



**RESEARCH PAPER**

**Radicalism in Pakistan: An Analytical Perspective**

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PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
<b>Received:</b> February 13, 2022 <b>Accepted:</b> April 24, 2022 <b>Online:</b> April 26, 2022 <b>Keywords:</b> Democracy, Intolerant, Islam, Pakistan, Radical <b>*Corresponding Author</b> Samra.hameed26@gmail.com	The actual problem is that there is no culture of stimulating the intolerant discourse which has formed a violent Pakistani society and it has challenged the liberal values of the state. The radical's narrative is based on the concept that Pakistan is an Islamic country, only way of being a good Muslim, and to create an ideal Islamic state which denounces the western ideas of democracy and liberalism. There are number of internal and external factors which helped to radicalize the already polarized society, resulted in extremism, sectarianism and militancy. Military and political leadership helped to patronage radicals for their own benefits. The moderate and liberal voices of the society are forced to remain silent and this silence is interpreted as the support of the radicals by the West. Radical's strong hold and lack of unified approach to contain them caused serious problems. This paper aims to explain the radical's narrative and find a counter narrative of moderate and liberal Pakistan.

**Introduction**

Radicalism is not fundamental of Islam but the radical interpretation of Islamic principles is very common in many geographical regions. In many Muslim countries, radical approaches towards Islam have caused radicalization of the country (Saikal, 2003). There are number of factors and reasons for this radicalization like political, economic and social factor which are the main causes of the radicalization because radical actions cannot be taken without any solid political support (Ahrari, 2000). Nasr (2002) argues that there are a number of factors which are equally significant for the radicalization. The curriculum has an important factor in patronage of hate and intolerance towards the other groups of the society (Fair, 2010). This curriculum of different seminaries has cultivated and given rise to the sectarian killing in Pakistan (Roy, 2002). Traditionally, the moderate Islamic beliefs and culture practiced by the Sufis played an important role in spreading harmony and love in sub-continent. Such unified bond appeared to be opposed by the radicalized Taliban mindset (Yusuf, 2008) which resulted in the fragmentation of Pakistan and brought instability and conflict not only to the country but to the whole region (Kirby, 2007). Among the other factors, economic factor considerably caused extremism as it can be witnessed in Pakistan after 1979 during war against Soviet in Afghanistan. The capitalist interests of America helped in the patronage of the fundamentalists and radical elements (Ahrari, 2000) & (Karamat, Muzaffar & Shah, 2019)

This paper elaborates the meaning of radicalism and the link between different states and these radicals. Moreover, it also highlights the way the political parties and

politics have provided a strong base to these elements in order to deepen their roots. It is important to view how radicalism has affected almost every field of life. It has changed the outlook of Pakistan and is considered as a grave threat to the peace and stability of whole world. This study therefore, elucidates its cause, spread and effects on Pakistani society and analytically explains the radicalism in Pakistan.

### **Radicalization: Definition**

Radicalism is derived from the Latin word "Radis" which means root and it is considered as the root of fundamentalism (Merriam Webster Dictionary). Many scholars have defined radicalization as a process in which extremist ideas are gradually adopted by an individual and justify violence to spread its ideals. According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2010) "Radicalization is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and the attainment of particular goals justify the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both, mental and emotional process, that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behavior" (p. 38). Stevens and Neuman (2009) argue that in the present situation, radicalism is mostly described as a process where an individual or group uses violence for political purposes and it is different from non-violent radicalism. Extremist ideas turn the mind of masses into violent radicals. Crossett and Spitaletta (2010) provide a comprehensive sociological concept of radicalism as "the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)" (p. 10). Radicalism or radicalization initially does not lead to violence; it is a gradual process until the gravity of the situation is so escalated. Western concept of radicalism believes it as anti-democratic and anti-liberal values but it can easily be termed as a mindset translated into religious and political actions as it becomes violent and gives force to terrorism (Hashmi, 2009). Nielson states that a society is radicalized in six stages

1. Injustice
2. Validation of any kind of violence including political, ideological and religious
3. Accusing and discrediting the victim for violence
4. Degrading and desensitizing the victim through different signs and language
5. Blame game, putting the responsibility on God or authorities and displacing it
6. Reducing and misconstruing the effects by using various methods like contrasting it with previous acts which are comparatively worse, or euphemisms

Religious radicalism may be defined as a person or a group which embrace extreme religious beliefs that reject the contemporary ideas of freedom and challenge status.

### **Radicalism in Pakistani Perspective**

In sub-continent, W.W. Hunter used the term fanatic first time for Sayyid Ahmad for his ideas of war against British rule and Touheed while in 20th century the Deobandi-tribal nexus against British rule started a new and exciting anti-colonial and pan-Islamism politics. Feyyez explains that in colonial definitions oriental writers' contextualized radicalism as fanaticism and politically driven while post-colonial definitions emphasize that it is more religious motivated.

It is quite difficult to explain radicalism in Pakistani perspective because Pakistani society is divided on ideological, ethno-linguistic, political and sectarian bases. Pakistani scholars do not agree on any unanimous definition of radicalism because there are different opinions either to accept it as a problem or just a western discourse to defame Pakistan or Muslim countries. There is huge disparity in Pakistani and western contexts to establish radicalism as a problem or not because it is often associated with terrorism which makes it hard to develop any coherent approach to tackle it. The problem is contributing in the increase of violence in Pakistani society.

### **Historical Background**

The idea of Pakistan and its independence in 1947 was not appreciated by religious groups of the sub-continent because of their differences with the Muslim League's leaders and their orientation. Muslim League was able to use Islam and mobilize Muslim masses during Pakistan movement although it has secular orientation and most of its leaders including Jinnah were educated, liberal and progressive who believed in the formation of a democratic state. But after Pakistan's creation the first decade strengthened Political Islam which led to radicalization of the society. Objective resolution and later in 1953 the anti-Ahmadi riots in Punjab set the very base of Pakistan's future (Ahmad, 2015).

In Pakistan radicalism during military rule and civilian government its performance was quite dismal because military rulers to strengthen and extend their rule are bound to embrace the right-wing support. But Pakistan has paid the heavy price of this embrace over the time.

In Pakistan's case a number of circumstances added to the propellants of radicalism list including domestic and external circumstances. Economic and political institutions specifically military helped to provide the ground for the legitimacy of religious right. The madrasahs became a source of breeding ground for the radical elements. External factors like ideological revolution in Iran, in Afghanistan the recruitment of Pakistani and Arab mujahedeen to counter Soviet intervention and later the infiltration of these mujahedeen in Kashmir to fight India that resulted in the up rise against Indian occupation in 1989 and became a major factor of radicalization and the catastrophic upheavals in Pakistan's vicinity. But apart from these factors, the number of other economic and political dynamics are also associated with the emergence of political Islam in Pakistan which helped to flourish the radicalism in Pakistan. It cannot be exclusively contributed to one cause because Pakistan has an amazing array of forces to feed it (Wirsing, 2004).

### **Objective Resolution**

The descent started in 1949 when the first constituent assembly made it clear that the sole objective of creation of Pakistan is to form an Islamic state with the approval of Objective Resolution. The Objective resolution defined state in Islamic terms and it opened the door for further legislation by the parliamentary majority based on their interpretation of the Islam. Newly born state was rushed into power struggle between generals, bureaucrats and regional politicians and every one of them invoked religion to enhance its credibility. This use had serious implications and it bogged down Pakistan into the ideological debate of role of religion in the national affairs.

### **Religious Purification**

Pakistan has embraced the idea of religious cleansing soon after its independence. Initially it was about the Christian and Hindus but over time the idea of purification and

protection demanded the Shias and Ahmadis exclusion too. These demands were backed by the street protests and clerics were able to get state approval and concessions in 1950's. In early two decades of 1950's and 1960's religious groups like Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat, Majlis-e-Ahrar and Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan strengthened themselves politically. Some of them were funded and provided weaponry to advance and obtain foreign policy goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Consequently, these religious parties did not limit themselves to this specific goal they extended their parties to contest elections and demanded legislation against minorities (Muzaffar, Khan & Karamat, 2017)

In 1953, protest against Ahmadis escalated in the whole province and caused in the casualties of 2000 Ahmadis. These riots anticipated as the most brutal treatment of the decade for the non-Muslim. Chief Justice Mohammed Munir and Chief Justice Muhammad Rustam Kayani headed a Judicial Commission concluded that most noteworthy finding about the religious leaders' attitude towards the non-Muslims. The commission's report mentioned that leading Ulema demanded that non-Muslims should be Dhimmis and not given status of full citizens in the Islamic Pakistan. Non-Muslims could not hold any key position in law making, administration and could not hold any public office. The first constitution of Pakistan in 1956 included objective resolution as preamble and promoted the Islamic principles and barred non-Muslims from holding public office.

### **Flourishing the Islamic Ideology**

Ayub Khan was the first military dictator in Pakistan who ruled over ten years. He abrogated the 1956's constitution and introduced a new presidential constitution in 1962 which introduced couple of Islamic provisions like establishing the Islamic Ideology Council to bring and make all laws according to Islamic guideline. He changed the syllabus and emphasized on Islamic ideology and Islam's martial traditions. Initially he was quite liberal in his approach but he started to use religion with gradual downfall of his regime. But overall Ayub's authoritarian era brought a little bit of relief for minorities from intolerance which engulfed the country since its creation (Ispahani, 2018).

### **Legal and Constitutional Changes towards Radicalism**

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto publicly promoted the image of a secular and modern state but after coming into power he ruled differently as mentioned by Feldman (1974) "a distinctly obscurantist tendency and an unconstructive harping on Islam" (pp. 39-40). A liberal and western educated person leader introduced 1973's constitution which was more Islamic in its nature than 1956 and 62. First time the political elite tried to define Muslim who believes that Muhammad (PBUH) is the last prophet. Through the second amendment of the constitution of 1973 passed by Bhutto government, Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims.

### **Radicalization of Pakistani Society**

The emergence of Zia-ul-Haq redefined and reshaped the Pakistan. He was declared as a messiah who can transform the Pakistani society into a real Islamic state which was promised by Muslim leaders. The real Islam of enlightenment and tolerance was replaced with the Islam thought by the religious parties and religious clerics depicting their own interests. This transformation transferred Pakistani society into a radical one.

Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) went further to Islamize the society. Zia promoted the madrasahs with foreign and state funding. Hardline religious clerics were allowed to preach on national TV and militias were trained to fight jihad against Russia in Afghanistan. As a result, these groups started to spread violence on the Pakistani land and began an era of

sectarian violence where all sects were equally targeted. He tried to legitimize his rule through Islamization. He changed the Social Studies to Pakistan Studies to enroot Islamic ideology in the brains of students and create such generation which will be wedded to Islamic ideology. The most disastrous consequence of this policy was that he quashed and tarnished the ability of critical thinking of the next generation. Zia introduced the religious bigotry to the students which caused to damage their feeling of empathy to minorities.

In case of Zakat issue, when Shias objected to pay zakat according to their religious laws despite, they offered to pay Khums. The Shia backlash helped Zia to consolidate Sunni opinion in his favor. Thousands of Shias marched towards Rawalpindi resulted in violence. Later, Zia amended that anyone who considers Zakat against their religious beliefs is exempted from tax. Although Shias won the argument but this win caused anger among Zia and other generals for defying the martial law rules. The government was afraid that Shias might get support from Iran and to handle this scenario Zia cultivated the extremist sunni groups that declared Shias non-Muslim as Nasr explained that martial law administrator of Punjab, General Ghulam Gilani deliberately turned a blind eye to growing Sunni militancy and the rise of armed bands centered in madrasas after 1980, to address the problem of shia resurgence” (pp. 155-157). Ispahani summed up that “under Zia rule, Pakistan’s legal system was methodically transformed against religious minorities and their right to maintain or profess their beliefs openly” (Ispahani, 2018).

“PPC (The Pakistan Penal Code and CrPC (Criminal Procedure Code) were amended through Ordinance in 1980, 1982 and 1986 criminalizing anything causing dishonor to the Holy prophet (PBUH), Ahl-e-Bait (Family of Prophet), Sahaba (companions of the Prophet) and Shaar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols). A simple complaint to the police over these crimes could result in arrest and trial leading to punishments of imprisonment or fine or both. Article 295A of PPC says that a deliberate and malicious act to outrage religious feeling of any class by insulting or with fine or with both; 295B makes the defiling of Holy Quran punishable by imprisonment for life; 295C mentions that the use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) by punished by death and fine; 298 A makes the use of insulting remarks in respect of the Holy personages as punishable by 3 years imprisonment or with fine or with both; 298 B mentions the misuse of epithets description and titles reserved for certain holy personages or place of Islam by Ahmadi as punishable by 3 years imprisonment and fine; and 298 C makes an Ahmadi calling himself Muslims or preaching or propagating his faith or outraging the religious feeling of Muslim or posing himself a Muslim a punishable crime for 3 years imprisonment and fine” (Ispahani, 2018). These legal changes empowered bigot Pakistani Muslims to prosecute minorities by false accusations and vague Blasphemy Law.

Apart from these legal changes and laws the abduction and forced conversion of Hindu women in Sind resulted in plethora cases during Zia era. There are number of instances when powerful and wealthy men kidnapped young underage non-Muslim girls later claimed that these girls changed their religion by their will and afterwards fake witnesses were fabricated to prove this. Internationally, Pakistani government was alleged of endorsing prejudice through changes in their laws.

### **Consequences of Zia’s Legacy**

After the death of Zia-ul-Haq Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister of Pakistan. She was foreign educated and it was believed that she would stave off the fate of Pakistan from Zia’s Islamization but she received severe criticism from religious parties and clerics. The Zia’s inheritance was so deep rooted that it was still alive and thriving after his demise too and eventually liberal political forces had to compromise on Islamization. In most of the

cases, the Benazir government was just a helpless, silent observer which could not do much to reduce religious discrimination. Apart from persecution of the religious minorities the target killing of the religious scholars became eminent phenomena during 1990's. Her second turn also faced the similar challenges. The rise of Taliban and the declining economy left little room for her to make changes which were needed to stop harassment and abuse against religious minorities.

After Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif made his government with the help of religious parties. He was promoted and became minister during Zia government and had great influence of Zia's ideology. After coming into power, he passed the Sharia bill in 1991 which declared Quran and Sunnah the law of the land. This bill opened the ways for the courts to base their judgments on Islamic ways. It was considered as one step further close to the theocratic state. In his second term he was even more eager to present himself as the champion of Islam. He attempted to Islamize Pakistan on the Zia's pattern but he could not because of the Nawaz was a civilian leader with limited power while Zia enjoy unlimited powers. Zia and his legacy had inevitable consequences for Pakistan as it promoted sectarian tolerance and religious militancy.

Nawaz was thrown out by Musharraf's coup on 12th October 1999. He promised a moderate and liberal Pakistan. He acknowledged that the governmental administration should look over the problem of religious extremism. Musharraf said that Islam as a religion of forbearance and patience declares that religious minorities will be equal citizens and will have full rights in the light of Islamic laws. Gradually with every passing day he had to compromise for his rule. He adopted the stance similar to earlier dictators. Although not a rigid one like Zia's stance but quite similar to Ayub Khan who was not Islamist but strengthened the Islamic identity of the state for internal and external policies.

Musharraf after assuring his strong hold with the help of religious parties, he was reluctant to stop them. The NWFP assembly passed the Hisba Bill in 2005 which enforced sharia in the province. However, the Supreme Court stepped in and declared it against the basic human rights guaranteed in 1973 constitution. It was another step forward towards the religion and politics wedding inextricably.

The tendency to accommodate extremists and their illegal demands remained relevant during democratic governments too. After Musharraf's departure, PPP came into power in center and ANP in NWFP. In 2009, the Nizam-e-Adl Agreement between ANP government and Muhammad's Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shairat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) was signed by president Zardari was a classic example of how everyone in power either military rule or civilian politicians can go to any extent to prolong and strengthen their rule. This agreement established a "state within a state" where radicals had complete sway (Saigol, 2009). Both PPP and PML (N) liberal and democratic parties agreed on this agreement. Initially, Nawaz Sharif and PML (N) adopted a religious texture but later by looking at the changing circumstances and internal dynamics of the party it adopted liberal approach but still comfortable with alliance with Mullana Fazl-ur-Rehman.

During Musharraf era the proliferation of the madrasas was at the alarming level. Ispahani narrates that the number of madrasas had risen from 6761 in 2000 to 11221 in 2005 to 28982 in 2011. The terrorist attacks were doubled during these years but the attacks on the minorities had increased at an alarming level. During 2012 to 2013 the violence against minorities has gotten worst during 2012 and in early quarter of 2013 67 terrorist attacks were made on Shia community including suicide bomb attack while performing their religious duties. During these years 54 attacks were made on Ahmadis, 37 against Christians, 16 on Hindus while 3 were made on Sikh community. These terrorists

more specifically assailants of minorities are rarely prosecuted and if it is so the weak judicial system of Pakistan cannot hold them responsible for so long and perpetually sets them free. Apart from minority group the sectarian violence has also affected the majority community like Sunnis (Ispahani, 2018).

The religious radicalism has increased to the extent that it had not only affected the minority groups like Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Shias but also the other Sunni Muslims who dare to ask the religious exclusion of minorities from the social life of the country and questions the blasphemy laws. Shahbaz Taseer, Governor Punjab was shot dead by Mumtaz Qadri, federal minister Shahbaz Bhatti, human right activist Rasheed Rehman were assassinated. Asia Bibi was arrested and sentenced to death on blasphemy charges. A student of Mardan University Mishal Khan was lynched to death on the false blasphemy accusations by a politically motivated group. The death plenty and hanging of Mumtaz Qadri and the reaction the majority of the Pakistanis was frightening to show the future landscape of the state.

A shoe was thrown on Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, federal minister Ahsan Iqbal escaped a deadly attack on the allegation s of the changing in the oath about khatm-e Nabuwat. This oath changing resulted in the Faizabad sit down which was allegedly supported by the Pakistani military to sabotage and pressurize Nawaz Sharif. The capacity of radical parties to mobilize support as TLP had done during sit-in in Islamabad in 2017 has frightened the already bigoted society.

TLP's three weeks protest in Islamabad came to an end on 26th November with the resignation of three federal ministers which is termed as an agreement meant to overwhelm the validity and ethical uprightness of the Nawaz government and entire state organizations. It was sparked on the speculated changes in the oath declaration form although it was dismissed as a clerical mistake and quickly removed. However, they persisted with the demand of resignation of the ministers on the blasphemy charges. Later on, the resignation of federal law minister he was forced to apologize and assured the nation that he believed in Khatam-e-Nabuwat. This sit-in was the result of military support as it was criticized by the Islamabad high court as extra judicial meddling. The TLP leadership refused to negotiate with civilian leadership and on the end, the military controlled paramilitary distributed money in the protesters (Siddiqui, 2017). Other political parties were quick to capitalize the situation and publicly sided with the protesters. They exploited the situation for their political gains holding PML (N) members responsible for interfering in the religious matters. These political opponents used religion card without noticing its daring effects on the society.

After Nawaz Sharif's dismissal from the office, Jamaat-ud-Dawa announced its entry in politics officially. This exploitation by the political parties gave rise to Khadim Rizvi in 2018's election where it Tehreek-e-Labaik. TLP mobilized mass support through criticizing Election Bill and the government on trying to tempering the declaration oath for parliamentary candidates. TLP emerged as a strong political force with a huge vote bank. TLP mobilized mass support through criticizing Election Bill and the government on trying to tempering the declaration oath for parliamentary candidates. It is alarming to see TLP emerged as the third majority party in Punjab in 2018's election. TLP took part in elections on emotional religious rhetoric of Khatm-e-Nabuwat and was successful to get approximately 2 million votes without any electoral manifesto or development plans in any sector. The TLP's vote bank seriously damaged PLM (N)'s strong right-leaning religious vote bank.

Political parties have understood the fact that by supporting bigoted legislation they can appease the voters which is not possible with their poor performance in governance. These political parties promoted the culture of bigotry and intolerance, and they became a victim of this radicalism themselves (Jamal, 2020). In September's by elections the TLP supported candidate got 11 % votes (Siddiqi, 2018).

In July 2020, Khwaja Asif, former law minister, was accused of committing blasphemy on simply narrating the equality of all religions. All political parties (PML (N), PPP and PML (Q)) joined their hands united to pass Tahafuzz-e-Bunyad-e-Islam Bill, ironically presented by a member of Democratic Party PML (Q) and not even by any individual of Islamist party. The rational unconditional support to bill in a polarized environment hardly tolerates each other, all three parties joined hands immediately for the safeguard of Islam in order to maintain the verdict of their supporters.

### **Human Rights Violation during Last Decade**

South Asian terrorism portal's data indicate that during 2001 to 2018 almost 471 attacks were done on Shias which resulted in the death of 2,693 people and 4947 injured. According to Pakistan's National Commission for Justice and Peace during 1987 to 2018, 776 Muslims, 505 Ahmadis, 229 Christians and 30 Hindus were accused under blasphemy laws. Human rights commission report of 2017 stats that every year over 1000 non-Muslim girls are forcefully converted to Islam and almost 5000 Hindus migrate to India which shrink the non-Muslim percentage in Pakistan to only 4 %.

### **External and Internal Factors to Promote Radicalism**

Pakistan's school curriculum and discourse resulted in the religious prejudice quite opposite to the vision of the Muhammad Ali Jinnah who dreamed of a secular and liberal Pakistan where all diversity of beliefs could be respected. As Noam Chomsky said that the religious intolerance has increased extremism and terrorism across the country. It hindered the progress of the state and it is greatest threat to the country today. The tolerant and liberal voices and being attacked and felt besieged. But still there is hope as many human right activists, politicians and newspapers have raised their voices for moderate and pluralist Pakistan.

Hassan Askari Rizvi (2000) explains that in Pakistan masses are religiously inspired by the state system and the political discourse has become a useful tool to influence the minds of countless people who observe national and international affairs in religious terms. Pakistani youth is impressed and prone to Islamic radicalism because they do not feel obligated to societal responsibilities but to find a way in Islamic context because they have nothing to look forward. They are vulnerable to political religious slogans which forms their disposition toward the country. Amir Rana (a security analyst) identifies three levels to understand the different drives which affect the different classes of the society. Firstly, the poor areas like south Punjab, rural Sindh and tribal areas where the main source of radicalism is poverty, poor administrative structure and inequality. Secondly the middle classes settled in urban and semi-urban areas are mostly influenced by the political developments and promoted radical narrative by media houses and the thirdly the upper class which alienate themselves from the society. Saddiqa (2011) strongly disagrees with this notion and argues that in Pakistan, it is strongly believed that lack of education and poverty are the main causes to fuel militancy and radicalism. Good jobs and fortune can distract them from joining Jihadi groups. Apart from this section, radicalism is spreading rapidly amongst upper and lower middle class as well. It is emerging as a part of pop-culture



and it is becoming difficult to stop poor from turning into militants due to financial reasons but because of their desire to be part of those classes which are above them.

Apart from internal factors, external factors are equally important to radicalize Pakistani society. Mujahedeen were never decommissioned in Afghanistan. After successful Jihad in Afghanistan they created chaos in Pakistan. The ideas and ideals of hatred which were propagated to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir did not limit itself to a specific geographical limit. It has started to haunt Pakistan. The madrasahs were funded by America, Gulf and Arab countries while the students were recruited from the tribal belt mostly Pashtuns and Afghan immigrants. After Soviet departure from Afghanistan there were estimated 40,000 to 60,000 jihadists were there and it was hard to decommission them. Rather stopping them they spread their offices and seminaries throughout the country (Ahmad, 2015).

Earlier the state patronage helped these radical elements to flourish across the country but after 9/11 the change in policy completely changed the dynamics. The crackdown on religious groups and mining of state patronage further frustrated these elements. They were not ready to abandon the control and power they enjoyed over the years. Their religious rhetoric influenced the young minds at great extent and the fear of losing that status led to exhibit more anger. According to Hashmi this situation is a threat to their existence and they felt unsafe. In order to protect themselves they are ready to go any extent even to drift away from ideological foundation of Pakistan because it only matters if establishment supports them and their interpretation of Sharia otherwise Pakistan has no theocratic foundation.

## **Conclusion**

The political Islam has achieved a solid mass support from all social classes. In Pakistan radicalism has proven itself as a powerful and undisputed force to control the government policies and in some instances, it is nearly gotten "out of hand" converting the whole blame on the failing governments. The evolution of the political Islam has gravely impacted the political evolution of the country itself. It has driven the already divided society into orthodoxy, radicalization, extremism and religious exclusiveness.

Jinnah created Pakistan in 1947 and he made it clear on his inaugural speech of national assembly on 11th August declared that there will be no difference in the status of Muslims and non-Muslims and they would be equal in newly born Pakistan. Jinnah had secular approach and intended to establish such state where all minorities had equal rights. He included all religious representatives in his cabinet. But during last couple of decades the things have become worst due to number of factors. These years radicalized the Pakistani society to the extent that there is no easy way back to normality. The hatred is bred in society through educational curriculum and judicial system which is failed to protect minorities.

Pakistan's history is evident that radicalism and violence cannot solely be attributed to superstructure and the ideology. There are number of reasons like historic, economic, social, political and material which are helping in patronizing radicalism (Rashid, 2008). Although there are number of reasons which helped to increase radicalism in the Pakistan but political and power struggle of the ruling either belong to civilian or military background remains the main cause of this spread and increase. They redefined the identity of Pakistan from a progressive tolerant and peaceful state to a harsh, intolerant, literalist and theological state. Apart from increasing education, economic condition and promotes values like peaceful co-existence through media would help to improve situation but the real help will

be through promoting democratic values. Military's influence and interference must be limited. As long as "national security" remains national priority as defined by military, Pakistan cannot step forward in right direction in future. The paradigm of national security solely favors and defends the interests of ruling elite. Military interventions weakened national institutions and democratic mechanism. Pakistan needs a paradigmatic shift to re-shape and re-order the elite's ideology which is based on religion and will start to reduce divisions and hierarchies in the society.

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