benefits of all people, openness, traceability, involvement, and robust anti-corruption measures (UNDP, 1997).

The wealth, education, and age distributions within a nation vary greatly. Therefore, it's possible that the impact of trust and confidence in the government and people's preferences for a welfare system change depending on the demographic categories of the people. When trust and confidence in local government are strong, individuals are more inclined to indicate support for income redistribution (Yamamura, 2014; Algan, Cahuc & Sangnier, 2016).

In the United States, people with higher incomes have higher levels of trust and confidence in the government of the US (Anderson, 2010). However, in China, a higher income is inversely correlated with trust and confidence in the Chinese government (Zhao & Hu, 2017). There is a mixed argument, and it can be deemed as nations may have an indifferent effect of the income levels over the confidence in government. There is evidence that those with greater education have less confidence in the government because they tend to be more critical of it and have a higher capability to criticize it. Overall, the major inspiration for the public's confidence in the government may come from demographic factors including education, income, health, and age (Gozgor, 2022).

Additionally, factors like gender, marital status, and the number of households (such as bearing kids or living with parents) might also impact public confidence in the government (Alesina, Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2004; Ulbig, 2007). It is commonly observed that people change their perspectives with time and experiences from events in life. People are influenced by the words and actions of their surroundings which includes not only their workplace but also their friends and family members.




Figure 1 Theoretical framework Source: Author's illustration

## Data Collection

This study uses data from Wave 7 of the World Values Survey (WVS, 2017–2020), with a country focus on Pakistan. Fieldwork began in mid-2017 but, owing to COVID-19 disruptions, data collection was extended by roughly one year and concluded on 31 December 2021. The districts covered by WVS (Wave 7) in Pakistan are listed below:

**Table 1**  
**List of the Selected Districts (WVS, wave 7) of Pakistan**

Punjab		Sindh	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Baluchistan
Lahore	Layyah	Karachi	Abbottabad	Quetta
Rawalpindi	Hafizabad	Hyderabad	Peshawar	Jafarabad
Chakwal	Kasur	Sukkur	Haripur	Qila Abdullah
Sialkot	Okara	Khairpur	Nowshera	Zhob
Jhelum	Dera Ghazi Khan	Nawabshah	Mansehra	
Gujranwala	Bhakkar	Dadu	Mardan	
Gujrat	Khanewal	Sanghar	Swat	
Faisalabad	Vehari	Mirpur Khas	Bannu	
Attock	Jhang	Larkana	Karak	
Sargodha	Bahawalnagar	Ghotki		
Sheikhupura	Lodhran	Shikarpur		
Mandi Bahauddin	Bahawalpur	Thatta		
Toba Tek Singh	Muzaffargarh	Badin		
Multan	Rahim Yar Khan	Jacobabad		
Narowal	Rajanpur			
Sahiwal				

World Values Survey uses a multi-stage, territory-stratified probability sample of adults aged 18 and older, designed to yield nationally representative estimates. The procedure first divides the population into strata (for example, regions or districts), then selects primary sampling units and households within those strata, and finally draws respondents at random in proportion to the population of each stratum. This stratified probability design ensures adequate representation of key subgroups in the national sample (Haerpfer, Inglehart, Moreno, Welzel, Kizilova, Diez-Medrano, Lagos, Norris, Ponarin & Puranen et al., 2020).

## Material and Methods

The study selects and builds the following models for the regression analysis, to assess the factors affecting the confidence in the government respectively.

**Table 2**  
**Selection of Variables and Particular Models to Study**

Dependent Variable	Models (Determining and Contributing Factors)	Assigned Independent Variables	Scale
Confidence in Government Scale 1: Yes - 4: No	Model 1 (Confidence in Public Institutions)	ConfidenceArmedForces	1: Yes → 4: No
		ConfidenceThePress	1: Yes → 4: No
		ConfidenceJusticeSystem	1: Yes → 4: No
		ConfidenceElections	1: Yes → 4: No
		InterestInPolitics	1: Yes → 4: No
	Model 2 (Demographics & Income Level)	PoliticalSystemDemocracy	1: Yes → 4: No
		PoliticalSystemReligious	1: Yes → 4: No
		Age	Numeric
		Gender	1: Male - 2: Female
		HouseholdStrength	Numeric

		MaritalStatus	1: Married → 6: Never Married
		EducationLevel	1: Low Education → 3: High Education
		ScaleOfIncome	1: Low Income → 10: High Income
Model 3 (Perception of Life & Security)		Happiness	1: Yes → 4: No
		HealthStatus	1: Good → 5: Bad
		SatisfactionWithYourLife	1: No → 10: Yes
		SatisfactionWithFinancial	1: No → 10: Yes
		WorriesJob	1: Yes → 4: No
		SecurityLocal	1: Yes → 4: No
	Model 4 (Perception of Corruption)		CorruptionState
		CorruptionLocal	1: None → 4: All
		CorruptionCivilServant	1: None → 4: All
		CorruptionMedia	1: None → 4: All
		JustifiableCheatTax	1: Justified → 4: Not Justified
		InformationSourceTV	1: Yes → 5: No
		InformationSourceInternet	1: Yes → 5: No

Source: World Value Survey (Wave 7) - Pakistan

**Table 3**  
**Explaining Selected Questions from WVS (wave 7), Pakistan**

Q #	Question Statement	Variable Name	Full Description of Scale
71.		The Government?	ConfidenceGovernment
65.	How much confidence you have in....	The Armed Forces?	ConfidenceArmedForces
66.		The Press?	ConfidenceThePress
70.		The Justice/Courts System?	ConfidenceJusticeSystem
76.		The Elections?	ConfidenceElections
199.	How much are you Interested...	In Politics?	InterestInPolitics
237.		Having an Army Rule?	-
238.	What are your remarks about the political system...	Having a Democratic Political System?	PoliticalSystemDemocracy
245.		Having a system governed by religious Law in which there are no Political Parties or Elections?	PoliticalSystemReligious
262.	What is your...	Age in years?	Age
260.	What is your...	Gender	Gender
270.	How many people are there...	In your household?	HouseholdStrength
273.	What is your...	Marital Status?	MaritalStatus
275R.	What is your...	Highest Education Level? (Recoded in 3 groups) ref. Q275 for classifications	EducationLevel

288.	Where do you fall in the list of the groups of the income level for your household which...	Includes all the wages, pensions, income, and other sources?	ScaleOfIncome	1: Lowest Income Level Group → 10: Highest Income Level Group
46.	How do you feel for yourself in terms of...	Happiness?	Happiness	1: Very Happy 2: Little Happy 3: Little Not Happy 4: Not Happy
47.	How do you feel for yourself in terms of...	Health? (Subjective)	HealthStatus	1: Very Good 2: Good 3: Fair 4: Bad 5: Very Bad
49.	How much Satisfied are you...	With your Life?	SatisfactionWithYourLife	1: Not Satisfied at all → 10: Fully Satisfied
50.	How much Satisfied are you...	With your Financial Situation of household	SatisfactionWithFinancial	1: Not Satisfied at all → 10: Fully Satisfied
142.	How much Worried you get when you think of...	Losing my job or not finding a job?	WorriesJob	1: Very Worried 2: Little Worried 3: Little Not Worried 4: Not Worried
131.	How much Secure are you...	In your Neighborhood?	SecurityLocal	1: Very Secure 2: Little Secure 3: Little Insecure 4: Very Insecure
113.	How many people from these groups do you think are involved Corruption. Groups...	State Authorities / Bureaucracy in Government	CorruptionState	1: No one 2: Few 3: Many 4: Everyone
115.	How many people from these groups do you think are involved Corruption. Groups...	Local Authorities	CorruptionLocal	1: No one 2: Few 3: Many 4: Everyone
116.	How many people from these groups do you think are involved Corruption. Groups...	Civil Servants including Police, Judge, Public Officers, Doctors, Teachers etc.	CorruptionCivilServant	1: No one 2: Few 3: Many 4: Everyone
117.	How many people from these groups do you think are involved Corruption. Groups...	Journalists and Media	CorruptionMedia	1: No one 2: Few 3: Many 4: Everyone
180.	Do you feel it is...	Justified to cheat tax as soon as you get a chance to avoid paying it?	JustifiableCheatTax	1: Not Justified at all → 10: Fully Justified
202.	How frequently you obtain...	Information from TV News and Internet for the current affairs at both global and national level?	InformationSourceTV	1: Daily 2: Once a week 3: Once a month 4: Less than once a month 5: Never
206.	How frequently you obtain...	Information from TV News and Internet for the current affairs at both global and national level?	InformationSourceInternet	1: Daily 2: Once a week 3: Once a month 4: Less than once a month 5: Never
107.	What do you say there should be an increase in...	Private ownership of businesses and industries or public ownership of businesses and industries?	-	1: Increase Private Ownership → 10: Increase Public Ownership

Source: World Value Survey (Wave 7) - Pakistan

The analysis uses Wave 7 of the World Values Survey for Pakistan (fieldwork 2017–2020, extended into 2021). Because the WVS employs a stratified, multi-stage probability design, all results account for the survey structure: we apply sampling weights and report cluster-robust standard errors where appropriate. After cleaning and weighting, the

working sample comprises 1,995 respondents, which form the basis for both exploratory and multivariable analyses.

The dependent variable, confidence in government, is ordinal. Ordinal methods respect the ranked nature of the response categories without assuming equal distances between them, so they are preferable to linear models for this type of data (Fullerton, 2009). We therefore adopt ordinal techniques throughout the analysis.

We begin with Spearman's rank correlations to explore pairwise, monotonic relationships among ordinal variables. Spearman's  $\rho$  is nonparametric and does not assume linearity or normality, making it a robust first step for detecting association patterns and potential multicollinearity. These correlations guide variable selection for the multivariable models.

The primary multivariable method is ordered logistic regression (proportional odds model). This estimates how predictors, institutional trust measures, demographic characteristics, life- and security-related perceptions, and corruption beliefs, shift the odds of reporting higher confidence, controlling for other covariates. To improve interpretability for policy audiences, we convert coefficients into average marginal effects (AME), which report the average change in the probability of each confidence category associated with a one-unit change in a predictor (or a discrete change for binary variables).

### GIS Mapping

The study charts district-level averages from respondent answers and visualizes them through GIS mapping, where each map shows the mean score for a single variable (such as confidence in government, confidence in the judiciary, or happiness) aggregated to the district level. A sequential color scheme is applied, while legends specify the numeric ranges of each class. Districts are identified by their scode, and averages are classified into five categories using Jenks (natural breaks) for clearer interpretation. These visuals highlight spatial patterns across Pakistan but should be read as indicative trends, since they depict averages rather than individual responses, and small color differences do not necessarily reflect statistically significant variation.




Figure 2 District-wise distribution of average "Confidence in Government" Source: Author's illustration

The map shows average confidence in the government across selected districts. Most districts in Sindh (including Karachi) and in north-west Punjab report low or no confidence. By contrast, many districts in South Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa show moderate to high confidence.




Figure 3 District-wise distribution of average “Confidence in Armed Forces” Source: Author’s illustration

The map displays mean confidence in the armed forces by district. Many districts in Punjab report strong confidence. Sindh (outside Karachi), parts of Baluchistan, and some Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts show moderate confidence. No district reports very low confidence, indicating generally favorable public sentiment toward the armed forces.




Figure 4 District-wise distribution of average “Confidence in Judiciary System” Source: Author’s illustration

The map presents average confidence in the judiciary across districts. Southern Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and north-west Sindh record moderate to high confidence. By contrast, northern and western Punjab (which include most urban centers), some districts in Baluchistan, and a few in Sindh show low or minimal confidence.




Figure 5 District-wise distribution of average “Remarks for Political System: Democracy” Source: Author’s illustration

This map shows districts’ mean ratings of a democratic political system. South Punjab and selected Balochistan districts give predominantly positive ratings (Excellent/Good). Sindh, and the northern and central parts of Punjab, along with many districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, especially urban areas, tend to rate democracy as Fair or Poor.




Figure 6 District-wise distribution of average “Remarks for Political System: Religious Authorities” Source: Author’s illustration

The map displays district-level attitudes toward political systems led by religious authorities. Several districts in South Punjab and most districts in Sindh rate such systems as Poor or Fair. In contrast, many districts in eastern, central, and northern Punjab and some in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa rate them as Good or Excellent.




Figure 7 District-wise distribution of average “Preference of increasing Private vs. State ownership of Businesses” Source: Author’s illustration

The map shows districts’ average preference for private or state ownership. Certain districts in Punjab and Balochistan lean toward private ownership or limited state involvement. Most districts in Sindh (except Karachi), northern Punjab, and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa favor greater state ownership or limited private involvement, reflecting preferences that align with stronger state control versus private-sector orientation.




Figure 8 District-wise distribution of average “Feeling of Happiness” Source: Author’s illustration

The map presents mean happiness scores by district. A majority of districts report relatively high average happiness, and some showing lower values.

**Curve Fitting**

Following linear curve fitting has been made to understand the correlation through the distribution of the values across districts of Pakistan.




Figure 8 Curve Fitting: Confidence in government and judiciary across districts Source: Author’s illustration

The figure illustrates the distribution of average confidence levels in government and the judiciary across districts of Pakistan (with ‘scoode’ denoting district identifiers). The strong correlation between the two variables, confirmed by both rank correlation and ordered-logistic regression analyses, is reflected in the similar patterns observed. Districts in the blue region, indicating high confidence in government, also show elevated confidence in the judiciary, while those in the yellow region, with lower government confidence, exhibit correspondingly lower judicial confidence

**Estimates and Results**

The table below presents the estimates derived from the ordered logistic regression analysis for each of the designated models.

**Table 4**  
**Estimates from Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis**

		Dependent Variable (Confidence in Government)							
ConfidenceGovernment	Model (1)		Model (2)		Model (3)		Model (4)		
	Coef.	P>z	Coef.	P>z	Coef.	P>z	Coef.	P>z	
ConfidenceArmedForces	0.094326	(0.168)							
ConfidenceThePress	0.155108	(0)							
ConfidenceJusticeSystem	0.792502	(0)							
ConfidenceElections	0.526855	(0)							
InterestInPolitics	0.107393	(0.008)							
PoliticalSystemDemocracy	0.055124	(0.236)							
PoliticalSystemReligious	0.072002	(0.106)							
Age			0.005967	((0.12)					
Gender			0.05932	(0.472)					
HouseholdStrength			-0.01856	(0.214)					
MaritalStatus			-0.03476	(0.148)					
EducationLevel			-0.11539	(0.067)					
ScaleOfIncome			0.057162	(0.001)					
Happiness					0.165501	(0.008)			
HealthStatus					0.055291	(0.246)			
SatisfactionWithYourLife					-0.01358	(0.49)			
SatisfactionWithFinancial					-0.0202	(0.281)			
WorriesJob					0.150799	(0.001)			
Securitylocal					0.355537	(0)			
CorruptionState							0.142082	(0.009)	
CorruptionLocal							0.157445	(0.004)	
CorruptionCivilServant							0.047451	(0.38)	
CorruptionMedia							0.231938	(0)	
JustifiableCheatTax							0.039717	(0.043)	
InformationSourceTV							0.0335	(0.231)	
InformationSourceInternet							0.045495	(0.084)	
/cut1	2.753986		-0.73259		0.095859		0.834341		
/cut2	4.768099		0.777968		1.661383		2.409926		
/cut3	5.835903		1.59526		2.501976		3.258575		

<b>LR chi2(7)</b>	783.88	20.43	105.80	815.54
<b>Prob &gt; chi2</b>	0.0000	0.0023	0.0000	0.0000
<b>Pseudo R-Square</b>	0.1467	0.0038	0.0198	0.1578
<b>(N)</b>	1,995	1,995	1,995	1,995

Source: Author's estimations

The tables below present the estimates derived from the Spearman rank correlation analysis for each of the designated models.

**Table 5**  
**Estimates from Spearman Rank Correlations (ρ, p-value); Model 1 — Confidence in Public Institutions**

<b>Variable</b>	ConfidenceGovernment	ConfidenceArmedForces	ConfidenceThePresidents	ConfidenceJusticeSystem	ConfidenceElections	InterestInPolitics	PoliticalSystemDemocracy	PoliticalSystemReligious
ConfidenceGovernment	1.00 (—)	0.16 (0.00)	0.25 (0.00)	0.50 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)
ConfidenceArmedForces	0.16 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.17 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.02 (0.46)	0.18 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)
ConfidenceThePresidents	0.25 (0.00)	0.17 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.23 (0.00)	0.29 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)
ConfidenceJusticeSystem	0.50 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)	0.23 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.38 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)
ConfidenceElections	0.43 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.29 (0.00)	0.38 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.13 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)
InterestInPolitics	0.15 (0.00)	0.02 (0.46)	0.07 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.11 (0.00)	0.02 (0.44)
PoliticalSystemDemocracy	0.14 (0.00)	0.18 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	0.11 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.30 (0.00)
PoliticalSystemReligious	0.13 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)	0.13 (0.00)	0.02 (0.44)	0.30 (0.00)	1.00 (—)

Source: Author's estimations

**Table 6**  
**Estimates from Spearman Rank Correlations (ρ, p-value); Model 2 — Demographics & Income**

<b>Variable</b>	ConfidenceGovernment	Age	Gender	HouseholdStrength	MaritalStatus	EducationLevel	ScaleOfIncome
ConfidenceGovernment	1.00 (—)	0.06 (0.00)	0.02 (0.46)	-0.01 (0.55)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.06 (0.00)
Age	0.06 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	-0.09 (0.00)	0.18 (0.00)	-0.40 (0.00)	-0.16 (0.00)	-0.05 (0.04)
Gender	0.02 (0.46)	-0.09 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.06 (0.01)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.01)
HouseholdStrength	-0.01 (0.55)	0.18 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.28)	1.00 (—)	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.00)	0.03 (0.26)
MaritalStatus	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.40 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.23)	1.00 (—)	0.15 (0.00)	0.05 (0.03)
EducationLevel	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.11 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.20 (0.00)
ScaleOfIncome	0.06 (0.00)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.01)	0.03 (0.26)	0.05 (0.03)	0.20 (0.00)	1.00 (—)

Source: Author's estimations

**Table 7**  
**Estimates from Spearman Rank Correlations (ρ, p-value); Model 3 — Perceptions of Life & Security**

<b>Variable</b>	ConfidenceGovernment	Happiness	HealthStatus	SatisfactionWithYourLife	SatisfactionWithFinancial	WorriesJob	SecurityLocal
ConfidenceGovernment	1.00 (—)	0.13 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)	-0.10 (0.00)	-0.09 (0.00)	0.10 (0.00)	0.19 (0.00)

Happiness	0.13 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.36 (0.00)	-0.32 (0.00)	-0.31 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)	0.22 (0.00)
HealthStatus	0.09 (0.00)	0.36 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	-0.17 (0.00)	-0.15 (0.00)	0.00 (0.84)	0.16 (0.00)
SatisfactionWithYourLife	-0.10 (0.00)	-0.32 (0.00)	-0.17 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.55 (0.00)	-0.08 (0.00)	-0.15 (0.00)
SatisfactionWithFinancial	-0.09 (0.00)	-0.31 (0.00)	-0.15 (0.00)	0.55 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	-0.03 (0.21)	-0.12 (0.00)
WorriesJob	0.10 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)	0.00 (0.84)	-0.08 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.21)	1.00 (—)	0.07 (0.00)
Securitylocal	0.19 (0.00)	0.22 (0.00)	0.16 (0.00)	-0.15 (0.00)	-0.12 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	1.00 (—)

Source: Author's estimates

**Table 8**  
**Estimates from Spearman Rank Correlations ( $\rho$ , p-value); Model 4 — Perceptions of Corruption & Information**

Variable	ConfidenceGovernment	CorruptionState	CorruptionLocal	CorruptionCivilServant	CorruptionMedia	JustifiableCheatingTax	InformationSourceTV
ConfidenceGovernment	1.00 (—)	0.16 (0.00)	0.19 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.20 (0.00)	0.12 (0.00)	0.05 (0.03)
CorruptionState	0.16 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.49 (0.00)	0.44 (0.00)	0.37 (0.00)	0.03 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.06)
CorruptionLocal	0.19 (0.00)	0.49 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.46 (0.00)	0.48 (0.00)	0.14 (0.00)	0.02 (0.41)
CorruptionCivilServant	0.14 (0.00)	0.44 (0.00)	0.46 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.45 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)	0.01 (0.78)
CorruptionMedia	0.20 (0.00)	0.37 (0.00)	0.48 (0.00)	0.45 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.15 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.82)
JustifiableCheatingTax	0.12 (0.00)	0.03 (0.23)	0.14 (0.00)	0.08 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	1.00 (—)	0.13 (0.00)
InformationSourceTV	0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.41)	0.01 (0.78)	-0.01 (0.82)	0.13 (0.00)	1.00 (—)

Source: Author's estimates

The tables below present the estimates derived from the ordinal logistic regression analysis with Average Marginal Effects (AME) for each of the designated models. Dependent variable is Confidence in Government, while coefficients explain probability of occurrences.

**Table 9**  
**Ordered-logistic regression estimates with AME; Model 1**

	dy/dx	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
<b>ConfidenceArmedForces</b>						
1	-0.01532	0.011121	-1.38	0.168	-0.03712	0.006476
2	-0.00035	0.000407	-0.85	0.396	-0.00114	0.000453
3	0.004184	0.003051	1.37	0.17	-0.0018	0.010163
4	0.011482	0.008325	1.38	0.168	-0.00484	0.027798
<b>ConfidenceThePress</b>						
1	-0.02519	0.00674	-3.74	0	-0.0384	-0.01198
2	-0.00057	0.000572	-0.99	0.32	-0.00169	0.000553
3	0.006879	0.001884	3.65	0	0.003187	0.010572
4	0.01888	0.005109	3.7	0	0.008867	0.028893
<b>ConfidenceJusticeSystem</b>						
1	-0.12871	0.007155	-17.99	0	-0.14274	-0.11469
2	-0.0029	0.002713	-1.07	0.285	-0.00822	0.002415
3	0.035149	0.00239	14.71	0	0.030465	0.039834
4	0.096466	0.005532	17.44	0	0.085624	0.107307
<b>ConfidenceElections</b>						
1	-0.08557	0.007164	-11.94	0	-0.09961	-0.07153
2	-0.00193	0.001827	-1.06	0.291	-0.00551	0.001652
3	0.023367	0.002298	10.17	0	0.018864	0.027871
4	0.06413	0.005507	11.65	0	0.053337	0.074924
<b>Interestinpolitics</b>						
1	-0.01744	0.006537	-2.67	0.008	-0.03025	-0.00463
2	-0.00039	0.000391	-1.01	0.314	-0.00116	0.000372
3	0.004763	0.001803	2.64	0.008	0.001229	0.008298
4	0.013072	0.004881	2.68	0.007	0.003505	0.022639
<b>Politicalsystemdemocracy</b>						

1	-0.00895	0.00755	-1.19	0.236	-0.02375	0.005846
2	-0.0002	0.000256	-0.79	0.431	-0.0007	0.0003
3	0.002445	0.002074	1.18	0.238	-0.00162	0.00651
4	0.00671	0.005653	1.19	0.235	-0.00437	0.017789
<i>Politicssystemreligious</i>						
1	-0.01169	0.007232	-1.62	0.106	-0.02587	0.002481
2	-0.00026	0.000301	-0.88	0.381	-0.00085	0.000327
3	0.003193	0.001985	1.61	0.108	-0.0007	0.007084
4	0.008764	0.005426	1.62	0.106	-0.00187	0.0194

Source: Author's esitmatios

**Table 10**  
**Ordered-logistic regression estimates with AME; Model 2**

	dy/dx	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
<i>Age</i>						
1	-0.00121	0.00078	-1.56	0.12	-0.00274	0.000314
2	-0.00014	9.94E-05	-1.46	0.145	-0.00034	0.00005
3	0.000418	0.000269	1.56	0.12	-0.00011	0.000945
4	0.00094	0.000604	1.56	0.12	-0.00024	0.002125
<i>Gender</i>						
1	-0.01207	0.016792	-0.72	0.472	-0.04498	0.020845
2	-0.00144	0.002033	-0.71	0.479	-0.00542	0.002544
3	0.004157	0.005786	0.72	0.472	-0.00718	0.015497
4	0.009349	0.013011	0.72	0.472	-0.01615	0.03485
<i>Householdstrength</i>						
1	0.003776	0.003037	1.24	0.214	-0.00218	0.009729
2	0.000451	0.000381	1.18	0.237	-0.0003	0.001198
3	-0.0013	0.001048	-1.24	0.214	-0.00335	0.000752
4	-0.00293	0.002356	-1.24	0.214	-0.00754	0.001692
<i>Maritalstatus</i>						
1	0.00707	0.004882	1.45	0.148	-0.0025	0.016638
2	0.000844	0.000623	1.35	0.176	-0.00038	0.002065
3	-0.00244	0.001684	-1.45	0.148	-0.00574	0.000865
4	-0.00548	0.00379	-1.45	0.148	-0.01291	0.00195
<i>Educationlevel</i>						
1	0.02347	0.012774	1.84	0.066	-0.00157	0.048506
2	0.002801	0.001688	1.66	0.097	-0.00051	0.00611
3	-0.00809	0.004414	-1.83	0.067	-0.01674	0.000565
4	-0.01818	0.009921	-1.83	0.067	-0.03763	0.001259
<i>Scaleofincome</i>						
1	-0.01163	0.003644	-3.19	0.001	-0.01877	-0.00449
2	-0.00139	0.000551	-2.52	0.012	-0.00247	-0.00031
3	0.004006	0.001261	3.18	0.001	0.001535	0.006477
4	0.009009	0.002832	3.18	0.001	0.003458	0.01456

Source: Author's esitmatios

**Table 11**  
**Ordered-logistic regression estimates with AME; Model 3**

	dy/dx	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
<i>Happiness</i>						
1	-0.03291	0.012384	-2.66	0.008	-0.05718	-0.00864
2	-0.00335	0.001564	-2.14	0.032	-0.00641	-0.00028
3	0.011023	0.004171	2.64	0.008	0.002848	0.019198
4	0.025236	0.00951	2.65	0.008	0.006597	0.043874
<i>Healthstatus</i>						
1	-0.01099	0.009464	-1.16	0.245	-0.02954	0.007555
2	-0.00112	0.001018	-1.1	0.272	-0.00311	0.000876
3	0.003683	0.003174	1.16	0.246	-0.00254	0.009904
4	0.008431	0.007265	1.16	0.246	-0.00581	0.02267
<i>Satisfactionwithyourlife</i>						
1	0.0027	0.003913	0.69	0.49	-0.00497	0.010369
2	0.000275	0.000406	0.68	0.499	-0.00052	0.00107
3	-0.0009	0.001311	-0.69	0.49	-0.00347	0.001665

4	-0.00207	0.003001	-0.69	0.49	-0.00795	0.003811
<i>Satisfactionwithfinancial</i>						
1	0.004016	0.00372	1.08	0.28	-0.00328	0.011308
2	0.000409	0.000394	1.04	0.3	-0.00036	0.001181
3	-0.00135	0.001246	-1.08	0.28	-0.00379	0.001097
4	-0.00308	0.002854	-1.08	0.281	-0.00867	0.002514
<i>WorriesJob</i>						
1	-0.02999	0.008671	-3.46	0.001	-0.04698	-0.01299
2	-0.00305	0.001215	-2.51	0.012	-0.00543	-0.00067
3	0.010044	0.002929	3.43	0.001	0.004303	0.015785
4	0.022994	0.006659	3.45	0.001	0.009943	0.036045
<i>Securitylocal</i>						
1	-0.0707	0.009638	-7.34	0	-0.08959	-0.05181
2	-0.00719	0.002194	-3.28	0.001	-0.01149	-0.00289
3	0.02368	0.0033	7.18	0	0.017212	0.030148
4	0.054212	0.007478	7.25	0	0.039556	0.068868

Source: Author's esitimations

**Table 12 Ordered-logistic regression estimates with AME; Model 4**

	<b>dy/dx</b>	<b>Std. Err.</b>	<b>z</b>	<b>P&gt;z</b>	<b>[95% Conf.</b>	<b>Interval]</b>
<i>Corruptionstate</i>						
1	-0.02785	0.010644	-2.62	0.009	-0.04872	-0.00699
2	-0.00324	0.001476	-2.2	0.028	-0.00614	-0.00035
3	0.009353	0.003591	2.6	0.009	0.002314	0.016392
4	0.021744	0.008348	2.6	0.009	0.005381	0.038106
<i>Corruptionlocal</i>						
1	-0.03087	0.010675	-2.89	0.004	-0.05179	-0.00994
2	-0.00359	0.001508	-2.38	0.017	-0.00655	-0.00064
3	0.010364	0.003604	2.88	0.004	0.0033	0.017428
4	0.024095	0.008358	2.88	0.004	0.007714	0.040476
<i>CorruptionCivilServant</i>						
1	-0.0093	0.010578	-0.88	0.379	-0.03003	0.011429
2	-0.00108	0.001268	-0.85	0.393	-0.00357	0.001402
3	0.003124	0.003555	0.88	0.38	-0.00384	0.010091
4	0.007262	0.008268	0.88	0.38	-0.00894	0.023467
<i>CorruptionMedia</i>						
1	-0.04547	0.009157	-4.97	0	-0.06342	-0.02752
2	-0.00529	0.001651	-3.21	0.001	-0.00853	-0.00206
3	0.015268	0.003116	4.9	0	0.00916	0.021376
4	0.035495	0.007223	4.91	0	0.021339	0.049652
<i>JustifiableCheatTax</i>						
1	-0.00779	0.003839	-2.03	0.043	-0.01531	-0.00026
2	-0.00091	0.000495	-1.83	0.067	-0.00188	6.33E-05
3	0.002614	0.001294	2.02	0.043	7.91E-05	0.00515
4	0.006078	0.002999	2.03	0.043	0.000201	0.011955
<i>InformationsourceTV</i>						
1	-0.00657	0.005487	-1.2	0.231	-0.01732	0.004187
2	-0.00076	0.000664	-1.15	0.249	-0.00206	0.000536
3	0.002205	0.001846	1.19	0.232	-0.00141	0.005823
4	0.005127	0.004283	1.2	0.231	-0.00327	0.013522
<i>InformationsourceInternet</i>						
1	-0.00892	0.005165	-1.73	0.084	-0.01904	0.001203
2	-0.00104	0.000651	-1.6	0.111	-0.00231	0.000237
3	0.002995	0.001738	1.72	0.085	-0.00041	0.006401
4	0.006962	0.004036	1.72	0.085	-0.00095	0.014874

Source: Author's esitimations

**Interpretations**

**Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis**

Model 1: Confidence in Public Institutions

- There is a significant and positive relationship between confidence in government and confidence in public institutions, including the Armed Forces, Judiciary, Election System, and the press. The coefficients for confidence in the judiciary system and confidence in elections are higher compared to other public institutions, indicating that higher confidence in these two areas has a stronger positive impact on confidence in the government.
- There is a significant and positive relationship between confidence in government and interest in politics. Individuals with a greater interest in politics tend to have higher confidence in the government.
- The preference for the democratic and religious systems in the political system is not statistically significant in explaining the relationship with confidence in government.

#### Model 2: Demographics and Income Levels

- There is a significant and negative relationship between confidence in government and age. Older individuals tend to have less confidence in the government, while younger individuals tend to have more confidence.
- Gender has an insignificant role in explaining the relationship with confidence in government.
- Household strength has an insignificant impact on confidence in government.
- Marital status has a significant impact on confidence in government. People who are married or have been married tend to have more confidence in the government, while those who are never married or lack a partner tend to have less confidence.
- Education level has a significant and negative relationship with confidence in government. Individuals with higher education levels tend to have less confidence in the government.
- Income level has a significant and negative relationship with confidence in government. Wealthier individuals tend to have less confidence in the government.

#### Model 3: Perception of Life and Security

- There is a significant and positive relationship between confidence in government and the level of happiness. People who report higher levels of happiness tend to have higher confidence in the government.
- There is a positive but insignificant relationship between confidence in government and health status. While the coefficients are weak, the correlation analysis suggests a significant correlation. Thus, healthier individuals might have slightly higher confidence in the government.
- There is a positive but insignificant relationship between confidence in government and satisfaction in life and financial conditions. The coefficients are weak, but the correlation analysis suggests a significant correlation. Individuals who are more satisfied with their life and financial conditions tend to have slightly more confidence in the government.
- There is a significant and negative relationship between confidence in government and worries about job security. Individuals who are more worried about losing their jobs in the future tend to have less confidence in the government.
- There is a significant and positive relationship between confidence in government and the perception of security in the neighborhood. People who feel more secure in their neighborhoods tend to have higher confidence in the government.

#### Model 4: Perception of Corruption

- There is a significant and positive relationship between confidence in government and the perception of people's involvement in corruption, both at the state and local levels of government, as well as among civil servants and the media. Individuals who perceive higher levels of corruption tend to have less confidence in the government.
- People who believe that it's not justifiable to cheat on taxes when given the chance tend to have less confidence in the government. Conversely, those who find it justified to cheat taxes tend to have more confidence in the government.

- There is a positive relationship between the frequency of obtaining information from sources like the internet and TV and confidence in the government. Individuals who frequently access information from these sources tend to have more confidence in the government.

### **Spearman's Rank Correlation Analysis**

#### Model 1: Confidence in Government and Confidence in Public Institutions

- Confidence in the armed forces: As confidence in the armed forces increases, confidence in the government tends to increase.
- Confidence in the press: Higher confidence in the press is associated with higher confidence in the government.
- Confidence in the justice system: Greater confidence in the justice system corresponds to higher confidence in the government.
- Confidence in elections: When confidence in elections is higher, confidence in the government tends to be higher.
- Interest in politics: People with more interest in politics exhibit higher confidence in the government.

#### Model 2: Confidence in Government and Demographics & Income Level

- Age: Older individuals tend to have slightly higher confidence in the government.
- Income level: People with higher income levels generally exhibit higher confidence in the government.
- Gender, household strength, marital status, and education level: These variables exhibit weak or negligible correlations with confidence in government.

#### Model 3: Confidence in Government and Perception of Life & Security

- Happiness: Those who report higher levels of happiness also tend to have higher confidence in the government.
- Health status: Individuals with better health status show higher confidence in the government.
- Satisfaction with life: Higher satisfaction with life is weakly associated with slightly lower confidence in the government.
- Satisfaction with financial status: Similar to satisfaction with life, higher satisfaction with financial status is weakly correlated with slightly lower confidence in the government.
- Worries about job security: People who worry less about job security tend to have higher confidence in the government.
- Security in the neighborhood: Individuals who feel more secure in their neighborhood are more likely to have higher confidence in the government.

#### Model 4: Confidence in Government and Perception of Corruption

- Justifiable cheating on taxes: A weak positive correlation indicates that those who find justifiable reasons for cheating on taxes might have slightly higher confidence in the government.
- Corruption-related variables: There are weak correlations between confidence in government and perceptions of corruption at various levels (state, local, civil servant, media). These correlations suggest that higher perceptions of corruption are weakly linked to lower confidence in the government.
- Information sources: Confidence in government has negligible correlations with the information sources of TV and the internet.

These interpretations provide insights into the relationships among variables, but the strength and direction of these relationships might not be extremely substantial. Practical implications should be considered alongside statistical significance.

## **Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis with Average Marginal Effects (AME)**

### Model 1: Confidence in Public Institutions

- Confidence in Armed Forces: A decrease in confidence in the armed forces leads to a slight decrease in the probability of having high confidence in the government.
- Confidence in the Press: Lower confidence in the press is associated with a decreased likelihood of having high confidence in the government.
- Confidence in Justice System: Reduced confidence in the justice system results in a lower probability of high confidence in the government.
- Confidence in Elections: Decreasing confidence in the election system leads to a decrease in the probability of having high confidence in the government.
- Interest in Politics: Lower interest in politics is linked to reduced likelihood of high confidence in the government.
- Political System (Democracy and Religious): Changes in preferences for political system types have relatively minor effects on confidence in the government.

### Model 2: Demographics and Income Levels

- Age: As age increases, the probability of high confidence in the government slightly decreases.
- Gender: Gender has minimal impact on confidence in the government.
- Household Strength: Household strength has limited influence on confidence in the government.
- Marital Status: Married individuals tend to have a slightly higher probability of high confidence in the government.
- Education Level: Higher education levels are associated with a lower likelihood of high confidence in the government.
- Scale of Income: As income level increases, the probability of high confidence in the government decreases.

### Model 3: Perception of Life and Security

- Happiness: Decreased happiness is linked to a lower likelihood of high confidence in the government.
- Health Status: Health status has limited impact on confidence in the government.
- Satisfaction with Life: Satisfaction with life has minor influence on confidence in the government.
- Satisfaction with Financial Conditions: Satisfaction with financial conditions has limited impact on confidence in the government.
- Worries about Job: Increased worries about job loss are associated with a lower probability of high confidence in the government.
- Security in Neighborhood: Feeling more secure in the neighborhood leads to a higher likelihood of high confidence in the government.

### Model 4: Perception of Corruption

- Perception of State Corruption: Believing in higher state-level corruption results in lower probability of high confidence in the government.
- Perception of Local Corruption: Higher perception of local corruption is linked to a reduced likelihood of high confidence in the government.
- Perception of Civil Servant Corruption: Perception of civil servant corruption has minor influence on confidence in the government.
- Perception of Media Corruption: Higher perception of media corruption results in lower probability of high confidence in the government.
- Justifiability of Tax Cheating: Those who find tax cheating more justifiable have a lower likelihood of high confidence in the government.
- Information Source (TV and Internet): Frequency of obtaining information from TV and the Internet has minimal impact on confidence in the government.

## **Discussions and Recommendations**

The GIS maps show clear regional differences in public confidence. Policymakers should use this spatial information to design localised interventions rather than one-size-fits-all solutions. For example, provincial task forces or pilot programs can be launched in low-trust districts to test targeted service improvements (health, safety, courts) and then scaled up if successful. Using district-level maps to prioritise resources will make policy responses faster, fairer, and more cost-effective.

Rebuilding trust in government is essential for effective fiscal and economic policy. The government should begin with visible, high-impact actions in districts where confidence is weakest, simple things like improving complaint handling, reducing administrative delays, and delivering a small but meaningful set of public services on time. Publicly reporting progress using district-level dashboards will help demonstrate responsiveness and rebuild credibility with businesses and citizens.

The armed forces enjoy comparatively high public confidence; it is important to preserve this positive relationship while keeping civilian institutions strong. Maintain transparent civil-military communications and ensure civilian institutions show equal competence and accountability. Public outreach and joint community programs (e.g., disaster relief, civic education) can reinforce stability without politicising the military's role.

Judicial confidence needs strengthening where it is low. Practical steps include speeding up case processing in priority districts, improving court access (mobile courts or legal aid clinics), and transparent reporting of judicial performance metrics. Training for lower-court staff on responsiveness and case management, paired with a public information campaign explaining rights and procedures, can raise public perceptions of fairness and effectiveness.

Changing attitudes toward democracy, especially in Sindh and parts of Punjab, require diagnosis and action. Conduct qualitative studies and citizen dialogues to understand specific grievances (service delivery, representation, or corruption). Strengthen local democratic institutions by improving local council performance, increasing transparency in decision-making, and ensuring meaningful citizen participation in policy choices that affect their communities.

Divergent preferences for state versus private ownership call for nuanced market and industrial policy. Where people prefer state ownership, focus on improving public enterprise performance and governance to attract trust and investment. Where private ownership is preferred, reduce regulatory uncertainty and provide incentives for private sector development. Align investment promotion and industrial policy with local preferences to attract both public support and private investment.

Regression findings point to deeper drivers of trust that require broader social policy. Health, living standards, job security, and neighborhood safety strongly affect confidence; therefore, social protection, public health investments, and local employment initiatives should be central to trust-rebuilding strategies. Target these programs first at districts with low confidence to produce visible improvements in people's daily lives.

Demographics matter: older, more educated, and higher-income groups show different responses to policy. Fiscal measures and communication strategies should be tailored, use progressive social policies where needed, and present clear, evidence-based explanations of fiscal reforms to educated and income-earning groups to reduce scepticism. Consider citizen advisory panels that include diverse demographic groups to test policy messaging and design.

Combating corruption and strengthening institutional transparency are non-negotiable. Strengthen audit, grievance, and accountability systems at the district level, publish procurement and budget data openly, and enforce clear disciplinary procedures. Combine these reforms with a public education campaign on anti-corruption mechanisms and a simple, accessible reporting channel so citizens can both see and verify that reforms are working.

## **Conclusion**

This study examined public confidence in the Government of Pakistan using a mixed-methods approach: descriptive statistics, GIS-based spatial mapping, and ordered-logistic regression with Average Marginal Effects (AME). Combining these methods allowed us to move beyond single-number summaries and to reveal both where confidence is concentrated and which factors most strongly shape it. GIS mapping exposed clear spatial patterns and provincial inequalities in trust. Some regions show consistently higher confidence while others lag, indicating that national policies will be more effective when they are tailored to local conditions. Mapping therefore serves as a practical diagnostic tool to prioritize districts for targeted interventions. The regression analysis and AME estimates identified the key demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal drivers of confidence, and quantified their relative importance. Variables such as perceived corruption, quality of life indicators (health, job security, neighborhood safety), and institutional performance emerged as significant predictors. Demographic characteristics moderated these relationships, underlining that the same policy may have different effects across age, education, and income groups.

From a policy standpoint, the evidence supports a two-track strategy: (1) place-based interventions that address district-level deficits revealed by GIS, and (2) systemic reforms that strengthen institutional performance, transparency, and service delivery to build trust broadly. Prioritizing visible, local improvements, alongside stronger anti-corruption measures and better communication of reforms, should yield the most immediate gains in public confidence.

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